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Preface ix
Preface
This report brings together the views of a Commission of 19 leaders, mostly 
from developing countries, and 2 academics, Bob Solow and me. The lead-
ers carry with them decades of accumulated experience in the challenging 
work of making policies that infl uence millions of people’s lives: their job 
prospects, their health, their education, their access to basic amenities, such 
as water, public transportation, and light in their homes; the quality of their 
day-to-day lives; as well as the lives and opportunities enjoyed by their 
children. 
They have wrestled with the complexity of all the basic ingredients of 
growth strategies: budget allocations, taxes, exchange rates, trade and 
industrial policies, regulations, privatizations, and monetary policies, to 
name just a few. Sometimes these choices seem remote from people’s day-
to-day lives. But they have a tremendous impact. 
It has been an honor for me to serve with them and also a breathtak-
ing, high-speed learning process. I hope we are successful in sharing their 
insights, and those of a dedicated development and policy community of 
academics and practitioners, through this report and prominently through 
the papers, workshops, and case studies that go along with it.
The number of people living in high-growth environments or in countries 
with OECD per capita income levels has increased in the past 30 years by a 
factor of four, from 1 billion to about 4 billion. Growth has accelerated in 
the global economy and in an even wider set of developing countries. There 
is, perhaps for the fi rst time in history, a reasonable chance of transform-
x Preface
ing the quality of life and creative opportunities for the vast majority of 
humanity. This report is an attempt to increase the likelihood that the hope 
becomes a reality.
Formidable challenges exist, to be sure: climate change, global gover-
nance, rising interdependence, volatility, risk, and inclusiveness which 
entails making sure everyone experiences the benefi ts. But these should not 
exceed our capacity for ingenuity, creativity, and empathy.
Our approach has been to try to assimilate and digest the cumulative 
experience of growth and development as well as careful and thoughtful 
policy analysis in a wide spectrum of fi elds. We then seek to share this under-
standing with political leaders and policy makers in developing countries, 
including the next generation of leaders; with an international community 
of advisers; and with investors, policy makers, and leaders in advanced 
countries and international institutions who share the same goals.
We started our work two years ago, in April 2006. We focused on sus-
tained growth, not because it is the fi nal goal, but because sustained growth 
enables and is essential for things that people care about: poverty reduction, 
productive employment, education, health, and the opportunity to be cre-
ative. We also agreed that our work needed to be informed by knowledge 
at the frontier in all the areas the Commissioners thought relevant for eco-
nomic growth and development.
This led us to hold 12 workshops on a wide array of policy areas, all 
related to growth and development. In the workshops, more than 300 dis-
tinguished academics wrote and presented papers and discussed the issues. 
I want to take this opportunity to express my deep appreciation to my aca-
demic colleagues who joined in with enthusiasm, insight, and generosity in 
committing their time. Commissioners participated in the workshops as their 
schedules permitted. We focused on what we know and also on what we do 
not know. The whole enterprise would not have been possible without this 
rigorous assessment of the state of the art in growth-oriented policies. 
The discussions among Commissioners over six meetings in New York, 
Singapore, Suzhou, London, and Washington, DC, and the 12 workshops 
helped clarify a large number of theoretical and empirical issues. It didn’t 
take long to learn that in a number of areas the experts did not agree among 
themselves; nor do the Commissioners agree in all areas. The Commission 
does not think it has to settle the outstanding issues, or arbitrate ongoing 
debates. That will be dealt with over time, as academic and policy research 
progresses. It does believe that understanding the incompleteness of our 
knowledge, as well as the benefi ts and risks of certain kinds of policies, con-
stitutes a useful and important input to those who have to take decisions 
under conditions of uncertainty and incomplete information.
The work has been rendered possible by the engagement and commit-
ment of a large number of individuals. I am particularly grateful to the 
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Commissioners who had no hesitation in spending long hours in discussions 
in Commission meetings, in the workshops, and in helping me understand 
the nature of the economic, political, and social challenges that developing 
countries face. 
The Commission and I have relied on a working group—I should say 
a hard-working group: Pedro Carneiro, Homi Kharas, Danny Leipziger, 
Edwin Lim, Paul Romer, Bob Solow, and Roberto Zagha. Together we 
have tried to assimilate a vast amount of material; organize and review the 
work prepared for the workshops; and decide on principal themes for the 
report. Bob Solow is revered for the depth of his economic insight and for 
his modesty and generosity. It is impossible to overstate the impact he has 
had on the evolution of the thinking of the Commissioners, and on me in 
particular. 
Our editor, Simon Cox, played a particularly important role. Seldom 
does one fi nd an editor who so deeply and thoroughly understands the logic 
and structure of the argument, and then expresses it with simplicity, clarity, 
and vividness. 
A dedicated group of staff at the World Bank—Maya Brahmam, Muriel 
Darlington, Heiko Hesse, Teng Jiang, Diana Manevskaya, and Dorota 
Nowak—has organized every aspect of the work of the Commission, the 
workshops, the outreach strategy, publication of the report, and numerous 
working papers and reports. I thank them for their dedication, effi ciency, 
and grace under intense pressure. Their efforts have produced the work-
shops, publications, communication and outreach activities, and the Web 
site, with more to come. In addition, the publication team has worked under 
enormous pressure and moving deadlines. I thank them for their patience, 
attention to detail, creativity in design, and can-do attitude. They are Aziz 
Gökdemir, Stephen McGroarty, Denise Bergeron, Nancy Lammers, and San-
tiago Pombo. I also want to thank Tim Cullen and his colleagues for their 
expertise and help in communicating the work of the Commission.
The whole enterprise was rendered possible by individuals and institu-
tions that thought the project important, and decided to support it. I thank 
the governments of Australia, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom; the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation; and the World Bank 
Group for their interest and support.
It will be clear that it is not possible to name everyone who has contrib-
uted to this effort in the preface. I have included in an appendix the names 
of all those in various categories whose efforts made this possible. 
I want to thank the vice chair of the Commission, Danny Leipziger. His 
many years of experience with growth and development, his generosity 
with his own time and in making available the considerable resources of the 
World Bank, have been invaluable. I should also say that this project, the 
Commission, owes its origin to Danny and his colleague Roberto Zagha in 
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the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management network in the Bank. 
They thought and I agreed that the centrality of growth in achieving a num-
ber of development objectives, including poverty reduction, especially, and 
the availability of a growing body of research and experience, made this 
project timely.
Finally, I worked with one individual pretty much every day for two 
years. He is Roberto Zagha, the secretary to the Commission. Without 
even the slightest risk of exaggeration, none of this would have happened 
without him. The workshops, an essential ingredient of the process, were 
entirely his doing. His range of knowledge of the relevant work in develop-
ment is amazing. His respect for, and his personal relationships with, lead-
ers in academia and in practice have been the glue that held this all together. 
He is generous, modest, rigorous in his thinking and interactions, and cares 
deeply about the end goal. For me it has been enormously rewarding to be 
his working partner in this effort.
Michael Spence
June 2008
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Overview
Since 1950, 13 economies have grown at an average rate of 7 percent a 
year or more for 25 years or longer. At that pace of expansion, an econ-
omy almost doubles in size every decade. This report is about sustained, 
high growth of this kind: its causes, consequences, and internal dynamics.1
One might call it a report on “economic miracles,” except that we believe 
the term is a misnomer. Unlike miracles, sustained, high growth can be 
explained and, we hope, repeated.
Growth is not an end in itself. But it makes it possible to achieve other 
important objectives of individuals and societies. It can spare people en 
masse from poverty and drudgery. Nothing else ever has. It also creates 
the resources to support health care, education, and the other Millennium 
Development Goals to which the world has committed itself. In short, we 
take the view that growth is a necessary, if not suffi cient, condition for 
broader development, enlarging the scope for individuals to be productive 
and creative. 
1 It refl ects the views of a Commission consisting of 19 well-known and experienced policy, government, 
and business leaders, mostly from the developing world, and two renowned economists. It was written 
over two years during which the Commission interacted, consulted with, and learned from leading 
academics, business leaders, policy makers, and NGOs. The report refl ects the learning over this period 
and is informed by the Commission members’ own experience.
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Growth Dynamics and the Global Economy
The report identifi es some of the distinctive characteristics of high-growth 
economies and asks how other developing countries can emulate them. It 
does not provide a formula for policy makers to apply—no generic formula 
exists. Each country has specifi c characteristics and historical experiences 
that must be refl ected in its growth strategy. But the report does offer a 
framework that should help policy makers create a growth strategy of their 
own. It will not give them a full set of answers, but it should at least help 
them ask the right questions. Fast, sustained growth does not happen spon-
taneously. It requires a long-term commitment by a country’s political lead-
ers, a commitment pursued with patience, perseverance, and pragmatism.
Growth of 7 percent a year, sustained over 25 years, was unheard of 
before the latter half of the 20th century. It is possible only because the 
world economy is now more open and integrated. This allows fast-growing 
economies to import ideas, technologies, and know-how from the rest of 
the world. One conduit for this knowledge is foreign direct investment, 
which several high-growth economies actively courted; another is foreign 
education, which often creates lasting international networks. Since learning 
something is easier than inventing it, fast learners can rapidly gain ground 
on the leading economies. Sustainable, high growth is catch-up growth. 
And the global economy is the essential resource.
The open world economy also offers developing countries a deep, elastic 
market for their exports. Since the division of labor is limited by the extent 
of the market, this extensive world demand allows countries to specialize in 
new export lines and improve their productivity in manifold ways.
Is a turn outward the only route to growth? Some economies have 
instead looked inward, competing with imports in the home market, rather 
than competing for foreign custom in the world market. These strategies 
have occasionally succeeded in spurring investment, increasing the size and 
effi ciency of domestic producers. They also avoid the risks and dislocations 
of opening up to foreign competition too abruptly. Nevertheless, growth 
strategies that rely exclusively on domestic demand eventually reach their 
limits. The home market is usually too small to sustain growth for long, 
and it does not give an economy the same freedom to specialize in whatever 
it is best at producing.
Catch-up growth is also made possible by an abundant labor supply. 
As the economy expands and branches out, new ventures draw underem-
ployed workers out of traditional agriculture into more productive work 
in the cities. Resources, especially labor, must be mobile. No country has 
industrialized without also urbanizing, however chaotically.
Economies in high-growth mode are transforming themselves structur-
ally. To quote from the report, “The growth of GDP may be measured 
up in the macroeconomic treetops, but all the action is in the microeco-
“Our objective was 
not to summarize the 
state of knowledge, 
but to prepare a report 
short enough for prime 
ministers and presidents 
to read, a report which 
might help them think 
through the nature of 
growth strategies and 
ask the right questions 
of their ministers and 
advisers.”
—Montek Singh Ahluwalia
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nomic undergrowth, where new limbs sprout, and dead wood is cleared 
away.” Most growth-oriented policies and reforms are designed to foster 
this microeconomics of creation and destruction, and, crucially, to protect 
people who are adversely affected by these dynamics.
Thanks to abundant labor and deep world demand, the speed of growth 
in the early stages of development is limited primarily by the pace of invest-
ment (public and private together). This investment is itself affected by the 
availability of savings. High-growth economies typically set aside a for-
midable share of their income: a national saving rate of 20–25 percent or 
higher, is not unusual. In principle, countries could rely more on foreign 
capital to fi nance their investment needs. But capital infl ows over the past 
several decades have a mixed record. Our view is that foreign saving is an 
imperfect substitute for domestic saving, including public saving, to fi nance 
the investment a booming economy requires. 
Leadership and Effective Government
Successful cases share a further characteristic: an increasingly capable, cred-
ible, and committed government. Growth at such a quick pace, over such 
a long period, requires strong political leadership. Policy makers have to 
choose a growth strategy, communicate their goals to the public, and con-
vince people that the future rewards are worth the effort, thrift, and eco-
nomic upheaval. They will succeed only if their promises are credible and 
inclusive, reassuring people that they or their children will enjoy their full 
share of the fruits of growth.
Such leadership requires patience, a long planning horizon, and an 
unwavering focus on the goal of inclusive growth. In several cases, fast-
growing economies were overseen by a single-party government that could 
expect to remain in power for a long period of time. In other cases, multi-
party democracies found ways to be patient and maintain a consistent focus 
over time. Rival political parties can, for example, agree on a bipartisan 
growth strategy, which they each follow during their term in power. Even 
if a formal pact is never made, a successful growth strategy, commanding 
the confi dence of the public, may outlast the government that introduced 
it. Experience suggests that strong, technocratic teams, focused on long-
term growth, can also provide some institutional memory and continuity 
of policy. This stability and experience can be particularly valuable during 
political upheavals, because new systems of collective decision making can 
take a long while to bed down and function effi ciently.
Just as growth is not the ultimate objective, reforms aren’t either. Both 
are means to ends. Reforms may be admirable and represent major achieve-
ments, but if growth does not accelerate, or if large numbers of people do 
not feel any improvement in their circumstances, then there is more work 
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to do. Relying on markets to allocate resources effi ciently is clearly neces-
sary (there is no known, effective substitute), but that is not the same thing 
as letting some combination of markets and a menu of reforms determine 
outcomes. 
Wedded to the goal of high growth, governments should be pragmatic in 
their pursuit of it. Orthodoxies apply only so far. This report is the product 
of two years of inquiry and debate, led by experienced policy makers, busi-
ness people and two Nobel prize-winning academics, who heard from lead-
ing authorities on everything from macroeconomic policy to urbanization. 
If there were just one valid growth doctrine, we are confi dent we would 
have found it. 
Economists know how markets work, and they can say with some con-
fi dence how a mature market economy will respond to their policy pre-
scriptions. But mature markets rely on deep institutional underpinnings, 
institutions that defi ne property rights, enforce contracts, convey prices, 
and bridge informational gaps between buyers and sellers.
Developing countries often lack these market and regulatory institutions. 
Indeed, an important part of development is precisely the creation of these 
institutionalized capabilities. Even without them, growth can occur, and 
these institutions can co-evolve with the economy as it expands. However, 
we do not know in detail how these institutions can be engineered, and 
policy makers cannot always know how a market will function without 
them. The impact of policy shifts and reforms is therefore harder to predict 
accurately in a developing economy. At this stage, our models or predictive 
devices are, in important respects, incomplete.
It is, therefore, prudent for governments to pursue an experimen-
tal approach to the implementation of economic policy. The principle is 
expressed well by Deng Xiaoping’s oft-quoted dictum to “cross the river 
by feeling for the stones.” Governments should sometimes proceed step by 
step, avoiding sudden shifts in policy where the potential risks outweigh the 
benefi ts. This will limit the potential damage of any policy misstep, making 
it easier for the government and the economy to right itself. Likewise, each 
footfall should represent a small trial or experiment, a “feeling about” for 
the best way forward. 
Making policy is only part of the battle. Policies must also be faithfully 
implemented and tolerably administered. An effective government appa-
ratus is not built overnight and requires constant attention. A culture of 
honest public service must be fostered and maintained. The administration 
must also attract and retain talented people, by offering better pay, promo-
tions, and recognition to offi cials who can measurably improve the public 
sector’s performance.
Government is not the proximate cause of growth. That role falls to 
the private sector, to investment and entrepreneurship responding to price 
signals and market forces. But stable, honest, and effective government is 
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critical in the long run. The remit of the government, for example, includes 
maintaining price stability and fi scal responsibility, both of which infl uence 
the risks and returns faced by private investors.
In recent decades governments were advised to “stabilize, privatize and 
liberalize.” There is merit in what lies behind this injunction—governments 
should not try to do too much, replacing markets or closing the economy 
off from the rest of the world. But we believe this prescription defi nes the 
role of government too narrowly. Just because governments are sometimes 
clumsy and sometimes errant, does not mean they should be written out 
of the script. On the contrary, as the economy grows and develops, active, 
pragmatic governments have crucial roles to play.
Sustained, high growth is not easy. If it were, the list of successful cases 
would be longer. Some countries struggle to start growth; others fail to 
sustain it. Some grow quickly, but reach a plateau when they reach middle-
income. A fast-growing economy is a moving target. Bad policies are often 
good policies applied for too long. And just as a country’s growth strategy 
must evolve with the economy, a country’s politics must as well. Prosper-
ity will create a middle class whose voice will need to be recognized in the 
political process, both locally and centrally.
 Having described the art of policy making, we now turn to policy ingre-
dients themselves. The number of desirable reforms and outlays a govern-
ment might consider at any point of time will vastly exceed its reach and 
budget. A coherent growth strategy will therefore set priorities, deciding 
where to devote a government’s energies and resources. These choices are 
extremely important. They should also be country- and context-specifi c, 
responding to widely varying initial conditions. This report cannot there-
fore set priorities for policy makers. It can only identify the policies that 
need attention.
The policy underpinnings of sustained, high growth create an environ-
ment for high levels of investment, job creation, competition, mobility of 
resources, social protections, equity, and inclusiveness. It would be going a 
little too far to describe them all as necessary conditions. Our view is that 
an understanding of the dynamics and a focused attention on the policy 
foundations will signifi cantly increase the chances of accelerating growth. 
Conversely, persistent inattention to them will eventually harm it. There 
are many different recipes for pasta. The precise ingredients and timing are 
different for each. But if you leave out the salt or boil it too long, the results 
are distinctly inferior. 
Selected Policy Ingredients
No country has sustained rapid growth without also keeping up impressive 
rates of public investment—in infrastructure, education, and health. Far 
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from crowding out private investment, this spending crowds it in. It paves 
the way for new industries to emerge and raises the return to any private 
venture that benefi ts from healthy, educated workers, passable roads, and 
reliable electricity.
Unfortunately, we discovered, infrastructure spending is widely neglected. 
Often it is not even measured. We also found that the quantity of educa-
tion (years of schooling, rates of enrollment) in many countries was more 
impressive than the results: literacy, numeracy, and other cognitive skills. 
Needless to say, it is the results that matter to growth.
Health is of deep value to people, regardless of its impact on growth. 
Nonetheless, the economic consequences of hunger, malnutrition, and dis-
ease should not be forgotten. We wish to highlight one example in particu-
lar: if children are undernourished in the womb or in infancy, their cognitive 
development can be permanently impaired. This reduces their productivity 
and their ability to benefi t from an education. It is also deeply unfair. The 
rapid rise in world food prices, which has made it harder for poor families 
to feed themselves adequately, therefore poses a fi rst-order threat to long-
term growth. While higher food prices may create long-run opportunities 
for developing countries, the suddenness of the increase and the inevitable 
lags in raising supply have produced an emergency in the short term that 
needs to be addressed.
Growth entails a structural transformation of the economy, from agri-
culture to manufacturing, from a rural workforce to an urban one. This 
transformation is the result of competitive pressure. Governments com-
mitted to growth must therefore liberalize product markets, allowing new, 
more productive fi rms to enter and obsolete fi rms to exit. They must also 
create room to maneuver in the labor market, so that new industries can 
quickly create jobs and workers can move freely to fi ll them. These reforms 
are easier to recommend than to enact. If a wholesale overhaul of the labor 
laws is politically impossible, policy makers should instead seek a pragmatic 
compromise that fulfi lls the aspirations of jobseekers and is not vetoed by 
politically infl uential jobholders.
While creative destruction is economically natural, it doesn’t feel natural 
to those displaced in the process. Policy makers should resist calls to protect 
industries, fi rms, or jobs, but they should endeavor to protect people. Per-
haps the best protections a government can provide are education, which 
makes it easier to pick up new skills, and a strong rate of job creation, 
which makes it easy to fi nd new employment. Beyond that, governments 
should also establish social safety nets—which provide a source of income 
to people between jobs—and ensure uninterrupted access to basic services. 
These policies are both ethical and practical. Without them, popular sup-
port for a growth strategy will quickly erode.
Economic insecurity is not confi ned to the developing world. In a num-
ber of high-income countries, inequality is rising as median wages stagnate. 
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The cause of these trends is disputed. But whatever the true culprit, the 
public tends to blame globalization. As a result, they are increasingly skep-
tical of the case for an open economy, despite the great gains it brings. The 
Commission thinks governments should try harder to spread the benefi ts 
of globalization more equitably and to protect people from economic dis-
location, whatever the cause. Support for an open global economy depends 
upon it. 
The Commission strongly believes that growth strategies cannot succeed 
without a commitment to equality of opportunity, giving everyone a fair 
chance to enjoy the fruits of growth. But equal opportunities are no guar-
antee of equal outcomes. Indeed, in the early stages of growth, there is a 
natural tendency for income gaps to widen. Governments should seek to 
contain this inequality, the Commission believes, at the bottom and top 
ends of the income spectrum. Otherwise, the economy’s progress may be 
jeopardized by divisive politics, protest, and even violent confl ict. Again, if 
the ethical case does not persuade, the pragmatic one should. 
The education of girls provides one strong test of a government’s com-
mitment to equality of opportunity. Many formidable obstacles stop girls 
from completing their schooling: family fi nancial pressure, lack of safety, 
even things as basic as inadequate toilet facilities. But if these obstacles 
can be overcome, the payoff is very high. Educated women have fewer, 
healthier children, and they have them at older ages. Their children are then 
more successful in school, largely because they benefi t from their mother’s 
education. Educating girls and integrating them into the labor force is thus 
one way to break an intergenerational cycle of poverty.
Governments in the high-growth economies were not free-market pur-
ists. They tried a variety of policies to help diversify exports or sustain 
competitiveness. These included industrial policies to promote investment 
in new sectors, and managed exchange rates, shepherded by selected capital 
controls and reserve accumulation. These policies are highly controversial. 
Within the Commission and the broader policy community, there is a wide 
range of opinion about their benefi ts and risks. We have tried to set out 
the rationale for these policies and to identify the potential problems they 
create. An awareness of both seems important and useful. If they try these 
expedients, governments should be clear about what they are trying to 
achieve and be quick to reverse course if the intended results do not mate-
rialize. The policies should also be transitory, unless there are compelling 
externalities or market failures that require their retention. Any profi t-seek-
ing activity that needs permanent subsidies or price distortions to survive 
does not deserve to do so. 
The environment has often been neglected in the early stages of growth, 
leaving air thick with particulates and water contaminated with effl uents. 
We believe this is a mistake, and one that is extremely expensive to fi x in the 
future. The report argues that growth strategies should take account of the 
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cost of pollution from the outset, even if they do not immediately adopt the 
toughest environmental standards upheld in rich countries. The report also 
calls on developing countries to wean themselves off fuel subsidies. These 
subsidies impose a mounting fi scal burden as energy prices rise, diverting 
money that would be better spent on neglected public infrastructure. They 
also skew patterns of private investment in the economy towards smoke-
stack industries and energy-intensive techniques. Finally, these energy sub-
sidies will inhibit the participation of developing countries in global efforts 
to cut greenhouse gases. 
Countries Facing Special Challenges
The countries to whom this report is addressed all share a need for faster 
growth. But they are not otherwise alike. Some are large, others small; 
some rich in natural resources, others with nothing but their labor to sell. 
Some are keen to know how to start growth; others worried about how to 
recover it. The report identifi es four groupings of countries that appear to 
face particular challenges in generating and sustaining high growth. These 
are: 
1. African Countries: The countries of Sub-Saharan Africa must contend 
with unhelpful borders, bequeathed by colonialism, and the mixed bless-
ing of unusually rich natural resources. A striking proportion of Africa’s 
population lives in landlocked countries that under different historical 
circumstances would probably be provinces of a larger political unit. 
But Africa’s immediate past is more hopeful. It has grown by 6 percent a 
year in recent years and its commodity exports are fetching high prices. 
We look at the steps required to sustain this momentum, focusing in par-
ticular on how African countries can raise investment and diversify their 
exports.
2. Small States: The world economy is dotted with a large number of very 
small states, where the per capita cost of government and public services 
is inevitably high. Because of their small size, they have little scope to 
diversify their economies, which leaves them highly vulnerable to eco-
nomic shocks. The answers lie in embracing the world economy, forming 
regional clubs, and outsourcing some government functions. 
3. Countries rich in natural resources: Economies blessed with abundant 
oil, minerals, or other natural resources should be able to invest the 
“rents” or proceeds at home, raising their growth potential. But the 
historical experience has most often been the reverse. The pitfalls are 
well known. Sometimes the state sells extraction rights too cheaply or 
taxes resource revenues too lightly. Sometimes the money it raises is sto-
len or squandered by rent-seeking elites and vested interests. When the 
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money is invested, it is not always invested wisely or transparently. And 
by providing a ready source of foreign-exchange, natural resources can 
also reduce incentives for diversifying exports, a predicament known 
as “Dutch disease.” States will improve on this sorry historical record 
only if they capture an appropriate share of the resource rents; save a 
judicious amount overseas; and set clear, growth-oriented priorities for 
absorbing the remainder at home.
4. Middle-income countries: Economies often struggle to maintain their 
growth momentum as they narrow the gap with high-income countries. 
As wages rise, they steadily lose their comparative advantage in labor-
intensive industries. Eventually those industries fade away. Increasingly, 
growth must spring from knowledge, innovation, and a deeper stock of 
physical and human capital. Services also assume a more prominent role 
in the economic mix. The growth strategies that served an economy well 
at lower income levels cease to apply. Instead of providing targeted sup-
port to labor-intensive sectors, governments must expand higher educa-
tion to support the growing service sector of the economy. Skills must 
be upgraded across the spectrum of employment. Otherwise, the disap-
pearance of unskilled manufacturing jobs will leave the less skilled and 
less educated part of the population stranded without good employment 
options.
New Global Challenges
Countries embarking on a high-growth strategy today must overcome some 
global trends their predecessors did not face. These include global warm-
ing; the falling relative price of manufactured goods and rising relative price 
of commodities, including energy; swelling discontent with globalization in 
advanced and some developing economies; the aging of the world’s popula-
tion, even as poorer countries struggle to cope with a “youth bulge”; and a 
growing mismatch between global problems—in economics, health, climate 
change, and other areas—and weakly coordinated international responses. 
Global Warming and Climate Change
Climate change is the quintessential global challenge: the harm greenhouse 
gases do is not confi ned to the country that emitted them. Indeed, poorer 
countries, which have contributed least to the problem, may suffer the 
most. They may need to take defensive action against the consequences 
of climate change sooner rather than later. We don’t know how soon. But 
international contingency plans—to provide help to a country in case of 
need—are underway and should be speeded up. 
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Preventing climate change (or “mitigation” as the experts call it) is bet-
ter than palliating its effects. But how can we cut carbon emissions to safe 
levels by midcentury while also accommodating the growth of developing 
countries? At the moment the debate has reached a conceptual impasse. 
Technology offers one answer. Advanced economies should promote the 
creation of new techniques for cutting carbon and saving energy. The world 
needs to reduce radically the energy- and carbon-intensity of global growth. 
That is the only way developing countries can grow rapidly without sub-
jecting the world to potentially catastrophic global warming.
Second, global mitigation efforts need to satisfy the dual criteria of effi -
ciency (that is, cutting the most emissions at the least cost) and fairness. 
In the interests of fairness, advanced economies, which are responsible for 
most of the problem, should take the lead in setting medium-term targets 
for cuts in their own emissions.
Many people also argue that developing countries should commit to lon-
ger term, 50-year emissions targets. After all, these countries are respon-
sible for a growing share of gases in the atmosphere. But this, we feel, is 
the wrong approach. Poor developing countries can make a bigger, quicker 
contribution by cooperating in cross-border mitigation projects. These 
projects meet the dual criteria of effi ciency and fairness. The cuts are made 
in poor countries, which is effi cient. But the costs are borne by richer coun-
tries, which is fair. Beyond this contribution, developing countries also need 
to improve energy effi ciency, import new technologies rapidly, and elimi-
nate energy subsidies. 
Convergence in long-term per capita emissions is both feasible and desir-
able. As countries approach high-income levels, they should be entitled to 
the same per capita emissions as other advanced economies. These entitle-
ments must be consistent with a safe global level of emissions. This limit 
is currently estimated to be 14.8 gigatons per year, or 2.3 tons per person. 
The current global per capita CO2 emissions are 4.8 tons, about double the 
safe level. 
Changing Relative Prices
In recent years, the relative price of manufactured goods has fallen, and 
commodity prices have risen. The rising price of food has created nutritional 
emergencies in some countries, which demand an immediate response. 
Looking forward, countries and international organizations need to be bet-
ter prepared for sudden jumps in the price of essential commodities. It will 
be an ongoing feature of the global economy.
There is some evidence that growth in developing countries, princi-
pally China, has depressed the relative price of manufactured goods. This 
has raised the question of whether the growth strategies outlined in this 
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report—strategies based on rapid job creation in labor-intensive export 
industries—will work in the future. We believe they will. With help from 
experts, we examined the so-called “adding up” problem: if many devel-
oping economies expanded their exports of labor-intensive manufactures, 
would the world market be able to absorb them all? We reached a positive 
conclusion: the growth of developing countries, at least in the early stages, 
will not be blocked by further rapid declines in the relative price of manu-
factured goods, in part because the growth of emerging markets will help 
fuel future demand.
Demographics
It is clear that the world population is aging rapidly, due to dramatically 
increased longevity combined with relatively low fertility rates. It is also 
clear that this trend will require many countries, both developed and devel-
oping, to change their pension and social security systems, and revise their 
expectations about retirement. What is not clear is whether aging will cause 
a slowdown in global growth and a narrowing of opportunities for develop-
ing countries. The answer depends on how quickly pension arrangements 
change and how quickly people adapt their behavior, by retiring later, for 
example. Timely adaptation will minimize the impact on global growth.
In a signifi cant number of poorer countries, the demographics run directly 
counter to the global trend: high fertility; reduced longevity in some cases, 
due to diseases like HIV/AIDS; and an increasingly youthful population. 
This raises the danger of widespread youth unemployment. To avert this 
danger, countries need to grow faster. Migration, while not alone suffi cient 
to solve the problem of youth unemployment, would help alleviate it. It 
would also benefi t those host countries with an aging population. Well-
managed long-term migration and well-supervised programs of temporary 
migration for work should be part of 21st century globalization. 
Global Governance
A number of trends broached by the report demand a coordinated, multi-
lateral response from the world’s economies. These trends include the grow-
ing clout of developing countries, international fi nancial spillovers, and the 
unbalanced and probably unsustainable pattern of saving and spending in 
the world economy. 
Developing countries cannot grow without the support of the advanced 
economies. In particular, they need access to the open global trading sys-
tem. They may also need some latitude to promote their exports, until their 
economies have matured and their competitive position has improved. The 
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successful completion of the Doha round is substantively and symbolically 
important. 
It will take time to develop a new “architecture” of institutions and 
rules to govern the world economy. In the meantime there will remain a 
mismatch between our deep interdependence and our limited capacity to 
coordinate our regulatory responses. This mismatch will create risks that 
countries will have to insure themselves against. 
The recent success of many big developing countries raises an old ques-
tion with renewed urgency: are there natural limits to growth? The ris-
ing price of commodities suggests that the world’s endowment of natural 
resources may not easily accommodate the aspirations of poor countries. 
Likewise, the threat of global warming will grow as the developing world’s 
industry expands.
We do not know if limits to growth exist, or how generous those limits 
will be. The answer will depend on our ingenuity and technology, on fi nd-
ing new ways to create goods and services that people value on a fi nite 
foundation of natural resources. This is likely to be the ultimate challenge 
of the coming century. Growth and poverty reduction in the future will 
depend on our ability to meet it. 
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Introduction
The Commission and Its Mandate
What do we know about economic growth? And what practical implica-
tions can policy makers draw from that knowledge? Those are both daunt-
ing questions, no easier to answer than they are to ignore. Since April 2006, 
they have guided the work of the Commission on Growth and Development, 
an independent group of policy makers, business leaders, and scholars, sup-
ported by the World Bank, the Hewlett Foundation, and the governments 
of Australia, Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Drawing on 
academic research, case histories, and practical experience, the Commission 
has weighed what is known about generating and sustaining fast growth in 
developing countries. 
This assessment is meant to be useful to senior political and policy lead-
ers, those whose job it is to craft a developing country’s economic reforms. 
We hope it provides a framework within which policy makers can develop 
country-specifi c growth strategies of their own. We do not give policy mak-
ers all the answers, but we hope to help them ask the right questions. To 
this end, the majority of the members of the Commission are leaders from 
developing countries. Our intention is to share their experiences, priorities, 
successes, and failures with their peers and the next generation of leaders.
The Commission understands that growth is not an end in itself. It is 
instead a means to several ends that matter profoundly to individuals and 
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societies. Growth is, above all, the surest way to free a society from pov-
erty. Without it, a stark lack of material resources will tend to dominate 
everything else, narrowing people’s horizons, consuming them in a daily 
struggle to get by, and depriving them of the chance to fulfi ll their potential. 
Prosperity, on the other hand, frees people to make choices, and allows 
a more equal distribution of opportunities. Human development, under-
In the last 30 years absolute poverty has fallen substan-
tially. This is almost entirely due to sustained growth. 
The fall is likely to continue because India is likely to 
grow at a fast pace for another 15 years, when it will 
catch up to where China is today, and China has another 
600 million people in agriculture yet to move into more 
productive employment in urban areas. 
In a very poor country, it is arithmetically impos-
sible to reduce poverty without growth. There is no 
one to redistribute from. Conversely, if everyone is 
poor, growth will reduce poverty regardless of how it 
is distributed. 
But some kinds of growth reduce poverty more 
effectively than others. The distribution of income can 
change as average incomes rise, becoming more or less 
equal. The expansion of smallholder farming, for exam-
ple, cuts poverty quickly, raising the incomes of rural 
cultivators and reducing the price of the poor’s food bill. 
Growth in labor-intensive manufacturing also raises the 
incomes of the poor. The expansion of capital-intensive 
mining industries, on the other hand, can result in job-
less growth, making little impression on poverty.
One study shows that when average household 
incomes rise by 2 percent, poverty rates fall by about 
twice as much on average. But the range is wide, from 
as little as 1.2 percent to as much as 7 percent (95 per-
cent confi dence interval).a
Such studies look at spells of growth, some of 
them short-lived. This report is about sustained growth, 
lasting more than two decades. Over that timescale, 
growth almost always bites deeply into poverty. In 
some cases, it eliminates extreme poverty entirely. 
However growth starts, sustaining it will usually require 
mass job creation, raising the scarcity value of labor. As 
a result, wages rise, spreading the proceeds of growth 
more widely. In short, the most propoor growth is sus-
tained growth.
This virtue of sustained growth is sometimes 
missed, because people confuse rising inequality with 
a failure to make progress against poverty. In econo-
mies without growth, a widening gap between rich and 
poor does indeed entail an increase in poverty. But in 
fast-growing economies, it is possible and quite normal 
for poverty to fall even as inequality rises.
The higher a country’s average income level, the 
more complex is the relationship between growth and 
poverty reduction. In Latin America, for example, coun-
tries with incomes as high as $4,000 per head never-
theless contain large numbers of poor people. These 
impoverished populations are left behind by the rest 
of the economy, lacking access to formal jobs, capital 
markets, and public services. In such cases, growth is 
clearly not suffi cient to reduce poverty. It may not be 
necessary either, because some progress can be made 
by redistributing income, assets, or access to services. 
But it is much easier to carry out a program of redis-
tribution if the country is also growing. The proceeds 
of growth can then be redistributed without anyone’s 
standard of living having to fall. That makes the politics 
of redistribution much easier. After all, the richer sec-
tions of society will settle for smaller gains in income 
more readily than they will accept a loss of income.
a. Ravallion, Martin. 2001. “Growth, Inequality, and Poverty: Look-
ing Beyond Averages.” Policy Research Working Paper 2558, 
World Bank, Washington, DC.
Box 1: Growth and poverty
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stood in its broadest sense, is both an “output” of growth and one of the 
most important inputs. We have focused on sustained growth because it 
creates options for individuals and societies that are diffi cult or impossible 
to achieve otherwise.
In the developed world, the great questions of growth and poverty are 
inseparable from debates about aid. Many believe foreign aid can help raise 
growth and fi ght poverty. They are probably right. Aid, however, is not the 
focus of this report. Donors can help governments in some poor countries 
by relaxing their fi nancial limitations. But in many countries, the lack of aid 
dollars is not the binding constraint and in others it is only one constraint 
among many. It is not a substitute for leadership, good strategy, and effec-
tive implementation. 
A great deal of aid is not intended to raise growth per se. It makes a con-
tribution to the fi ght against disease and other social ills—worthy goals in 
themselves, whatever their effect on the economy. Other categories of aid 
do try to lift growth, by providing fi nance or expertise or both. If the logic 
of this report is compelling, it will be useful to these donors as they look for 
rewarding areas of investment.
The Commission asked distinguished academics and practitioners to 
assess the state of knowledge in a wide range of policy areas, from exchange 
rate intervention to school feeding programs. The result is a rich collection 
of papers, country case studies, and workshop deliberations available on 
the Commission’s Web site.1 In some cases there is widespread agreement. 
In others our knowledge is incomplete. In still others there are controversy 
and ongoing disagreement about the benefi ts and risks of a policy. 
This report is not a summary of all those assessments, but a distillation 
of them, guided by the commissioners’ own experience. Our goal has been 
to identify the key insights and policy levers that help countries raise and 
sustain the pace of growth and poverty reduction. 
The Organization of the Report
The report has four main parts. In the fi rst, we review the 13 economies 
that have sustained, high growth in the postwar period. Their growth 
models had some common fl avors: the strategic integration with the world 
economy; the mobility of resources, particularly labor; the high savings and 
investment rates; and a capable government committed to growth. The 
report goes on to describe the cast of mind and techniques of policy mak-
ing that leaders will need if they are to emulate such a growth model. It 
concludes that their policy making will need to be patient, pragmatic, and 
experimental. 
1 http://www.growthcommission.org.
“The objective of 
growth is to lift the most 
vulnerable in society 
out of poverty. There 
is suffi cient evidence 
to direct us as policy 
makers to those parts of 
the world where this has 
been done exceptionally 
well. And, for me, that is 
the light that emanates 
from the report.” 
—Trevor Manuel
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In the second part, we lay out the ingredients a growth strategy might 
include. These range from public investment and exchange rate policies to 
land sales and redistribution. A list of ingredients is not enough to make 
a dish, of course, as Bob Solow, a Nobel Prize-winning economist and a 
member of the Commission, points out. We, however, refrain from offer-
ing policy makers a recipe, or growth strategy, to follow. This is because 
no single recipe exists. Timing and circumstance will determine how the 
ingredients should be combined, in what quantities, and in what sequence. 
In India, for example, policy makers must concentrate on infrastructure 
investment and improving the quality of education. In China, on the other 
hand, policy makers should try to wean the economy off exports and invest-
ment and give freer rein to consumption. 
Formulating a full growth strategy, then, is not a job for this Commis-
sion but for a dedicated team of policy makers and economists, working on 
a single economy over time. Instead of a country-specifi c recipe, we offer 
some more general thoughts on the opportunities and constraints faced by 
nations in Sub-Saharan Africa, countries rich in resources, small states with 
fewer than 2 million people, and middle-income countries that have lost 
their economic momentum.
In the fi nal part of the report, we discuss global trends that are beyond 
the control of any single developing-country policy maker. Global warm-
ing is one example; the surge in protectionist sentiment another; the rise of 
commodity prices a third. In addition, we discuss the aging of the world 
population and the potential dangers of America’s external defi cit. These 
trends are new enough that the 13 high-growth economies of the postwar 
period did not have to face them. The question is whether they now make 
it impossible for other countries to emulate that postwar success. 
The developing countries today have a collective importance in the 
world economy that is impossible to ignore. They leave a sizable imprint 
on commodity prices, infl ation, capital fl ows, and greenhouse gas emis-
sions, to name just some of the ripple effects. Their collective importance 
has, however, yet to be fully refl ected in the few international institutions 
that help steward the world economy. This should change. The developing 
world has benefi ted enormously from the global economy and contributed 
a great deal to it. Now their policy makers need to assume a bigger role in 
managing it.
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Sustained, High Growth 
in the Postwar Period
What Is Growth?
Gross domestic product (GDP) is a familiar but remarkable statistic. It is an 
astonishing feat of statistical compression, reducing the restless endeavor 
and bewildering variety of a national economy into a single number, which 
can increase over time. China’s GDP grew by 11.9 percent in 2007, Amer-
ica’s may not grow at all in 2008. Both of those terse statistical statements 
sum up world-changing developments, which will attract vast volumes of 
commentary and explanation. Few other statistics in the social sciences are 
as expressive.
A growing GDP is evidence of a society getting its collective act together. 
As its economy grows, a society becomes more tightly organized, more 
densely interwoven. A growing economy is one in which energies are better 
directed; resources better deployed; techniques mastered, then advanced. It 
is not just about making money.
Economic growth is a recent phenomenon in human history. It began 
with the industrial revolution in Britain at the end of the 18th century. “It 
is impossible to contemplate the progress of manufactures in Great Britain 
within the last thirty years without wonder and astonishment,” wrote Patrick 
Colquhoun, a Scottish merchant, in 1814. This progress spread to Europe 
and North America in the 19th century, accelerating as it traveled. In the 20th 
century, particularly in the second half, it spread and accelerated again. 
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Mr. Colquhoun attributed the progress he saw to “ingenious machinery, 
invigorated by capital and skill.” Today’s economists account for growth 
with much the same triple formula of technology, capital, and human capi-
tal. But these are only the proximate causes of growth. Its deeper roots 
draw on advances in science, fi nance, trade, education, medicine, public 
health, and government, to name but a few of the factors in play.
Over the past two centuries, what we now call the global economy has 
expanded in fi ts and starts. Interrupted by the slump of the 1930s, it was 
rebuilt in the 1940s, when the institutional foundations of today’s world 
economy (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the precursor of the 
World Trade Organization; the International Monetary Fund; the World 
Bank; and the United Nations and its diverse agencies) were laid. Global-
ization has since proceeded apace, aided by legislation (the lowering of tar-
iffs and quotas and the relaxation of capital controls) and innovation (the 
declining cost of transport and communication). 
This renaissance of the world economy helps to explain an uptick in 
world growth since the latter half of the 20th century (see fi gure 1). As the 
world economy has opened and integrated, technology and know-how have 
fl owed more easily to developing countries. Latecomers can assimilate new 
techniques much more quickly than the pioneering economies can invent 
them. That is why poorer countries can “catch up” with richer ones. 
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The lessons that countries import are not only technological. Both China 
and then India reformed their closed, heavily regulated economies, moti-
vated in part by the force of international example. These epic voltes face 
also help to explain why global growth has increased in recent decades. It 
was probably no harder to reverse the policies of India and China than to 
reform the policies of Mauritius and Vietnam. But political breakthroughs 
in vast places benefi t a much greater proportion of the globe. 
This accelerating growth has created new challenges. The fi rst is a clear 
divergence in incomes within and between countries. Of the roughly 6 bil-
lion people on the planet, about 65 percent live in high-income or high-
growth economies, up from less than a fi fth 30 years ago. The remaining 2 
billion people live in countries with stagnating, or even declining, incomes. 
The world population is projected to increase by 3 billion people by 2050. 
Unfortunately, 2 billion of this extra population will live in countries that 
are currently enjoying little or no growth. Thus, if these trends persist, the 
proportion of the world population living in low-growth environments 
might increase.
The second challenge is environmental. The quickened growth of world 
GDP has put new pressure on the planet’s ecology and climate. This strain 
may ultimately threaten the growth environment of the last 200 years.2 If 
an economy fails to grow, man’s efforts to better himself become a scramble 
for a bigger share of a fi xed amount of resources. Ecological stress quickly 
becomes social and political. Some of these pressures and their implications 
are discussed in part 4 of the report.
The 13 Success Stories
As a point of departure we review the cases of high, sustained growth in 
the postwar period. Thirteen economies qualify: Botswana; Brazil; China; 
Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; 
Malta; Oman; Singapore; Taiwan, China; and Thailand. Two other coun-
tries, India and Vietnam, may be on their way to joining this group. It is to 
be hoped other countries will emerge soon. 
These cases demonstrate that fast, sustained growth is possible—after 
all, 13 economies have achieved it. They also show that it is not easy—after 
all, only 13 economies have ever done it. Indeed, some people view these 
cases as “economic miracles,” events impossible to explain and unlikely 
to be repeated. This report takes exception to that view. There is much to 
learn from outliers. Paul Romer, a leading growth theorist and a member 
2 See Martin Wolf on the possibility of returning to the zero-sum environment that characterized the 
pregrowth period, with the attendant risks of confl ict. Wolf, Martin. 2007. “The Dangers of Living in 
a Zero-Sum World Economy.” The Financial Times, December 19.
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of the Commission’s working group, reminds us that when Japan grew at 
this pace, commentators said it was a special case propelled by postwar 
recovery. When the four East Asian tigers (Hong Kong, China; Taiwan, 
China; Singapore; and Korea) matched it, skeptics said it was only possible 
because they were so small. When China surpassed them, people said it was 
only because China was so big.
In truth, the sample is remarkably diverse (see table 1). The familiar Asian 
examples may dominate the list, but every other region of the developing 
world (Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and emerging Europe) is also 
represented. Some of the countries are rich in natural resources (Botswana, 
Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, Oman, Thailand); the remainder are not. The 
sample includes one country with a population well over 1 billion (China), 
and another with a population well below 500,000 (Malta).
Perhaps more intriguing is how differently the success stories end. Six of 
the economies (Hong Kong, China; Japan; Korea; Malta; Singapore; and 
Taiwan, China) continued to grow all the way to high-income levels. But 
several of the others lost some or all of their growth momentum long before 
catching the leading economies. The most striking example is Brazil, where 
fast economic growth petered out around the time of the second oil shock 
in 1979 and has yet to resume (see box 2).
The 13 economies each, then, have their idiosyncrasies. But it would be 
wrong to conclude that they defy generalization, or that there is no point in 
learning about their growth paths because the lessons cannot be applied at 
home. That was not the attitude the countries themselves took. Policy mak-
Table 1 13 Success Stories of Sustained, High Growth
Economy
Period of high 
growth**
Per capita income at the 
beginning and 2005***
Botswana 1960–2005 210 3,800
Brazil 1950–1980 960 4,000
China 1961–2005 105 1,400
Hong Kong, China* 1960–1997 3,100 29,900
Indonesia 1966–1997 200 900
Japan* 1950–1983 3,500 39,600
Korea, Rep. of* 1960–2001 1,100 13,200
Malaysia 1967–1997 790 4,400
Malta* 1963–1994 1,100 9,600
Oman 1960–1999 950 9,000
Singapore* 1967–2002 2,200 25,400
Taiwan, China* 1965–2002 1,500 16,400
Thailand 1960–1997 330 2,400
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.
*Economies that have reached industrialized countries’ per capita income levels.
**Period in which GDP growth was 7 percent per year or more.
***In constant US$ of 2000.
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ers learned by example; case studies had a pronounced infl uence; demon-
stration effects were surprisingly important. It is said that Deng Xiao ping 
was strongly infl uenced by his fi rst encounters with Singapore and New 
York City, on a visit to the United Nations.
A close look at the 13 cases reveals fi ve striking points of resemblance 
(see fi gure 2):
1. They fully exploited the world economy
2. They maintained macroeconomic stability
3. They mustered high rates of saving and investment
4. They let markets allocate resources
5. They had committed, credible, and capable governments
1. The global economy
During their periods of fast growth, these 13 economies all made the most 
of the global economy. This is their most important shared characteristic 
and the central lesson of this report. Sustained growth at this pace was not 
possible before 1950. It became feasible only because the world economy 
became more open and more tightly integrated.3 The global economy is still 
3 As Barry Bosworth of the Brookings Institution has noted, this opening is not just about cutting tar-
iffs, but also about expanding the range of goods that can be traded and included in multilateral trade 
negotiations.
Brazil was one of the fi rst countries to achieve sus-
tained, high growth (its run began in 1950) and the fi rst 
to lose its momentum (in 1980). At fi rst glance, Bra-
zil’s case sits uneasily beside the other 12 on our list. 
Unlike those countries, it is best known for a strategy of 
“import substitution,” sheltering its domestic industries 
so they could compete for the home market against 
foreign rivals.
During its fi rst phase of import substitution, how-
ever, Brazil in fact succeeded in diversifying its exports, 
branching out from coffee into light manufacturing with 
the help of foreign direct investment. Exports as a per-
centage of GDP more than doubled from 5 percent in 
the early-1950s to about 12 percent in the early 1980s, 
even as coffee’s share of exports fell dramatically. Bra-
zil also had the twin advantages of a sizable domes-
tic market and abundant agricultural resources. These 
two endowments allowed it to reach very high growth 
rates despite a modest engagement with the world 
economy.
Why did it slow down? The causes are hard to disen-
tangle, just as the slowdown has been hard to reverse. 
Brazil’s problems began after the fi rst oil shock in 1973, 
which left the country suffering from infl ation and an 
overhang of debt. In response, the government in 1974 
turned further inward. It began a “second phase” of 
import substitution, which went beyond light manufac-
turing to promote heavy industries and capital goods 
production, a strategy that was heavily dependent on 
the recycling of petrodollars. When dollar interest rates 
spiked after 1979, Brazil plunged into a debt and high-
infl ation crisis from which it took more than a decade to 
emerge. In the process, Brazil’s exports declined from 
12 percent of GDP in the early 1980s to 6 percent in 
the mid-1990s, losing nearly all of the ground they had 
gained in the high-growth period.
Box 2: Brazil’s slowdown
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a work in progress, of course, but its effects have already been dramatic. 
Properly exploited for the benefi t of all citizens, it is one of the most power-
ful weapons against poverty.
The high-growth countries benefi ted in two ways. One, they imported 
ideas, technology, and know-how from the rest of the world. Two, they 
exploited global demand, which provided a deep, elastic market for their 
goods. The infl ow of knowledge dramatically increased the economy’s pro-
ductive potential; the global market provided the demand necessary to ful-
fi ll it. To put it very simply, they imported what the rest of the world knew, 
and exported what it wanted.
Knowledge
It is easier to learn something than it is to invent it. That is why advanced 
economies do not grow (and cannot grow) at rates of 7 percent or more, 
and why lagging economies can catch up. To take an early example: the 
textiles industry of Osaka eclipsed the mills of Lancashire by borrowing, 
Openness
Import knowledge
Exploit global
demand
Leadership
and governance
Credible commitment
to growth
Credible commitment
to inclusion
Capable administration
Market allocation
Prices guide
resources
Resources
follow prices
Macroeconomic
stability
Modest inflation
Sustainable
public finances
Future orientation
High investment
High saving
Figure 2 The Common Characteristics of High, Sustained Growth
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assimilating, and improving British designs and techniques. The façade of 
the Osaka Spinning Company, established in 1883, was even built from 
imported Lancashire red brick.4
There are many channels through which knowledge can pass to a devel-
oping economy. One is foreign direct investment (FDI). Malaysia, for exam-
ple, has attracted multinationals to its three electronics clusters—in Penang, 
the Klang Valley, and Johore—where they enjoy tax holidays and other 
privileges.5 Multinationals bring production technologies, an understand-
ing of the global market, and an ability to manage international supply 
chains. Japan and Korea were historically much less open to FDI, but they 
did import and improve upon technology from outside. Japan’s Sony, for 
example, surpassed America’s RCA in the market for small radios, using 
technology it had licensed from the American company itself.
Demand
The global economy also provides a large, relatively stable market for the 
goods of developing countries. In the 1950s, some economists fell prey to 
“export pessimism.” They assumed that the more goods the developing 
world sold on global markets, the lower the price they would fetch. This 
thesis may or may not have been true for primary products and commodi-
ties. But it did not hold for the manufactured goods in which many of our 
13 success stories developed a comparative advantage. In most cases, their 
potential output was small relative to the size of the world market.6 This 
gave them scope to specialize, raise productivity dramatically, and expand 
their output manifold. The four tigers, for example, increased their manu-
factured exports from $4.6 billion (in 2000 dollars) in 1962 to $715 billion 
in 2004. If there was any small decline in price, it was overwhelmed by the 
vigorous growth in sales.
This is one reason why inward-looking growth strategies quickly falter. 
Domestic demand is no substitute for this expansive global market. In a 
poor country, the home market is small and therefore relatively “inelas-
tic.” For sales to rise, prices have to fall. Size is not the only problem. The 
pattern of domestic spending may not correspond well to the strengths of 
domestic supply. What home consumers want to buy may not match what 
home producers are best at making. Since specialization is limited by the 
extent of the market, home markets give an economy less scope to special-
ize in its areas of comparative advantage.
4 Saxonhouse, Gary. 1974. “A Tale of Japanese Technological Diffusion in the Meiji Period.” The 
Journal of Economic History 34 (1): 149–65.
5 Yusof, Zainal Aznam, and Bhattasali, Deepak. 2007. “Economic Growth and Development in Malay-
sia: Policy Making and Leadership.” Case Study, Commission on Growth and Development.
6 Two exceptions may be China in manufacturing and India in services.
“In the 1950s Korea 
pursued a policy of 
import substitution. 
Growth was only 2–3 
percent. But in the 
early 1960s, Korea 
totally changed to 
an outward-oriented 
strategy, emphasizing 
trade. This jump-started 
our growth to over 7 
percent, sustained over a 
long period.”
—Han Duck-soo
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2. Macroeconomic stability
Macroeconomic volatility and unpredictability damage private sector 
investment, and hence, growth. During their most successful periods, the 
13 high-growth cases avoided the worst of this turbulence. 
Their quick expansion was accompanied, from time to time, by moder-
ately high infl ation. Korea, for example, had double-digit infl ation rates for 
most of the 1970s; China’s infl ation peaked at about 24 percent in 1994. 
But prices were stable enough not to scramble market signals, cloud the 
view of long-term investors, or deter savers from entrusting their wealth to 
banks.
Governments were also fi scally responsible. Many ran budget defi cits for 
extended periods; some nursed high ratios of debt to GDP. But this public 
debt did not get out of hand, not least because the economy grew faster 
than the stock of public liabilities. 
3. Future orientation
This macroeconomic stability set the stage for their third characteristic: they 
all mustered high rates of saving and investment, not least public investment 
in infrastructure. They were all “future-oriented,” forgoing consumption in 
the present in pursuit of a higher level of income in the future.
In the mid-1970s, Southeast Asia and Latin America had similar savings 
rates. Twenty years later, the Asian rate was about 20 percentage points 
higher. China has saved more than a third of its national income every year 
for the past 25 years. This saving has been accompanied by prodigious rates 
of domestic investment.
 In a paper written for the Commission, Peter Montiel of Williams Col-
lege and Luis Serven of the World Bank catalog some of the possible reasons 
for East Asia’s thrift.7 The region benefi ted from favorable demography. 
With fewer dependents to take care of, working-age adults had more scope 
to put money aside. Macroeconomic stability also helped. Thailand’s sav-
ing rate rose quickly in the 1980s, for example, thanks to tighter govern-
ment budgets. As mentioned, these countries also mostly avoided high and 
unpredictable infl ation, which arbitrarily redistributes wealth from savers 
to debtors and discourages people from holding fi nancial assets. 
Some countries employed more direct measures to enforce thrift. In 
1955, Singapore established a mandatory saving scheme, the Central Provi-
dent Fund, which collects contributions from wages that are primarily 
saved until retirement, although some withdrawals for medical and housing 
have been permitted. Malaysia has a similar system. Both countries, as well 
as Japan and Korea, also had postal saving systems, which catered to the 
needs of small savers. Their fi nancial systems were, by contrast, less ready 
7 Montiel, Peter, and Serven, Luis. 2008. “Real Exchange Rates, Saving, and Growth: Is There a Link?” 
Background Paper, Commission on Growth and Development.
“The three “dos” for 
growth that I care most 
about in the report are 
economic openness, 
social inclusiveness, and 
effective governments. 
The message can 
be spelled out 
equally well in three 
“don’ts”: inwardness, 
exclusion, and bloated 
governments—a recipe 
for stagnation.”
—Edmar Bacha
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to extend consumer credit. By making it harder to borrow, they may have 
made it easier to save.
4. Market allocation
The 20th century saw many experiments with alternatives to markets. They 
were all conclusive failures. It therefore seems safe to say that markets are 
a necessary part of the economic structure in order to achieve and sustain 
growth. 
The high-growth economies all relied on a functioning market system, 
which provided price signals, decentralized decision making, and incentives 
to supply whatever was in demand. Countries varied in the strength and 
clarity of their property rights. But in all cases, fi rms and entrepreneurs felt 
they had enough of a claim on their assets to invest heavily in them. 
In Hong Kong, China, the administration was famously laissez faire. 
Other governments in our list were more hands-on, intervening with tax 
breaks, subsidized credit, directed lending and other such measures. These 
interventions may have helped them to discover their comparative advan-
tage—revealing how best to deploy their endowments of labor and capital. 
But they did not defy their comparative advantage, as Justin Yifu Lin, the 
chief economist of the World Bank, has put it. This distinction is conceptu-
ally subtle, but economically consequential.
An economy’s endowment of labor, natural resources, and capital 
dictates its comparative advantage. But this mandate is very broad. The 
crowded, coastal economies of East Asia, for example, had a compara-
tive advantage in labor-intensive manufacturing. But what line of labor-
intensive manufacturing, precisely? Using what techniques? Those answers 
they had to discover for themselves through trial and error. This process of 
“self-discovery” may have been helped along by the government’s hand.8 
What was not helpful were government efforts to promote heavy industry, 
before accumulating the capital required to make it viable.
Resource mobility and structural transformation
A country’s comparative advantage will evolve over time. In any period 
of fast growth, capital, and especially, labor moves rapidly from sector to 
sector, industry to industry. This mobility of resources was a feature of all 
the 13 high-growth cases. Governments did not resist (although they may 
have tempered) the market forces that pulled people into the urban areas 
or destroyed some jobs, while creating others. In Malaysia, for example, 
agriculture’s share of employment fell from 40 percent in 1975 to about 15 
percent in 2000. Only a quarter of Malaysia’s people lived in cities in 1957, 
the year of its independence; by 2005, 63 percent did. Even in China, where 
8 Hausmann, Ricardo, and Rodrik, Dani. 2003. “Economic Development as Self-Discovery.” Journal 
of Development Economics 72: 603–33.
“Government provides 
the environment for 
growth, but it is the 
private sector that invests 
and creates wealth for 
the people.”
—Goh Chok Tong
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the household registration system placed some restrictions on mobility, vast 
shifts of population have taken place. 
Economies do not grow smoothly and evenly, maintaining their shape 
as they increase their size. Instead, fast-growing economies go through a 
tumultuous process of creative destruction, breaking into new industries 
even as they abandon their traditional industrial strongholds. The challenge 
that each of the 13 governments faced was how to shield people from the 
worst of this tumult, without retarding the economy in the process.
5. Leadership and governance
Growth is about more than economics. It also requires committed, cred-
ible, and capable governments. “[I]n the long run it does not pay to build 
an economic mansion on a foundation of political sand,” writes Benjamin 
Mkapa, former president of Tanzania, in a paper written for the Commis-
sion.9 The high-growth economies typically built their prosperity on sturdy 
political foundations.
Their policy makers understood that growth does not just happen. It must 
be consciously chosen as an overarching goal by a country’s leadership. In 
Singapore, for example, the pursuit of growth has served as an organizing 
principle of the country’s politics for the past 40 years, according to a recent 
speech by Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong, a member of the Commission. 
The government and other institutions have constantly sought to anticipate 
the actions required to sustain the economy’s momentum.
Does that make Singapore unusual? After all, most political leaders 
advertise their commitment to economic development. But in their choices, 
if not their words, many governments prize political tranquility over the 
economic upheaval that growth can entail. Others carry out plausible eco-
nomic reforms for their own sake. If growth does not ensue, they do not 
experiment with something else; they simply declare victory and go home.
In the fast-growing economies, by contrast, policy makers understood 
that successful development entails a decades-long commitment, and a fun-
damental bargain between the present and the future. Even at very high 
growth rates of 7–10 percent it takes decades for a country to make the leap 
from low to relatively high incomes (see fi gure 3). 
During this long period of transition, citizens must forgo consumption 
today in return for higher standards of living tomorrow. This bargain will 
be accepted only if the country’s policy makers communicate a credible 
vision of the future and a strategy for getting there. They must be trusted 
as stewards of the economy and their promises of future rewards must be 
believed.
9 Mkapa, Benjamin. 2007. “Leadership for Growth, Development and Poverty Reduction: An African 
Viewpoint and Experience.” Case Study, Commission on Growth and Development.
“I think leadership 
matters, but I don’t 
mean just the top leader. 
I think you also need a 
team that knows what 
the right policies are and 
has the skills, or is able 
to contract the skills, to 
help implement those 
policies.”
—Ngozi N. Okonjo-Iweala
Part 1: Sustained, High Growth in the Postwar Period 27
Their promise must also be inclusive, leaving citizens confi dent that they 
and their children will share in the benefi ts. In Botswana, for example, 
Seretse Khama handed over diamond mining rights from his own tribe to 
the government, which gave every tribe in Botswana a bigger stake in the 
state’s success.10 Other governments forged an implicit or explicit social 
contract in support of growth, offering health, education, and sometimes 
redistribution. These contracts were kept, if not in detail, then at least in 
spirit. Absent this kind of political foundation, sustaining the policies that 
promote growth is very diffi cult if not impossible.
Such leadership requires patience and a long planning horizon. In several 
cases, fast-growing economies were overseen by a single-party government 
that could expect to remain in power for decades to come. In a multiparty 
democracy, on the other hand, governments typically look no further than 
the next election. But democracies can nonetheless preside over remarkable 
passages of growth. Today’s India is the most prominent example. But Ire-
land and Australia also provide some instructive lessons.
Australia’s Productivity Commission was established by an act of parlia-
ment in 1998, although it can trace its roots back 30 years. An independent 
state agency, it regularly evaluates government regulations and microeco-
nomic policies, analyzes Australia’s long-term growth prospects, and helps 
bring people together to craft proposals for reform. The Irish Social Part-
nership, which arose out of the country’s economic stagnation in the 1980s, 
10 Acemoglu, Daron, and Robinson, James. 2007. “The Role of Institutions in Growth and Develop-
ment.” Background Paper, Commission on Growth and Development.
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“Reforms can be costly—
they can withdraw from 
the political capital of 
governments. So after 
some achievements, 
governments may start to 
relax or enjoy the status 
quo. But what matters 
is sustainable efforts, not 
the ups and downs or ons 
and offs of reforms.”
—Mahmoud Mohieldin
28 The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development
brings employers, unions, and the government together every three years to 
rethink and renegotiate the nation’s economic strategy. Once these delib-
erations are ratifi ed, they become the framework for policy making for the 
next three years.
These latter cases show that democracies can be surprisingly farsighted. 
Rival political parties can, for example, agree on a bipartisan growth strat-
egy, which they each promise to follow when it is their turn in power. Even 
if a formal pact is never made, a successful growth strategy, commanding the 
confi dence of the public, may outlast the government that introduced it.
Committed to the goal of high growth, governments should be prag-
matic in their pursuit of it. The policy makers who succeeded in sustaining 
high growth were prepared to try, fail, and learn. Singapore, for example, 
did not turn outward until it had fi rst tried turning inward, encouraging 
domestic fi rms to compete with industrial imports. In China, Deng Xiao-
ping reportedly described his approach as crossing the river by feeling for 
the stones—an oft-repeated phrase in China. 
The Art of Policy Making
It is relatively easy to identify the shared characteristics of the high-growth 
cases and easy to appreciate their collective importance. But it is hard to 
know how to replicate these characteristics. Some of them are the outcome 
of innumerable decisions and interactions by fi rms, households, and offi -
The business of “feeling for the stones” in fast-grow-
ing economies was often carried out by highly qualifi ed 
technocrats in small, dedicated “reform teams”a. Sin-
gapore had its Economic Development Board, Korea 
its Economic Planning Board, and Japan its Ministry of 
Trade and Industry.
Reform teams were not burdened with administra-
tive duties, but they were given direct access to the top 
of the government. Malaysia’s Economic Planning Unit 
reported directly to the prime minister. Taiwan, China’s 
Council for U.S. Aid, which began in 1948 and evolved 
into the Council for Economic Planning and Develop-
ment, reported directly to the president. Indeed, sev-
eral future heads of government sprang from their 
ranks: the second chairman of the Council later became 
president of the country.
From this unique position—ensconced in the gov-
ernment, but distanced from day-to-day administrative 
burdens and immediate political demandsb—the reform 
teams helped coordinate the government’s efforts and 
overcome administrative opposition and inertia.
Although technocrats unchecked by political forces 
can fail to balance economic with political and social 
concerns, political forces unchecked by technocratic 
knowledge can be disruptive.
a. Criscuolo, Alberto, and Palmade, Vincent. 2008. “Reform 
Teams: How the Most Successful Reformers Organized Them-
selves.” Public Policy for the Private Sector Note 318, World 
Bank, Washington, DC.
b. Evans, Peter. 1995. Embedded Autonomy: States and Indus-
trial Transformation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press.
Box 3: Reform teams
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cials. Some are the result of evolution, not design. None is a straightfor-
ward policy. 
For example, the success stories show that high, sustained growth 
requires an impressive saving rate. But what should governments do to 
promote thrift? Should they restrict credit, mandate saving, or raise taxes? 
The historical record shows that growth requires broadly stable prices, a 
currency that is not debauched by hyperinfl ation. But does that mean the 
central bank should be made formally independent? It is also clear that suc-
cessful economies learned quickly from the rest of the world, assimilating 
new techniques. But how can policy makers help an economy to learn?
In the context of a developed country, economists prescribe policies with 
some measure of confi dence. Some advisers offer prescriptions to poorer 
countries with the same level of conviction. They argue that developing 
economies are just like advanced economies, only poorer. 
But in recent decades, economists have acquired a deeper appreciation 
of the underlying institutions that make mature markets work. These insti-
tutions defi ne property rights, enforce contracts, convey information, and 
bridge informational gaps between buyers and sellers. These institutions 
and capabilities may not be fully formed in a developing economy. Indeed, 
the immaturity of these institutions is synonymous with underdevelopment. 
That makes it harder to predict how an economy will respond to, say, the 
removal of a tariff or the sale of a public asset. 
Uncertain about how to model developing economies, we also suspect 
that the correct model changes over time. A fast-growing economy is a 
moving target. Often markets and institutions co-evolve, responding to the 
constraints and the demands one places on the other. Land registries, for 
example, emerge only after land becomes scarce. Accountancy evolves as 
and when the capital markets demand it.
This makes life doubly diffi cult for policy makers. It is hard to know 
how the economy will respond to a policy, and the right answer in the pres-
ent moment may not apply in the future. Today’s bad policies are often yes-
terday’s good policies, applied for too long. Governing a growing economy 
is not a static challenge. It is more akin to a long voyage undertaken with 
incomplete and sometimes inaccurate charts.11
The Role of Government
What then should governments do? What is the optimal size of the state 
and what are its proper responsibilities? More ink has been spilled on that 
question than any other in development. It is a recurring theme of this 
report and the debates that preceded it.
11 Four decades ago, independent Singapore embarked on an uncertain journey. Unemployment was 
high, industry nonexistent, and the future looked bleak. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew wrote of 
that day, “I started out with great trepidation on a journey along an unmarked road to an unknown 
destination.”
“Markets and 
governments work 
differently at different 
stages of development—
their structure, their 
functions, their goals all 
change. There are phases 
in which governments 
substitute for markets 
and phases in which 
market institutions 
develop.”
—Zhou Xiaochuan
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One response is to argue that governments should do as little as possible. 
“That government is best which governs least,” as the motto goes. Fifteen 
years ago, much of the discussion of government shared this presumption 
in favor of smaller government and freer markets. Its policy conclusions are 
captured in the phrase: “Stabilize, privatize, and liberalize.”
While there is some merit in what lies behind this prescription, it is an 
extremely incomplete statement of the problem. It is true that bloated gov-
ernment should not crowd out the private sector; regulation should not 
be excessive; the economy should be open to trade and competition; and 
private investors should be free to earn a remunerative return. The injunc-
tion to roll back the state was also motivated in part by concerns about the 
motivation and competence of government. If government’s role is defi ned 
too broadly, it may not have the capacity to perform such an expansive 
array of functions. Or it may misuse its broader mandate, pursuing goals 
other than growth and widespread prosperity, such as the welfare of vested 
interests.
But our view of effective government is somewhat different. The issues 
of competence and motivation cannot be dismissed. But they cannot be 
answered by simply writing government out of the script. Our model of 
developing economies is too primitive at this stage to make it wise to pre-
defi ne what governments should do. Numerous country case studies sug-
gest that its role evolves over time as its own capabilities and those of the 
private sector mature. Our motto then would follow Sir Arthur Lewis, the 
great development economist, who observed that “[G]overnments may fail 
either because they do too little, or because they do too much.”12
Some countries, for example, suffer from too little public investment; 
others, from too much government regulation. Some suffer from both prob-
lems simultaneously. In India, for example, the fi rst priority in the 1990s 
was for the government to do less, dismantling the excesses of the license-
and-permit Raj. Now the government is trying to do more, making up for 
years of underinvestment in public infrastructure.13 
A preoccupation with the size of government can also distract attention 
from its effectiveness. History is littered with instructive examples. After 
the Great Depression, economists came to understand that America’s fl edg-
ling central bank made the slump much worse. They could have argued for 
sharply limiting the powers and activities of the central bank, and some 
did. But others focused on how to help central banks do their job more 
effectively: how to free them from harmful political constraints, establish 
their credibility, and improve their tools and techniques. To us, this second 
approach seems more promising in developing countries. The task is to 
12 Lewis, Arthur. 1955. The Theory of Economic Growth. London: George Allen & Unwin.
13 See Montek Singh Ahluwalia (the Deputy Chairman of India’s Planning Commission and a member 
of the Commission) in an interview in The McKinsey Quarterly, October 2007. 
“If I were to make a 
provocative statement, 
I would say that the 
prevalence of the fi rst-
best, optimal policy 
approach, which implies 
an excess of orthodoxy, 
leads to sub-optimal 
growth performance. 
That’s a pretty strong 
statement.”
—Alejandro Foxley
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improve the effectiveness of government institutions rather than stripping 
them of their tasks.
It seems to us that the correct response to uncertainty is not paralysis but 
experiment. Governments should not do nothing, out of a fear of failure. 
They should test policies, and be quick to learn from failure. If they suffer 
a misstep, they should try something else, not plunge ahead or retreat to 
the shore.
These experiments should, however, be cautious. Each step should be 
weighed to generate the greatest amount of information about the econ-
omy for the least cost, should the policy prove to be a misstep. When they 
choose policies, governments should ask themselves, what is the worst that 
could happen? Small experiments are usually less damaging, should they 
fail, than big ones. Risk management is an important aspect of policy for-
mation in developing countries.
China offers examples of such cautious policy making. Its initial reforms 
in 1978 freed farmers to sell any surplus produce, over and above govern-
ment production quotas, on the open market. They responded much as 
microeconomic theory would predict. Prices rose, farm output soared, and 
farmers’ lives improved. On the other hand, Chinese reformers have been 
careful not to copy macroeconomic policies from advanced economies. 
They knew that the economy early in the reform period would not respond 
to macroeconomic variables, like interest rates, in the way predicted by 
advanced country models.
Some question this deliberate, step-by-step gradualism. In some cases, 
“bad times make good policies.” Crises, which can upset the stable con-
fi guration of political forces, sometimes provide an opening to implement 
major reform packages that would otherwise be blocked. However, there 
are possibly as many examples of crises leading to bad choices, as there are 
cases of crises leading to good ones. In short, crises may remove obstacles to 
a sound growth strategy, but they cannot ensure that a sound strategy will 
indeed be chosen. In this context, leadership and infl uential and enlightened 
technocrats play an enormously important role. 
“Pragmatism and 
gradualism are different. 
In Indonesia, reforms 
have been pragmatic, 
willing to accommodate 
political and social 
reality. But they have not 
been gradual. When the 
economy was growing 
well, complacency set 
in. It was only when 
fortunes reversed that the 
reformers were able to 
move, and then they had 
to move quickly.”
—Dr. Boediono
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The Policy Ingredients 
of Growth Strategies
PART 2
We do not know the suffi cient conditions for growth. We can characterize 
the successful economies of the postwar period, but we cannot name with 
certainty the factors that sealed their success, or the factors they could have 
succeeded without. It would be preferable if it were otherwise.
Nonetheless, the commissioners have a keen sense of the policies that 
probably matter— the policies that will make a material difference to a 
country’s chances of sustaining high growth, even if they do not provide a 
rock-solid guarantee.
Just as we cannot say this list is suffi cient, we cannot say for sure that 
all the ingredients are necessary. Countries have grown, for a time, on the 
back of a much shorter set of policies than this. But we suspect that over 
the course of 10 or 20 years of fast growth, all of these ingredients will mat-
ter. Low infl ation, for example, will not compensate for poor education or 
rickety infrastructure. To sustain growth over a long period, a set of things 
needs to come together. Doing some subset of them may produce benefi cial 
results. But the items the policy maker neglects will eventually haunt the 
economy’s progress. 
A list of ingredients is not a recipe, and our list does not constitute a 
growth strategy. We identify possible constraints on the economy’s perfor-
mance. A fully fl edged growth strategy would identify which of these con-
straints demands immediate attention and which can be deferred. It would 
“We shouldn’t slip into 
the mistake of equating 
something useful, 
like fi nancial-sector 
development or anything 
else, with a suffi cient 
condition for growth.” 
—Michael Spence
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specify what to do, when, and how much money, expertise and political 
capital to devote where. Given limited resources, governments should focus 
their effort in those areas with the highest incremental payoff to growth. 
But setting these priorities requires subtle judgments made with limited 
information. It is not a job for this Commission, but for a “reform team” 
of applied economists and policy makers with a deep knowledge of a par-
ticular country’s circumstances. Nonetheless, such an exercise would surely 
benefi t from paying close attention to the policies listed here. Our frame-
work may not provide policy makers with all the answers, but we hope at 
least to help them ask the right questions.
The policies we explore fall into several loose categories: accumulation, 
innovation, allocation, stabilization, and inclusion.
The fi rst set of policies on the list falls into the category of “accumula-
tion.” It includes strong public investment, which helps the economy to 
accumulate the infrastructure and skills it needs to grow quickly. The next 
group of measures promotes “innovation” and “imitation.” They help 
an economy to learn to do new things—venturing into unfamiliar export 
industries for example—and to do things in new ways.
In any successful period of growth, relative prices have a lot of work to 
do, attracting investment into certain industries, deterring it from others. 
Thus, the third set of policies concerns the “allocation” of capital and, espe-
cially, labor. They allow prices to guide resources and resources to respond 
to prices. This microeconomics cannot unfold if it is rudely interrupted by 
debt crises or wild fl uctuations in the general price level. The fourth group 
of policies therefore ensures the “stabilization” of the macroeconomy, safe-
guarding against slumps, insolvency, and runaway infl ation.
We also recommend a set of policies to promote “inclusion.” The com-
missioners prize equity and equality of opportunity for their own sake. But 
they also recognize that if a growth strategy brings all classes and regions of 
a society along with it, no group will seek to derail it.
High Levels of Investment
Strong, enduring growth requires high rates of investment. By invest-
ing resources, rather than consuming them, economies make a trade-off 
between present and future standards of living. That trade-off is quite steep. 
If the sustained, high-growth cases are any guide, it appears that overall 
investment rates of 25 percent of GDP or above are needed, counting both 
public and private expenditures (see fi gure 4). They often invested at least 
another 7–8 percent of GDP in education, training, and health (also count-
ing public and private spending), although this is not treated as investment 
in the national accounts. 
“Checklists of reforms 
are not helpful. The 
implicit message to 
policy makers is: if price 
control is diffi cult, why 
not do education? There 
is no element of strategy 
in that approach, no 
sense of the time lags or 
horizons involved.”
—Ngozi N. Okonjo-Iweala
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Infrastructure
In fast-growing Asia, public investment in infrastructure accounts for 5–7 
percent of GDP or more. In China, Thailand, and Vietnam, total infrastruc-
ture investment exceeds 7 percent of GDP. History suggests this is the right 
order of magnitude for high and sustained growth, although it is diffi cult 
to be precise.
The data on public investment in infrastructure is surprisingly patchy. 
The numbers one can fi nd suggest that spending is disturbingly low on 
average. Many developing countries invest on the order of 2 percent of 
GDP, or less—and this is refl ected in their growth rate.
These two defi ciencies—the shortage of data and the lack of spend-
ing—may be connected. What gets attention gets measured and what gets 
measured gets attention. Macroeconomic data are collected mostly for 
the purpose of stabilizing the economy in the short run. For that purpose, 
what matters is the overall level of government spending—the distinction 
between current outlays and capital investment is of little importance. But 
for growth, the distinction is essential. 
Too often, both the composition and the size of public spending consti-
tute a victory of the short run over the long run. Immediate claims for cur-
rent spending—to pay wages, benefi t politically powerful groups, or protect 
the population against declines in consumption—take away resources from 
what is important for the longer term. If the government’s budget is too 
large, it can also crowd out private investment in the future. Spending, after 
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all, must be fi nanced by taxes, fees, or infl ation, all of which deprive the 
private sector of resources it might otherwise have invested in growth. 
On the other hand, public spending on infrastructure—roads, ports, air-
ports, and power—crowds private investment in. It expands investment 
opportunities and raises the return to private investment. By paving the 
way for new industries to emerge, it is also a crucial aid to structural trans-
formation and export diversifi cation.
Telecommunications infrastructure (and the pricing of services) is of par-
ticular importance. Telecommunications plays a variety of crucial roles in 
the public and private sector. It can aid education, transparency initiatives, 
and the delivery of government services. It can also raise productivity by 
disseminating price information to farmers, fi shermen, and other produc-
ers. Telecommunications promotes widespread access to fi nancial services. 
It also enables trade in services (a rapidly growing area of commerce) and 
links to global supply chains.
Given the great importance of infrastructure and the tight constraints 
on their resources, governments have increasingly sought to tap private 
sources of fi nance. Although most investment in infrastructure is still pub-
lic, the private sector has increased in importance as governments have 
gained experience in regulating it. 
These public-private partnerships can help a government stretch its bud-
get further. They also spare the public sector the burden of running projects. 
But if the partnerships are to work, governments must be prepared to bear 
other responsibilities instead. They must establish autonomous regulatory 
agencies to oversee the activities of the private agents. The terms of the 
partnership must be written and monitored carefully, so that the private 
investor can earn an honest return but not a monopoly profi t. It is also 
important for commercial risks to be borne by the private party. In too 
many cases, the division of labor has put profi ts in private hands, and risks 
in the public lap. There is now a great deal of accumulated, international 
experience with these partnerships. Some have been extremely successful in 
a wide variety of infrastructure areas, including telecommunications, roads, 
power generation, port management. But there have been equally numer-
ous failures. Lessons should be drawn from both.
Governments must also resist the temptation to see infrastructure as a 
source of revenue. In telecommunications, for example, governments often 
allow private monopolies or quasi-monopolies to earn excessive profi ts, 
which the government can then tax to fi ll its coffers. This transfer from the 
consumer to the government, via the telecommunications giant, results in 
overpriced services, out of reach to large parts of the population. It may 
seem like a second-best solution for a cash-strapped government. But the 
damage to growth is likely to outweigh any fi scal benefi ts.
In short, governments should recognize that their own infrastructure 
investments are an indispensable complement to private efforts. If they 
“International fi nancial 
institutions, the IMF in 
particular, have tended to 
see public investment as 
a short-term stabilization 
issue, and failed to 
grasp its long-term 
growth consequences. 
If low-income countries 
are stuck in a low-level 
equilibrium, then 
putting constraints on 
their infrastructure 
spending may ensure they 
never take off.”
—Montek Singh Ahluwalia
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abrogate the public investment function, it will not be replaced by private 
providers. Growth and delivery of basic services to the public will suffer as 
a result.
Human capital14
Investments in the health, knowledge, and skills of the people—human cap-
ital—are as important as investments in the more visible, physical capital of 
the country. Few economists would dissent from that statement. But they 
fi nd it surprisingly hard to prove it statistically.
This is partly a problem of measurement. Empirical exercises usually 
try to fi nd a connection between, say, education spending and growth. But 
spending on education should not be confused with the ultimate objec-
tive of education, which is to impart knowledge, the ability to learn, and 
noncognitive skills such as curiosity, empathy, and sociability. The same 
fi nancial outlay can yield very different amounts of learning. 
But even if researchers had better measures of education, they may have 
the wrong model of growth. Education may infl uence the economy in subtle 
ways, interacting with other factors. For example, India turned out world-
class engineers and scientists for decades before its economy took off. This 
investment in skills yielded limited economic results until India discovered 
a global demand for software services (a demand which has since broad-
ened to include outsourced research-and-development and a wide array of 
services delivered over the Internet). India, in short, had to solve a demand 
and supply problem, not just a supply problem.
Investments in human capital will generate opportunities for growth, 
including opportunities unforeseen at the time of the investment. But as 
India’s experience demonstrates, those investments do not translate mechan-
ically into growth. Other factors can intervene.
Education
Every country that sustained high growth for long periods put substan-
tial effort into schooling its citizens and deepening its human capital. Con-
versely, considerable evidence suggests that other developing countries are 
not doing enough. 
Education makes a legitimate claim on public money for at least two 
reasons. First, the Commission believes the social return probably exceeds 
the private return. (The research literature is full of controversy and dis-
agreement on this point—debates that were aired during the Commission’s 
workshops.) In other words, educated people contribute more to society 
14 The Commission invited papers and held workshops on health, education, and growth. This section 
draws on those papers and discussions. There is, of course, a vast amount of research underway. As 
governments and donors focus attention and resources on health and education, the body of relevant 
experience is also growing quickly.
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than they get back in higher pay, although the social return is notoriously 
diffi cult to measure.
Second, some families are credit-constrained and cannot borrow as 
much as they would like to spend on schooling, even if the higher wages a 
diploma or degree would fetch could more than repay the loan. Thus public 
spending on education is justifi ed on the grounds of effi ciency and equal-
ity of opportunity. It corrects the failure of the market to allocate enough 
resources to education, and it also widens access to education beyond those 
who can pay for it upfront. 
The timing of education spending matters as well as the amount. Invest-
ments in early childhood raise the returns to investments later in life—chil-
dren must learn how to learn. If they do not, they may never regain the lost 
ground, leaving a society sapped of potential and scarred by inequality. 
How, then, should governments divide their budgets among primary, sec-
ondary, and tertiary education (that is, universities, colleges, and the like)? 
Developing countries, including the high-growth cases, have answered this 
question in a variety of ways. This suggests policy makers need not worry 
unduly about fi ne-tuning the mix in any precise way, provided they do not 
tilt it to one extreme or the other.
It seems reasonable to us to focus fi rst on preschool and early childhood 
education, then on elementary education and literacy, and then increase the 
numbers in secondary school. Nor should governments forget the impor-
tance of a small tertiary sector that should grow as incomes rise and the 
demand for human capital sharpens. It is mostly from the tertiary sector, 
after all, that the government and private sector will fi ll its more senior, 
managerial ranks.
Researchers in this fi eld have settled on “years of schooling” as a conve-
nient, summary indicator of education. This is the measure they most often 
cite in debate, and it is much envied by their counterparts in health policy, 
who lack a single, “vulgar” measure (to use their term) in their fi eld.
But years of schooling is only an input to education. The output—
knowledge, cognitive abilities, and probably also social skills and other 
noncognitive skills—is often not captured. When it is measured, the results 
are often quite worrying. International tests in OECD countries, and also 
some developing countries, show that secondary school students vary enor-
mously in what they actually learn (see fi gure 5).
Why do results vary so much? It is much too early to venture a strong 
opinion. We know that family background matters a lot, especially the par-
ents’ level of education and interest in schooling. In addition to demand-
ing parents, demand from the market matters. When growth accelerates 
and demand for skills expands, the higher return to education strengthens 
incentives for schooling.
On the supply side, a combination of national exams and school auton-
omy works best, according to some experts. The ministry of education 
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should set centralized exams, but leave schools relatively free to decide how 
to meet those national tests. In particular, schools should enjoy autonomy 
in deciding their teachers’ salaries and training. 
Such a combination may explain Finland’s success, relative to other 
OECD countries. But in poorer countries the reasons for success and failure 
may be less subtle. Some countries, for example, face a simple shortage of 
qualifi ed teachers. The schooling budget may not be big enough to attract 
highly educated people, who enjoy more lucrative options in the private 
sector.
Moreover, once hired, teachers do not always face strong incentives to 
do a good job—or even to show up in class. In some countries, teaching 
positions are handed out as a form of political patronage. If people owe 
their jobs to a political favor, they are unlikely to do it well.
This is a knotty problem to solve, and some families decide they can-
not afford to wait. Even those in poor households send their children to 
private schools, at the elementary and secondary levels, despite the fi nan-
cial sacrifi ce this entails. We have been surprised to learn how widespread 
private education has become in many developing countries, even among 
the poorest parts of the population. Most iniquitous are systems in which 
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elite universities, fi nanced from the public purse, set demanding entrance 
standards, which can be met only if people are wealthy enough to pay for 
high-quality private schooling.
We still need to know much more about education—how to get the 
most out of the government’s budget, and how to get the best out of teach-
ers and their students. We recommend this as a high priority for policy 
research. One place to start is measurement. The abilities of students—
their literacy and numeracy—need to be gauged far more widely around 
the world. In other areas of government and business, measuring things 
and disclosing the results are known to change outcomes even without 
further intervention. 
More research would help. But on the basis of the evidence we have 
already seen, it is hard to resist the conclusion that educational spending in 
many countries is marred by waste and ineffi ciency, even as the return to 
human capital is rising around the world. This ineffi ciency is a constraint 
on growth and a threat to equality of opportunity. 
Health
Health is justifi ably viewed by many as a right. It is an end in itself, which 
is deeply valued whether or not it also contributes to economic goals. The 
fact remains, however, that health does also affect economic performance 
in multiple ways.
For example, the threat of disease can deter investment in human capital. 
If households fear their children will not survive infancy, they are likely to 
have more offspring. But with lots of children to care for, they may not 
invest in educating each one.
Researchers are refi ning their estimates of these effects. Take malaria, for 
example. Where the disease is endemic, workers can expect to suffer two 
bouts of fever each year, losing 5–10 working days each time. That is a sub-
stantial loss of labor supply. Much worse is the damage childhood malaria 
may do to the cognitive development of infants.15
But one area stands out as critical. Indeed, ill health and poor nutrition 
in early childhood seems to have a fi rst-order impact on both growth and 
equality. It does so by causing lasting harm to a child’s ability to acquire 
cognitive and noncognitive skills as he or she moves up through school—
harm that is impossible or very diffi cult to reverse. In a world where cog-
nitive skills are rising in value, this damage will jeopardize equality of 
opportunity, and, if widespread, impair a country’s economic potential far 
into the future.
It is not easy, however, to make this insidious problem a pressing politi-
cal issue. The payoffs to interventions in early childhood emerge only in the 
15 See Bloom, David, and Canning, David. 2008. “Population Health and Economic Growth.” Back-
ground Paper, Commission on Growth and Development. 
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very long run. Moreover, children do not have a voice of their own, and 
cannot show their discontent with policy.
The recent run-up in food prices has highlighted the vulnerability of 
low-income groups to undernutrition. The potential consequences on their 
children may be severe. Prompt action to protect poorer groups is urgently 
needed; otherwise malnutrition will cause suffering and also reduce long-
term growth prospects in a manner that is deeply unfair. The world does 
have the resources to deal with this problem, to which later parts of this 
report return. 
Technology Transfer
In all the cases of sustained, high growth, the economies have rapidly 
absorbed knowhow, technology, and, more generally, knowledge from the 
rest of the world. These economies did not have to originate much of this 
knowledge, but they did have to assimilate it at a tremendous pace. That we 
know. What we do not know—at least not as well as we would like—is pre-
cisely how they did it, and how policy makers can hurry the process along. 
This is an obvious priority for research. As highlighted at the beginning of 
this report, economies can learn faster than they can invent. Knowledge 
acquired from the global economy is thus the fundamental basis of eco-
nomic catch-up and sustained growth. 
“Knowledge,” in the language of economics, refers to any trick, tech-
nique, or insight that allows an economy to generate more out of its exist-
ing resources of land, labor, and capital. It includes the codifi ed knowledge 
that can be set out in books, blueprints, and manuals, but also the tacit 
knowhow acquired through experience. The concept is a broad one, as Paul 
Romer, a member of the Commission’s working group, has emphasized. It 
extends from abstract ideas, such as scientifi c formulae, to eminently practi-
cal ones, such as the traffi c circle or roundabout.
Knowledge does not only consist of ideas for making more things, cheaper 
things, or new things. It includes the accumulated wisdom of human and 
social experience—as historians and social scientists interpret and reinter-
pret it. For example, the “invention” of the separation of powers between 
three branches of government, and the checks and balances it ensures, is 
possibly one of the most creative and infl uential innovations of the last few 
centuries. Many other institutional innovations have been tried and refi ned 
through trial and error, and have helped achieve economic and social goals 
more effi ciently and fairly. 
To economists, these ideas all share one characteristic: they are “nonri-
val.” If you use or “consume” an idea, it does not stop me from also using 
it. Thomas Jefferson made a famous analogy with the light of a candle: If 
you light your candle with mine, it does not darken my fl ame.
“In this globalized world, 
physical capital and 
technology are always 
available. But human 
capital is still very 
immobile, so you should 
have good education and 
job-training programs 
to acquaint people 
with the necessary 
technology. Then capital 
and technology can be 
easily transferred to the 
developing economies to 
jump-start growth.”
—Han Duck-soo
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The value of knowledge in the global economy is high and rising. Indeed, 
the progress of the advanced economies depends mainly on innovation and 
new ideas. Technology also spreads more quickly now from the countries 
where it is invented to other parts of the world. For example, it took over 
90 years after its invention for the telegram to spread to 80 percent of devel-
oping countries. It took only 16 years for the mobile phone to do so.16
What can developing economies do to ensure that they learn—to ensure 
that productive and institutional knowledge is transferred to the public and 
private sector? 
One known channel is foreign direct investment (FDI). As well as money, 
FDI can bring a familiarity with foreign production techniques, overseas 
markets, and international supply chains. This expertise may be worth 
more than the capital itself. (China, which has recently experienced an 
excess of saving over investment, would probably prefer FDI without the 
“I”—although China is admittedly a unique case.) In developing countries, 
FDI is a small fraction of total investment. But because of the knowledge 
transfer it normally carries with it, its importance is much larger than its 
fractional contribution to total investment. 
Foreign investors fi nd it hard to keep their knowledge and expertise 
entirely to themselves. A multinational may train a local recruit, who later 
leaves to join another fi rm. It may share technology with a supplier, who 
then serves rival customers. Because know-how leaks beyond the borders of 
the fi rm into the wider economy, there is a natural tendency for the social 
return to FDI to exceed the private return. This creates some justifi cation 
for government policies to encourage it.
Such policies fall into two categories: measures to attract more FDI, and 
measures to extract more knowledge from a given amount of investment. A 
common example of the fi rst is a simple information campaign designed to 
introduce a country’s investment opportunities to potential foreign inves-
tors. These can make a difference if foreign investors imperfectly perceive 
the opportunities and the risks of a potential location. They can also help if 
potential investors are all waiting for each other to be the “pioneer,” who 
incurs the costs of fi nding out about a country. 
Examples of the second type of policy—those that glean more knowl-
edge from FDI—include obligations on the foreign investor to hire and 
train local staff as managers, even letting them advance to positions beyond 
their home country. A common organizational form for doing this is the 
joint venture. However, if such provisions are too onerous (“involuntary 
technology transfer” is the commonly used term), they will deter investors, 
especially those with valuable proprietary knowledge to lose. FDI occurs in 
a highly competitive international environment, and countries need to keep 
16 World Bank. 2008. Global Economic Prospects 2008: Technology Diffusion in the Developing 
World. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Part 2: The Policy Ingredients of Growth Strategies 43
the demands they put on foreign investors in balance with the alternatives 
offered by other potential hosts competing for the same knowledge and 
investment.
Whereas in most countries FDI is a relatively small fraction of total 
investment, in some cases, a single foreign investor looms large. This is 
more likely in small states where economic activity is concentrated in a few 
industries, such as mining or plantation agriculture. In these cases, care 
must be taken to prevent the foreign investor from exercising undue politi-
cal infl uence. Excessive clout can undermine domestic governance, destroy 
trust, and sometimes opens the door to large-scale corruption. 
Foreign education, particularly higher education, has proved to be an 
important channel of knowledge transfer. One of the fi rst actions Japan 
took during the Meiji Restoration was to bring experts from the United 
States and Europe, and to send Japanese students to Western universities. 
A more recent and well-known example is China when it started reforms. 
At the invitation of leaders and offi cials from the Chinese government, a 
stream of foreign experts started to visit the country to help them learn 
about the workings of a market economy, the institutions underpinning it, 
and its responses to change. At the same time, a stream of Chinese students 
left to be trained in U.S. and European universities.
In general, higher education in advanced countries has fi gured promi-
nently in the training of senior managers, policy makers, and political 
leaders in a wide range of countries. The results in terms of growth vary 
considerably. Notwithstanding ambiguous results, foreign education, ideally 
subsidized by advanced countries, is an underused channel for knowledge 
transfer in many countries. By studying abroad, students acquire interna-
tional contacts, which will help them remain abreast of new thinking long 
after they have left the classroom.
Governments should expand such placements and international donors 
should fund them. Furthermore, these opportunities should not be limited 
to scientists and engineers, but should also include young people who are 
likely to serve in policy making and the civil service. We recommend that 
donors, including the international fi nancial institutions, support a program 
of international exchanges for civil servants, so that government personnel 
from one developing country can visit and learn from their counterparts in 
another. Such programs now exist in some countries, particularly in Africa. 
Developing countries would gain if these programs were expanded, made 
more systematic, and extended beyond Africa.
Competition and Structural Change
As it expands, an economy changes its shape and composition as well as 
its size. New industries emerge, older ones eventually fade. The growth 
“Technology comes with 
trade. So trade plays a 
very multidimensional 
role.”
—Han Duck-soo
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of GDP may be measured up in the macroeconomic treetops, but all the 
action is in the microeconomic undergrowth, where new limbs sprout, and 
deadwood is cleared away. From an economic point of view, this process 
is natural. As workers become better educated, better equipped, and better 
paid, some industries become newly viable; others cease to be so.
Joseph Schumpeter described this process as “creative destruction.” 
Governments can hasten the process by encouraging the entry of new fi rms 
and the emergence of new industries. But what perhaps matters more is that 
they do not resist it.
They will certainly be called upon to do so. Some companies, for exam-
ple, will argue they should be sheltered so that they can attain a big enough 
size to be effi cient. The case is thought to be more compelling the smaller 
the economy. But it is a static argument. It dwells on the unit costs of big 
fi rms compared with small ones in an otherwise unchanging world. While 
incumbent fi rms press this case with the government, new companies or 
technologies may be waiting in the wings that will overturn the industry’s 
cost structure or supplant the industry altogether. The static analysis, so 
commonly deployed, is simply misleading and a poor approach to produc-
tivity gains and growth.
In fact, some empirical studies suggest that economies owe most of their 
progress to the entry of new, more productive fi rms, and the exit of ailing 
ones. Improvements in the effi ciency of incumbent fi rms play a smaller role. 
The dynamic productivity gains from entry and exit can overwhelm the 
static effi ciency gains from scale. This means that entry and the threat of 
entry are important to ensure competition. 
Just as the entry and exit of fi rms invigorates industries, so the rise and 
fall of industries breathes life into whole economies. Structural change 
under competitive pressure is what propels productivity growth. It is coun-
terproductive to cling to stagnating industries, even industries that were 
once responsible for the country’s growth. One of the most common mis-
takes, we have learned from a range of experiences, is to fi nd a successful 
constellation of policies and industries, then stay with them for too long. 
When it comes to growth, very little if anything is permanent.
While creative destruction is economically natural, it doesn’t feel natural 
to those displaced in the process. If these casualties of growth are simply 
disregarded, they will seek ways to slow the economy’s progress. In inter-
vening on their behalf, governments should be guided by two principles. 
First, they should try, as far as possible, to protect people, not jobs. Unem-
ployment insurance, retraining, and uninterrupted access to health care are 
all ways to cushion the blows of the market, without shutting it down. 
Second, if governments cannot provide much social protection, they may 
have to tread more carefully with their economic reforms. The speed of job 
destruction should not outstrip the pace of job creation.
“Being exposed to 
competition brings out 
the best in institutions. 
A famous economist 
once said that the best of 
all monopoly profi ts is a 
quiet life. You don’t want 
a quiet life for a fi rm; you 
want it forever trying to 
improve its productivity.”
—Robert Solow
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Labor Markets
In poor, populous countries, labor is in surplus supply. Jobs are hard to 
come by, wages are low, and many people are self-employed out of neces-
sity. This unhappy situation is what 7 percent growth sustained for decades 
is supposed to solve. 
The solution starts by creating gainful employment, often in export 
industries, for people otherwise underemployed in the traditional or infor-
mal sectors. In the next stage, the economy creates better jobs, worthy of 
better educated, more skilful workers. For these stages to unfold, labor 
must be mobile. It must move from fi eld to factory, and from one industry 
to another.
Perhaps the greatest analyst of a labor-surplus economy was Sir Arthur 
Lewis. In his models, the fi elds were so overmanned that the “marginal 
product” of agricultural labor was close to zero. In other words, if one 
fi eld hand left the farm to work in an export factory, the farm would lose 
nothing. By the same token, if the worker were to add even one cent to the 
economy in his or her new factory job, society would gain.
The problem is that an export factory cannot tempt workers from the 
fi elds for one cent. They have to pay more than this. Therefore, the cost to 
the factory of hiring workers from the fi elds is greater than the opportunity 
cost of their labor. As a result, the social return to factory employment 
can be higher than the private return for a period of time. This period 
persists until the surplus labor is absorbed and the wages in the export sec-
tor converge to the opportunity cost in the traditional sector. This is one 
justifi cation for the industrial policies, including the exchange rate policies, 
described in a subsequent section. They make investment in the export sec-
tor more profi table, bringing the private returns more into line with the 
social benefi ts. 
There is much governments can do to increase labor mobility. For exam-
ple, workers fi nd it easier to pick up new skills and enter new trades if they 
are literate and educated. In addition, they will leave the countryside more 
readily if the cities are prepared to accommodate them. In a later section, we 
will discuss what governments can do to ease the strains of urbanization.
Beyond these outlays, governments can also try to overhaul labor market 
institutions and regulations. These institutions are complicated and vari-
ous. Unsurprisingly, researchers disagree about how to reform them.
Some rules and institutions exist to safeguard the rights of labor, defend-
ing workers against exploitation, abuse, underage employment, and unsafe 
working conditions. In some countries, these rights are protected by unions 
or government regulations. But in others, no such protections are in place. 
The Commission feels strongly that these rights should not be sacrifi ced to 
achieve other economic objectives, including growth. Besides, labor viola-
“There’s no doubt that 
sustained growth needs 
well-functioning labor 
markets. Today, we all 
know that the right 
approach is not to 
protect jobs in existing 
industries, but to protect 
employment by giving 
people the chance to get 
training and retraining. 
This kind of mobility is 
absolutely essential.”
—Danuta Hübner
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tions can have a commercial cost, thanks to growing international scrutiny 
of employment conditions and the threat of consumer boycotts.
In many economies, a formal labor market coexists with an informal 
one. Formal jobs typically offer better wages and terms than informal jobs, 
even if the jobholder is no better qualifi ed. They can do so because they 
are fenced off by regulations or unions’ agreement or a combination of the 
two, which prevents the vast pool of “outsiders” bidding down the wages 
of the “insiders.” It is understandable that workers in the formal sector 
will fi ght to defend their privileges and resist competition from outside. In 
a surplus-labor economy, they are playing something close to a zero-sum 
game: there are only so many well-paid, tightly regulated jobs to go round. 
If you gain, I lose.
If demand for labor is strong enough, high costs and heavy regulations 
in the formal sector pose few problems. Firms that are enthusiastically hir-
ing workers may not worry about restrictions on fi ring. Likewise, if the 
labor market is tight enough, the going wage rate will exceed any mini-
mum wages stipulated by law. Many supposed regulatory impediments to 
growth decline in signifi cance or vanish altogether in the face of excess 
demand for labor. 
It is also not uncommon in policy debates in developing countries to hear 
that the problem is on the supply side: it is a matter of weaknesses in the 
labor force, not the weakness of labor demand. The underemployed popu-
lation lack skills, the argument goes, therefore the solution is to train them. 
The aim is to upgrade labor supply, rather than stimulating labor demand. 
There is a certain theoretical sense in which this argument is true. In 
principle, if workers were suffi ciently educated and heavily trained, they 
would be worth the cost of hiring them, even with the full panoply of ben-
efi ts and wages that prevail in the formal sector. But it is diffi cult, not to 
say extremely expensive, to upgrade the skills of workers before fi nding 
employment for them, partly because workers learn so much on the job. 
Thus, while there is no disagreement about the need for education and 
human capital investment, as a matter of strategy in many countries, this 
supply-side approach will often not be suffi cient.
In most cases, the high cost of labor in the formal sector will deter invest-
ment, especially in export industries that must compete in the global mar-
ketplace. But any attempt to breach the divide between the formal and 
informal sectors will meet insurmountable resistance. How, then, can a 
country resolve this conundrum? What policies will simultaneously create 
jobs for the underemployed poor, permit a viable return to industry, and 
mollify the infl uential minority of workers already employed in the formal 
sector?
A pragmatic compromise is one possibility. Rather than imposing the 
full costs of the formal sector on employers, or infl icting unbridled wage 
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competition on workers, governments could create an alternative employ-
ment track. They should allow export-oriented industries to recruit workers 
on easier terms than those that prevail in the formal sector. The govern-
ment could, for example, create special economic zones with less onerous 
employment obligations. The virtue of this approach is that it creates room 
for employment to grow without threatening participants in the formal sec-
tor. The aim is to turn something close to a zero-sum game into a positive-
sum one.
It should be emphasized that this alternative employment track would 
not be free of regulation. It would not be exempt from rules on health, 
safety, working hours, environmental conditions, and child labor. These 
rights are not negotiable.
Nonetheless, this approach to the labor market will not appeal to some. 
It will seem to exacerbate, rather than solve, the existing problem of “dual-
ism,” whereby the labor market is split into segments, each governed by 
different rules and different prices. In a way these charges are true. But the 
alternative is worse. It is to leave large fractions of the population blocked 
from higher productivity employment, consigned to breaking bricks or 
opening doors, rather than assembling toys or stitching garments.
The compromise suggested here should be a temporary one. If successful, 
wages and benefi ts in the new industries will eventually catch up with those 
in the formal sector. As the labor surplus declines, special provisions in the 
export zones can be removed. This is often exactly what happened in coun-
tries that have tried this approach. The country case studies contributed to 
the Commission show that special labor provisions and export zones were 
phased out over time as the need for them declined, and the distortions they 
created in employment, investment, and wages became more worrisome.
Even if they back this temporary compromise, governments should con-
tinue their efforts to reform the formal labor market. An overhaul would 
certainly be desirable. In India, for example, labor contracts that permit 
seasonal work in cyclical industries are problematic even though argu-
ably in the interest of all parties. Our conclusion, born of experience, is 
merely that such reforms are politically diffi cult. Although worthwhile, 
they do not solve the underlying problem of the misalignment of the formal 
and informal sector. Therefore governments should not wait to win these 
battles before exploring other ways to jump-start job growth and export 
diversifi cation.17
It is worth noting that China did not face quite the same problem. At the 
time of its reforms in 1978, there was no formal sector, just the state-owned 
sector, which spanned most of the industrial economy. The new enterprises 
and joint ventures in the export zones were no immediate threat to work-
17 The alternative employment framework for informal jobs may also be useful for things like part-time 
work, which would allow greater female labor force participation. 
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ers in the state-owned enterprises. And the government did not require the 
emerging export sector to offer the same wages or terms of employment 
as the state companies. Thus the exporters had direct access to the surplus 
labor in China’s vast agricultural sector.
Getting the labor market right is vital to both the economics and politics 
of growth. In too many developing countries, a portion of the population 
has not enjoyed the benefi ts of economic advance, and does not anticipate 
enjoying them in the future. If they are forever blocked from employment, 
the economy will miss out on their labor and any growth strategy will lose 
their support. 
Export Promotion and Industrial Policy 
All of the sustained, high-growth cases prospered by serving global mar-
kets. The crucial role of exports in their success is not much disputed. But 
the role of export promotion is. Many of them tried a variety of policies 
to encourage investment in the export sectors in the early stages of their 
development, and several of these measures would qualify as industrial 
policies. They tried to promote specifi c industries or sectors through tax 
breaks, direct subsidies, import tariff exemptions, cheap credit, dedicated 
infrastructure, or the bundling of all of these in export zones.
Nonetheless, the signifi cance of these policies is hard to prove. Even 
though most of the high-growth successful economies tried industrial poli-
cies, so did a lot of failures. Nor do we know the counterfactual: whether the 
high-growth cases would have succeeded even without targeted incentives.
All sides of this debate were refl ected in the Commission’s workshop 
on industrial policies, and in its own deliberations. The cut-and-thrust 
of the argument usefully clarifi ed some of the virtues and risks of export 
promotion. 
Some in the broader debate argue that industrial policies are not neces-
sary. The private sector, in pursuit of profi t, will discover where a country’s 
comparative advantage lies and invest accordingly. Others argue that mar-
kets fall short in certain respects. Outside industrial investors (entering via 
FDI) may not know how to do business in a new location, for example. 
Those that enter fi rst, regardless of whether they are successful, provide 
a benefi t to other potential entrants. Their rivals and successors will learn 
from their experiment, without having borne the costs or risks. This can 
lead to a suboptimal level of experimentation, unless the government steps 
in to encourage it.
To take another example, in countries where large numbers of workers 
are underemployed in agriculture, the social return to factory employment 
may exceed the private return. It may be necessary to subsidize employment 
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or investment outside agriculture to compensate for this gap. (This point is 
explained in greater detail in the section on labor markets.)
Some skeptics might concede that markets do not always work, but they 
argue that industrial policies don’t either. This is either because govern-
ments do not know what they are doing—they lack the expertise to iden-
tify successful targets for investment, and will waste resources on plausible 
failures—or because they knowingly subvert the process to their own ends, 
dispensing favors to their industrial allies. There is, of course, consider-
able variation across countries in the competence of government and in the 
undue infl uence of special interests. But those who worry about govern-
ment competence or capture would prefer to rule out promotional activities 
altogether. The risk of failure or subversion is too great, they say; better not 
to try.
But there are also risks to doing nothing. A fl ourishing export sector 
is a critical ingredient of high growth, especially in the early stages. If an 
economy is failing to diversify its exports and failing to generate productive 
jobs in new industries, governments do look for ways to try to jump-start 
the process, and they should.
These efforts should bow to certain disciplines, however. First, they 
should be temporary, because the problems they are designed to overcome 
are not permanent. Second, they should be evaluated critically and aban-
doned quickly if they are not producing the desired results. Subsidies may 
be justifi ed if an export industry cannot get started without them. But if it 
cannot keep going without them, the original policy was a mistake and the 
subsidies should be abandoned. Third, although such policies will discrimi-
nate in favor of exports, they should remain as neutral as possible about 
which exports. As far as possible, they should be agnostic about particular 
industries, leaving the remainder of the choice to private investors.18 Finally 
and importantly, export promotion is not a good substitute for other key 
supportive ingredients: education, infrastructure, responsive regulation, 
and the like. 
Exchange Rates
In the developing world, most governments and central banks feel they 
cannot afford to take their eye off the foreign value of their currency. But 
efforts to shepherd exchange rates are as controversial as industrial policies. 
Indeed, they can be thought of as a form of industrial policy. If a govern-
ment resists an appreciation of the currency, or if it devalues, it is, in effect, 
18 This last is not a rigid rule. For example, training for particular industries may be warranted, espe-
cially if private companies underinvest in transferable skills, because they fear that workers will carry 
those skills with them to a rival fi rm. But these types of sector-specifi c support work best when they 
follow rather than lead private investment.
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imposing an across-the-board tax on imports and providing a subsidy to 
exports.
Economists have lined up equally passionately for and against such poli-
cies. Max Corden describes them as a kind of protectionism. Others, such 
as Bela Balassa, thought they held the key to development. This is how John 
Williamson, a fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Econom-
ics, has described Balassa’s position: “give [a country] an exchange rate 
suffi ciently competitive that its entrepreneurs are motivated to go and sell 
on the world market, and it will grow. Give it too much easy money from 
oil exports, or aid, or capital infl ows, and let its exchange rate appreciate 
in consequence, and too many people with ability will be diverted from 
exporting to squabbling about the rents, and growth will be doomed.”19
Many of the countries that enjoyed sustained, high growth have shared 
Balassa’s exchange rate convictions at various times. To keep the currency 
competitive, they have regulated the amount and type of capital fl owing 
across their borders. They have also accumulated foreign reserves in the 
central bank. A mixture of the two policies was normal.
The use of exchange rates for “industrial policy,” that is to maintain 
export competitiveness, has the advantage of being neutral between indus-
trial sectors. It does not make big demands on government discretion and 
expertise. However, it has its own costs and risks.
For one thing, these policies can limit the amount of capital a coun-
try imports from overseas. This raises the cost of capital, which will tend 
to reduce investment. Indeed, these policies create an interesting trade-off. 
They make investment in the export sector more appealing. But they simul-
taneously make capital less readily available.20
Second, management of the exchange rate is sometimes used as a sub-
stitute for productivity-enhancing investments in education and human 
capital or for other crucial elements of a growth strategy, such as inbound 
knowledge transfer. When used in this way, it results in growth, purchased 
at the price of very low wages commensurate with equally low productivity 
levels. 
Third, where surplus labor is no longer available, or labor unions are 
strong, an undervalued exchange rate may lead to higher pay demands and 
a wage-price spiral that is detrimental to sustained growth prospects. 
At best, management of the exchange rate can be used for two purposes. 
One is to tip the balance slightly in favor of exports in the early stages of 
growth, to overcome informational asymmetries and other potential transi-
tory frictions. The other is to prevent a surge of capital infl ows (which may 
be transitory) from disrupting the profi tability and growth of the export 
sectors.
19 Williamson, John. 2003. Review of “Too Sensational” by Max Corden. Journal of Economic Litera-
ture 41(4): 1289–90.
20 Williamson, John. 2003. “Exchange Rate Policy and Development.” Initiative for Policy Dialogue.
“Fixed exchange rates 
can lead to all kinds of 
imbalances, pent-up 
problems and ultimately 
duress and even crisis, as 
happened in the 1990s. 
So I think it is very much 
in the interest of each 
developing country to 
move toward a fl exible 
exchange rate. Obviously 
if you have a relatively 
fi xed rate to begin with, 
you’ve got to fi nd some 
way to do that at a pace 
that enables the rest 
of your fi nancial and 
economic system to 
adjust to the change.”
—Robert Rubin
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If pursued to extremes, holding the exchange rate down will result in a 
big trade surplus. This is not in the country’s own interest, as it involves 
forsaking current consumption in order to lend to foreigners. Nor will sur-
pluses go down well with the neighbors. By keeping its currency cheap, 
a country makes its trading partners’ currencies more expensive. When a 
large country like China does this, it does not escape notice. Trade part-
ners, who feel China’s exporters enjoy an unfair advantage, may threaten 
to retaliate with tariffs. That is in no one’s interest.
Is “export promotion” a polite term for crude mercantilism? In the 18th 
century, some European powers thought the goal of economic statecraft 
was simply to sell more to foreigners than you bought from them, resulting 
in a trade surplus and an infl ow of gold bullion. 
The case of high-growth economies is different. To catch up with the 
advanced economies, countries will need to increase the size of their export 
sector, so that exports as a percentage of GDP will increase. But that is 
only one side of the ledger. On the other side, imports can and should also 
increase. The goal of an export-led strategy is not to increase reserves or to 
run a trade surplus. It is to increase exports to enable incremental produc-
tive employment, larger imports, and ultimately faster growth. (See also 
our discussion of the “adding-up” problem in part 4.)
The more a country earns from its exports, the more it can afford to 
benefi t from imports, especially the equipment and machinery that embody 
new technologies. If, on the other hand, exports fl ag, the shortage of for-
eign exchange will limit what a country can buy-in from abroad and ham-
per its progress.
As with other forms of export promotion, exchange rate policies can 
outlive their usefulness. If the currency is suppressed by too much or for too 
long, it will distort the evolution of the economy by removing the natural 
market pressure for change. The cheap currency will tend to lock activity 
into labor-intensive export sectors, reduce the return to upgrading skills, 
and eventually harm productivity as a result. Like other industrial policies, 
a keenly priced currency is supposed to solve a specifi c, transitory prob-
lem. Eventually, as an economy grows more prosperous, domestic demand 
should and usually does play an increasingly important role in generating 
and sustaining growth. Exchange rate policy should not stand in the way 
of this natural evolution.
Capital Flows and Financial Market Openness
Economists would readily agree that fi nancial openness is benefi cial in the 
long run. No one now advocates capital controls for America or the Euro-
pean Union. But analysts will also confess to considerable uncertainty and 
some disagreement about the timing and sequencing of moves to open up.
“The East Asian 
experience since the 
1960s—the tigers, 
the dragons, and now 
China, Vietnam, and 
others—demonstrates 
the role of a competitive 
exchange rate in rapid 
growth. In all cases, this 
was achieved through 
a combination of 
restrictions on capital 
infl ows and monetization 
of infl ows.”
—Zhou Xiaochuan
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None of the sustained, high-growth cases that we know about were par-
ticularly quick to open their capital accounts. Yet developing countries have 
come under considerable pressure from international fi nancial institutions 
and economic commentators, urging them to unlock the fi nancial gates. 
Whether this is good advice seems to us to depend heavily on whether the 
economy is diversifi ed, its capital markets mature, and its fi nancial institu-
tions strong. 
Even if one thinks controls on capital infl ows and outfl ows are desirable 
at certain stages of growth, are they feasible? Can they be effective? There 
are indeed many ways of circumventing capital controls, and fi nancial 
markets have proven exceptionally creative in exploiting them. But poli-
cies that actively discourage speculative, short-term capital infl ows have 
proven useful in turbulent times. The fact that controls may be leaky and 
imperfect does not seem a decisive argument against them. Many other 
policies—taxes, for example—are also leaky and imperfect. That is not a 
reason to abandon them altogether; merely a reason to implement them 
better.
Developing countries like to exercise some control over the exchange 
rate, both to maintain the competitiveness of their exports, and also to 
offset damaging bouts of exchange rate volatility. Capital controls allow a 
developing country to do this while also controlling infl ation. Absent con-
trols, large capital infl ows give central bankers no choice but to let the cur-
rency strengthen or to accumulate reserves, a policy which implies a loss of 
monetary control. To put the same point slightly differently: every country 
wants and needs to control infl ation. If it also wishes to exercise some inde-
pendent control over the exchange rate (for competitive reasons or just to 
control volatility), then it needs capital controls.21 
This is why many countries favor capital controls until such time as the 
structural transformation of the economy is well advanced. It is diffi cult to 
be precise as to when exactly the point of “well advanced” is reached. And 
the exact timing of when the controls should be lifted is a controversial 
matter. Some believe that middle-income countries, economically diversi-
fi ed, and with diversifi ed and deep local fi nancial markets and strong links 
to the world economy are better off with an infl ation-targeting regime, 
allowing relatively free capital fl ows and fl exible exchange rates (“dirty 
fl oats”). But to avoid damaging currency overvaluations, such economies 
would be well advised to maintain a strong fi scal position that would per-
mit them to accumulate international reserves without loss of monetary 
control. 
21 The proposition more precisely is that if a country has an open capital account and manages its 
exchange rate it will not be in control of the money supply. Thus, it is dependent on other instruments 
to manage infl ationary pressures; fi scal policy being the obvious candidate. Fiscal policy is a very 
imperfect substitute for monetary policy in dealing with infl ation.
“Keeping exchange rates 
competitive should be 
a principal objective 
of policy in emerging 
economies. Central 
banks should stand 
ready to buy up to the 
last dollar. The pressure 
on central banks can 
be relieved by placing 
controls on capital 
infl ows. Yes, capital 
controls are leaky, but so 
are taxes, and that does 
not stop governments 
from trying to tax their 
citizens.”
—Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski
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Macroeconomic Stability
No economy can fl ourish in the midst of macroeconomic instability. Wild 
fl uctuations in the price level, the exchange rate, the interest rate, or the 
tax burden serve as a major deterrent to private investment, the proximate 
driver of growth. Economists and policy makers, however, disagree about 
the precise defi nition of stability and the best way to preserve it.
For example, very high infl ation is clearly damaging to investment and 
growth. Bringing infl ation down is also very costly in terms of lost output 
and employment. But how high is very high? Some countries have grown 
for long periods with persistent infl ation of 15–30 percent.22 With central 
banks in Europe, the United States, and developing countries now targeting 
much lower rates, this threshold appears excessive. The consensus now is 
that infl ation should be kept stable and in single digits. However, the ben-
efi ts of bringing it to very low levels are unclear. 
There is widespread agreement that central banks can best fi ght infl ation 
if given a degree of autonomy from political imperatives. In particular, a 
central bank should be insulated from the potentially irresponsible behav-
ior of politicians, who may want it to relax its grip on infl ation before 
elections, or to bankroll their spending plans. As they have become more 
autonomous, central banks have become much better at controlling infl a-
tion all over the world, without harming growth.
At the same time, central banks have sometimes been criticized for 
appearing indifferent to the need of the real economy and unresponsive to 
political demands. In a mature market economy, the downsides of central 
bank independence seem pretty modest. The central bank’s commitment 
to price stability does not greatly endanger any of the economy’s other 
objectives. And if its commitment results in higher interest rates or a more 
volatile exchange rate, the private sector has the fl exibility and the fi nancial 
instruments to cope.
In a developing economy, the issue is more complicated. The desirable 
effects of independence do not go away. But the economy must also main-
tain a coherent economic strategy. High-speed growth relies on export 
growth and a rapid integration into the global economy. That process is 
affected by exchange rates, interest rates, and infl ation. Thus the central 
bank’s choices in all three areas bear heavily on the implementation of a 
growth strategy. Judgment is required to balance the benefi ts of autonomy 
and the need for coherence. In some countries this balance is achieved by 
having the Minister of Finance set the objectives and broad parameters of 
macroeconomic policies, and then leaving the Central Bank free to operate 
within these parameters. 
22 Fischer, Stanley. 1993. “The Role of Macroeconomic Factors in Growth.” Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics 32(3): 485–512.
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Fiscal policy poses similar dilemmas. Rigid fi scal rules, which set ceilings 
for defi cits, debt, current spending, and the like, help policy makers avoid 
costly mistakes. There are certainly times and places in which avoidance of 
mistakes is the fi rst priority and rigid rules can be essential for this purpose. 
However, these rules can become counterproductive if applied too strictly 
for too long. In the words of one of the workshop participants, fi scal and 
monetary rules need to be left with an element of “creative ambiguity.”
The concern is that the rules may be too rigid. They may set a fi xed 
ceiling on fi scal defi cits, for example. But defi cits are more or less reckless 
depending on how quickly an economy is growing. If GDP is increasing 
quickly enough, then the government can run quite a big defi cit without 
the ratio of debt to GDP ever growing. The ambiguities do not end there. 
Growth may itself depend on government investment, which may relieve 
infrastructure bottlenecks, for example. If the government cuts this invest-
ment to meet a fi scal defi cit target, growth may falter, leaving the medium-
run debt-to-GDP ratio no better off than before.
Thus, pragmatism suggests that any assessment of the public fi nances 
should take account of the economy’s growth rate, and the effect of public 
expenditure on that growth. 
Savings
Just as growth depends on investment, investment depends on a country’s 
ability to fi nance it—out of its own savings or from foreign sources. There 
are limits to the latter, however, because foreign borrowing is risky. These 
limits are not very precise. But when they are breached the consequences 
can be very costly as many debt crises remind us. What is important to 
keep in mind is that there is no case of a sustained high investment path not 
backed up by high domestic savings. This raises the question, what drives 
savings? There is an old controversy which remains unresolved: do savings 
drive investment? Or do investments generate their own savings? Probably 
the causation runs in both directions. It depends on whether the economy 
has underutilized resources that can be transformed into investment, but the 
truth is that experts in this area have not yet come to fi rm conclusions.23
Savings have three components: household, corporate, and government.
Government saving is the percentage of its investment that is fi nanced out 
of revenues (that percentage can exceed 100 when the government covers its 
investment and also pays back debt). The number can be less than zero if the 
government is fi nancing its current expenditure, which can include redistri-
bution programs, with debt. To sustain adequate levels of public investment, 
23 Deaton, Angus. 1999. “Saving and Growth,” in Luis Serven and Klaus Schmitt-Hebbel, The Econom-
ics of Savings and Growth. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
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government revenues need to be high enough to support current expendi-
tures on service delivery and a part of the investment program.
But governments are often short of revenues, and wary of imprudent 
borrowing. As a result, public investment is commonly crowded out by 
demands for current expenditures and redistribution. This partly refl ects a 
political process that places a higher value on current consumption relative 
to future consumption, which is both more distant in time and less certain 
to materialize.24 For public sector investment to survive, government rev-
enue needs to be adequate to the task. 
The second element of savings is corporate. Companies retain profi ts, 
rather than distributing them to shareholders, and reinvest them in the busi-
ness, wherever they think the return is likely to exceed the cost of capital. 
This component of saving, then, is largely driven by the returns to private 
investment.
Companies also turn to external fi nancing to pay for investment projects. 
Start-up companies, for example, often have little in the way of retained 
earnings to fi nance new ventures. Some of this extra fi nancing can come 
from abroad, as is the case with FDI. But experience suggests that most of 
it needs to come from domestic saving. 
The determinants of household savings are complex and not fully under-
stood. They are affected by income levels, demographics, the presence or 
absence of social insurance systems. There may also be cultural differences 
that show up in the propensity to save. 
Household savings may be too low to fi nance high levels of private 
investment. One reason may be the lack of secure and accessible vehicles 
for saving. Many poor households lack a bank account. They store their 
wealth in jewelry, or by investing in their own tiny businesses. In neither 
case is the household’s saving available to other, more productive fi rms to 
invest. This lack of saving vehicles could have a fi rst-order negative impact 
on growth. 
Conversely, another cause of high savings can be the lack of social insur-
ance, pensions, and public funding of social services. In many countries, 
households, including poor ones, save for their own retirement, their chil-
dren’s education, and to insure themselves in the event of ill health. These 
choices represent socially very costly incentives for high savings. They 
should not be taken as having prescriptive value.
There are very few developing countries in which savings exceed invest-
ment by large amounts, with the notable exception of oil exporters and 
other resource-rich countries. China’s excess savings, as measured by its 
24 Government saving is a matter of collective but not individual choice, and hence is determined by 
somewhat different factors from those that affect household saving choices. There are a few cases of 
required (by law) individual or household savings. Singapore is one example. It does not seem to us 
that this model is likely to have wide applicability. 
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current account surplus, recently grew from modest levels (about 3 percent 
of GDP) to quite high (12 percent of GDP) in 2007. That is an unusual 
confi guration, even for China, which has had a high rate of saving and 
investment since its 1978 reforms. Generally, running savings well above 
investment levels is a bad idea except for resource-rich countries, especially 
during times of booming resource prices. The deferred consumption would 
be better enjoyed in the present. And large countries that sustain high sur-
pluses expose themselves to the charge of mercantilism. 
Countries with large oil reserves often invest a large portion of their 
export earnings abroad. If their resource rents are very large, it normally 
doesn’t make sense to consume or invest them domestically. But the scale of 
their overseas investments has aroused concern in some quarters. It is hard 
to know what other options oil-exporters have. If they were not permitted 
to invest their oil earnings abroad, their next best strategy would be to leave 
the oil in the ground. That would probably not be in anyone’s interest. 
Financial Sector Development
A well-developed fi nancial system can help an economy grow by mobiliz-
ing savings, allocating funds to investment, and redistributing risk. But the 
pattern of fi nancial sector maturation varies considerably among countries. 
Here we focus on a few key issues.
If the fi nancial system fails to reach large portions of the population, 
household savings will be stunted. People need a secure, accessible vehicle 
for storing their wealth. If the banks do not provide it, people will save 
less, or store their money in less liquid forms that do not serve the wider 
economy well.
The absence of savings channels is inequitable as well as ineffi cient. The 
same can be said of the uneven provision of other types of fi nancial services, 
including credit and secure transactions at reasonable cost. The burgeon-
ing fi eld of microfi nance is addressing these issues with benefi cial effects in 
many countries. 
Deprived of savings accounts and bank loans, the poor also often lack 
secure title to their physical assets. Without property rights and the means 
to enforce them, they may struggle to obtain a loan from a formal fi nancial 
institution. This reduces their access to credit, which makes it harder for 
them to start a business or expand one.
As the 2007–08 credit crunch demonstrates, even well-developed fi nan-
cial sectors are prone to shocks and crises. In emerging economies, fi nan-
cial crises can have devastating consequences for growth. Multiple banks 
can fail and whole swathes of industry can go bankrupt. Private liabilities 
quickly become public ones.
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Financial crises can originate at home or overseas, and they can play out 
within a country’s border or across them.
One common cause of internal crises is unsustainable public spending. 
Unable to raise the resources to pay its bills, a reckless government may 
order the central bank to print money instead. This will end in hyperinfl a-
tion, unless the central bank has enough autonomy to refuse the govern-
ment’s demands.
Internal crises can also result from imprudent banks. In the early stages 
of development, the banking system provides most of the credit in an 
economy. (Bond markets emerge only later, as the capacity to issue, rate, 
and trade these securities develops.) Careful regulation and supervision are 
required to prevent banks from expanding credit too far. 
The worst fi nancial crises are often those that have an external dimen-
sion, involving foreign as well as domestic capital. Indeed, the threat of such 
confl agrations is one reason why countries impose capital controls. There 
are no precise guidelines for opening up to foreign capital and minimiz-
ing the risk of fi nancial crises. But there is now a consensus that countries 
should open up, removing capital controls, only in step with their fi nancial 
market maturity. Excessive speed introduces unnecessary risk and excessive 
slowness raises the cost of capital.
However, openness and maturity are linked. One way to speed up fi nan-
cial sector development is to invite foreign fi nancial fi rms to invest in the 
sector. Just as FDI brings expertise to domestic industry, so the entry of 
foreign banks might raise the game of domestic ones, making them more 
robust. Governments will naturally want foreign banks to meet the same 
regulatory demands as domestic fi nancial institutions. However, foreign 
banks may be reluctant to set up shop in a developing economy if they can-
not conduct fi nancial transactions fairly freely across borders. Again there 
are interesting trade-offs and dilemmas. The more open a fi nancial system, 
the more mature it will become. But the more open a fi nancial system, the 
more mature it needs to be. The quality of regulation has a direct bearing 
on the speed of safe capital market opening.
Urbanization and Rural Investment
This year, the world will pass an important threshold: half the world’s peo-
ple will live in cities. Over the next two decades, as the global population 
increases, most of that growth will take place in cities in the developing 
world (see fi gure 6). 
People migrated from the countryside to the towns during Britain’s 
industrial revolution, and they have done so in every industrial revolution 
since. It is extremely rare to achieve per capita incomes above $10,000 
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(in purchasing power parity terms) before half of the population lives in 
the cities. Urbanization is the geographical corollary of industrialization: as 
workers leave the farms for the factories, they leave the fi elds for the cities. 
Although no country has industrialized without also urbanizing, in no 
country has this process been entirely smooth. Many fast-growing cities 
in the developing world are disfi gured by squalor and bereft of public ser-
vices. It is easy to conclude that urbanization is an unpleasant side effect of 
growth, best to be avoided. But this is a mistake. The proper response is not 
to resist urbanization, but to make it more orderly.
Cities thrive because of what economists call “agglomeration econo-
mies.” When activities are clustered closely together, they can reap econo-
mies of scale and scope. Information also fl ows more effi ciently. Valuable 
tricks of the trade seem to leak into the air, as Alfred Marshall, the great 
Victorian economist, observed.
But if cities thrive on scale and density, they also choke on congestion 
and pollution. In Cairo, the average daytime noise is 85 decibels, according 
to a report by Egypt’s National Research Center.25 That, The New York 
Times reports, is louder than a freight train 15 feet away.
To an economist, both the advantages of cities and their drawbacks 
represent “externalities” that are diffi cult to measure or price. (Your noise 
deafens me, but you do not compensate me for it. Likewise, I benefi t from 
25 Slackman, Michael. 2008. “A City Where You Can’t Hear Yourself Scream.” The New York Times, 
April 14.
0
2,500
1950–1975 1975–2000 2000–2030
rural, all countries
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
to
ta
l p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 g
ro
w
th
 (
m
ill
io
n
s)
urban, middle and low income urban, high income
time span
Figure 6 Population Growth to 2030: Low- and Middle-Income versus 
High-Income Countries
Source: United Nations Urbanization Prospects.
Part 2: The Policy Ingredients of Growth Strategies 59
copying your techniques or poaching your workers, but I do not compen-
sate you for it.) That may be one reason why they are so hard to manage.
The traditional response to these externalities is planning and regula-
tion. Zoning laws, for example, keep factories at a civilized distance from 
homes, where their noise, commotion, and pollution are less bothersome. 
But a delicate balance needs to be struck. Unrealistic regulations can fail 
or backfi re. Some cannot be enforced. Others do bite, but make matters 
worse. If building codes are too strict, for example, cheap housing will 
be illegal. Nor should governments resort to planning regulations to mask 
what is really an underlying shortage of infrastructure. If water is not reach-
ing every household in a dense urban area, the answer is to lay more water 
pipes, not to clear some households out.
Fast-growing cities need to extend infrastructure quickly. But city author-
ities cannot raise the money to build it at the pace required. The growth of 
economic activity in a city’s limits often far outstrips the growth of its tax 
base. Therefore money will have to be provided by the central government. 
An alternative is to sell land or lease it. This has risks—public land can 
be sold too cheaply in transactions that are not arm’s-length and at mar-
ket prices—but the opportunity to raise large sums outweighs the dangers. 
In the absence of municipal fi nancing mechanisms and an established tax 
base, land is one of the principal assets that can be sold and converted to 
needed infrastructure. Defi ning suitable guidelines and parameters would 
be a useful area of research.
As others have noted, the fi nancial system can be as important to the 
growth of cities as cranes or earthmovers. Financial institutions make it 
possible for municipalities or private buyers to borrow the money for real 
estate purchases. As fi nancial liberalization has spread, so too has housing 
fi nance. This is to be welcomed: mortgages allow property buyers to spread 
the cost of housing over longer periods, making it more affordable. But 
home lenders can be reckless, as recent events in America and Britain show. 
Mortgages are also the wrong answer if home building is constrained. In 
this case, mortgage fi nance will only increase the demand for a fi xed supply 
of houses, resulting in pricier homes, not more homes. 
As property prices rise in booming cities, so do the political demands for 
housing subsidies. Singapore used subsidized housing to narrow inequality 
and instill a sense of nationhood in its citizens. But it would be hard for 
other governments to emulate the experience of this city-state, which is 
small and unusually well administered. Rent subsidies distort private deci-
sions. They also rapidly become very costly. Even America does not reach 
more than a fraction of eligible people with its rent subsidy. 
Some people believe the problems of the cities can be solved out in the 
fi elds. Investment in rural areas might slow the tide of migrants to the cities, 
allowing for a more orderly urbanization. 
“Ten or more years ago, 
the Chinese central 
government resisted 
urbanization, which 
the authorities thought 
was too rapid. This 
deserves to be on the list 
of ‘bad ideas’ because it 
ignores the importance 
of agglomeration 
effi ciencies. The Chinese 
government has since 
reversed policy. It now 
understands the key 
role of urbanization 
in structural 
transformation. But 
urbanization poses a 
number of challenges. 
One is to develop an 
urban tax base and 
revenue system. Land 
rights are also extremely 
important: land is the 
most valuable asset in 
urban settings; how it is 
allocated determines how 
urbanization takes place. 
Another problem is how 
to subsidize housing 
effi ciently. The pressure 
to subsidize housing 
through rent controls 
needs to be resisted.”
—Zhou Xiaochuan
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There are many good reasons to invest in agriculture. The rewards can 
be impressive. Agricultural research and extension yield returns of around 
35 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa and 50 percent in Asia, according to the 
latest World Development Report. Moreover, in many developing coun-
tries, rural areas are where the bulk of the poor still live and work. To fi nd 
jobs for this population in the urban economy will take several decades, 
even in the most dynamic economies. India, for example, is still about 70 
percent rural. In China, which has been growing at 9–10 percent a year for 
almost 30 years, 55 percent of the population still lives in the countryside. 
Rural populations are often underserved by public services, which prompts 
some to seek better education or health care in the cities. The evidence 
also suggests that agricultural growth reduces poverty faster than growth 
in manufacturing or services.
Governments should invest in agriculture, then, insofar as such invest-
ments are justifi ed on their own merits. But as a way to slow the growth of 
cities, rural investment is likely to disappoint. In many countries, especially 
in Africa, the growth of cities is mostly due to natural population increases 
and not migration. In addition, if rural investment raises the productivity 
of agriculture, it may simply reduce the demand for farm labor, adding to 
the pressure to leave the land.
If history is any guide, large-scale migration to the cities is part and par-
cel of the transformation economies must go through if they are to grow 
quickly. No country has ever caught up with the advanced economies 
through farming alone. In countries that in the last 50 years sustained epi-
sodes of 7 percent growth or more over 25 years or longer, manufacturing 
and services led the way (see fi gure 7). In a few cases agriculture actually 
shrank. Of course, prior gains in agricultural productivity may have freed 
up workers to fi ll the factories. But by the same token, the outmigration of 
surplus workers from agriculture will, at a certain point, allow land to be 
consolidated into larger plots. This should permit more capital-intensive 
and productive farming. 
Ultimately a successful city will need urban planning, building codes, 
and robust property rights. It will need drainage, sewerage, rapid transit, 
and a sophisticated fi nancial system capable of mobilizing the funds for 
these. But accumulating this infrastructure, expertise, and sophistication 
takes time. Governments should avail themselves of whatever shortcuts 
they can fi nd, including the experience and expertise of other cities that 
have gone through this turmoil before them. 
Equity and Equality of Opportunity
It is our belief that equity and equality of opportunity are essential ingredi-
ents of sustainable growth strategies. The evidence from both high and low 
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cases supports this view. The benefi ts of brisk growth are spread widely but 
not evenly. The rural poor do gain. But the experience of sustained growth 
in the modern era clearly suggests city-dwellers gain more—and to some 
extent this is inevitable. In the early stages of development, measured pro-
ductivity in the cities is often 3–6 times that in the rural areas. As people 
move across this divide, measured inequality increases. This rise is not per-
manent, but it can take decades to run its course. The extent of inequality 
needs to be managed.
Albert Hirschman, the great development economist, compared this pro-
cess to a two-lane traffi c jam. If one lane begins to move, drivers in the 
other at fi rst take comfort, inferring that their lane will also move soon. But 
the longer they remain stuck, the more frustrated they will become. The 
other lane becomes a provocation, not a consolation.26
The workshop on this topic made an important distinction between 
equity and equality of opportunity. The former concept refers to outcomes 
or results: people differ greatly in the incomes they earn, the health they 
enjoy, the security they possess, and so on. The latter idea, equality of 
opportunity, refers to starting points. It turns on such things as access to 
nutrition, education, and job opportunities.
26 Hirschman, Albert. 1981. “The Changing Tolerance for Income Inequality in the Course of Economic 
Development,” in Essays in Trespassing. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
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People care about both kinds of equality. But they understand that mar-
kets do not produce equal outcomes. They will tolerate this inequality, 
provided governments take steps to contain it. Generally, this means two 
things. One is making sure that income and essential services are extended 
to the poorer part of the population. The second, more controversial, is 
addressing the upper end of the income distribution, which in many cases 
exhibits vast accumulating wealth and appears to be living in a differ-
ent, much richer country. Sharing this wealth through the tax system, and 
appropriate spending programs, including the funding of service provision 
and public sector investment, is an important part of social and political 
cohesion, and hence of the sustainability of the growth process. Judgment is 
required here. Carried to excess, redistribution can damage incentives and 
deter investment and risk taking. 
Inequality of opportunity, on the other hand, does not involve trade-offs 
and can be toxic. This is especially so if opportunities are systematically 
denied to a group due to its ethnicity, religion, caste, or gender. Such injus-
tices undermine social peace and spark political unrest. They will ultimately 
jeopardize buy-in and derail the economy’s growth strategy.
The distribution of income in successful, high-growth economies varied 
a lot: Botswana had a Gini coeffi cient of 0.61 in 1993, Indonesia 0.34. 
But all showed a commitment to equality of opportunity. Failure on this 
score harms the economy directly, by leaving talents underexploited. It also 
distorts the pattern of investment. According to a paper for the Commis-
sion by Abhijit Banerjee of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the 
middle ranks and the poor underinvest in their businesses, because they 
are denied equal access to capital. The rich, on the other hand, invest too 
much.27
Inequality of opportunity also sows longer-term dangers. If one group is 
persistently and fl agrantly excluded from the fruits of growth, the chances 
are they will eventually fi nd a way to derail it. To extend Hirschman’s meta-
phor, they will try to force their way into the other lane, disrupting traffi c in 
both. Conversely, evidence from many countries suggests people will make 
great sacrifi ces for the sake of economic progress if they believe their chil-
dren and grandchildren will enjoy a fair share of the rewards.
How can governments safeguard equality of opportunity and contain 
inequality of outcomes? The latter goal may be served by redistribution, 
over and above the informal sharing arrangements that often prevail in 
extended families and tight-knit communities. Equality of opportunity 
is best served by providing universal access to public services like health 
and education, and by meritocratic systems in government and the private 
sector.
27 Banerjee, Abhijit. 2007. “Investment Effi ciency and the Distribution of Wealth.” Background Paper, 
Commission on Growth and Development.
“In many ways, the more 
equitable the growth, 
the more sustainable it’s 
likely to be, because there 
will be less controversy, 
less disagreement, less 
resistance, and also 
there’s an enormous 
amount of talent in 
populations that needs 
to be tapped. Excluding 
some parts of the 
population, whether by 
gender, age, or ethnicity, 
from the benefi ts of 
growth loses the talents 
that they have. So in 
my view, it is not only 
desirable that they go 
together, it’s useful that 
they go together.”
—Robert Solow
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It is also served by building what might be called the infrastructure of 
popular capitalism. Titling programs, inspired by the work of the Peru-
vian economist Hernando de Soto, give poor people secure rights to their 
property. Microfi nance and “mesofi nance” allow small- and medium-scale 
entrepreneurs to invest more than they can save, loosening the knots iden-
tifi ed by Banerjee. Over the past 15 years, donors, businesses, and social 
entrepreneurs have embraced these ideas and made considerable progress 
on the ground.
Some of the sharpest divisions fall within the household, where women 
lack the opportunities their male relatives enjoy. Some countries still strug-
gle to get girls through school: almost one out of fi ve girls who enroll does 
not complete primary school. They are encumbered by domestic chores or 
deterred by the lack of basic facilities like bathrooms. This denial of oppor-
tunity can be passed on to the next generation: women who lack a primary 
school education are less likely to send their children to school. Indeed, their 
children are only about half as likely to survive infancy.28 It seems to us that 
the logical place to try to break this cycle is to focus on the obstacles (fi nan-
cial, safety, employment opportunities, sanitary facilities, and other) that 
prevent girls from completing the journey from school entry to productive 
employment. Young women play a pivotal role in education, health, and 
fertility rates; they are also potentially successful economic agents. There-
fore enabling women to move successfully through education to productive 
employment will have a very high payoff in terms of long-term growth and 
poverty reduction. 
Regional Development
Just as the impact of growth is felt unevenly across the population, so it falls 
unevenly across regions. Some states, provinces, and cities prosper rapidly, 
whereas others can lag behind. These spatial patterns can refl ect the fun-
damentals of geography—a harbor or an ore deposit, for example—or the 
history of agglomeration: fi rms migrate to a location because others have 
moved there. 
Governments can infl uence these forces, by deciding where to invest 
and build infrastructure, thus making the spatial distribution of opportu-
nity more equal. But they should resist the temptation to counteract them, 
however politically demanding it can be at times. Regional policies should 
not try to produce uniformity across space in the pattern of growth and 
development.
“Unity, not uniformity” is a guiding principle of the European Union’s 
regional development programs, which will amount to €347.4 billion over 
28 UNICEF. The State of the World’s Children 2007: The Double Dividend of Gender Equality. 
“There is no 
contradiction between 
equality, redistribution 
and growth. Quite the 
contrary. Prosperity that 
is shared is not only 
morally right, it also gives 
people a chance to lift 
themselves out of poverty, 
creates legitimacy for 
responsible economic 
policies and can have 
an enhancing effect on 
long-term growth and 
prosperity.” 
—Carin Jämtin
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the seven years to 2013. These programs try to reduce income and wealth 
gaps across countries and regions over time. As a result of recent enlarge-
ments, the most prosperous member of the union, Luxembourg, is now 
seven times richer than the poorest one, Romania. The EU’s regional poli-
cies try to add to its “cohesion,” which includes a sense of belonging to the 
union and owing obligations to it. It is ready to collaborate with developing 
countries to share experiences. China, Brazil, and India have already taken 
up this offer. 
Firms base their location decisions on the provision of infrastructure, 
delivery of public services, and other public policies. A sound regional pol-
icy will invest in less developed areas to make them more competitive and 
thus more attractive to private investors. 
If workers are also mobile, they can and do move away from depressed 
regions where labor is in excess supply. Thus, labor mobility is a partial 
substitute for regional policy. It is not a full substitute because some people, 
such as the elderly, will never be very mobile. And in many countries lan-
guages place a limit on mobility, as in the EU. Over time, the educational 
system should reduce these barriers to mobility. Nevertheless, the prior-
ity attached to regional investments should depend on the mobility of the 
people they are trying to help. 
Such policies will also have a greater impact if they seek to improve labor 
mobility. In the EU, mobility is a long-term goal. Some obstacles, such as 
language barriers, are harder to remove than others. The EU is, for exam-
ple, striving to ensure that credentials and licenses awarded in one member 
state are recognized in another. 
Governments should try to make sure that workers move for the right 
reasons—in pursuit of a better job, for instance—but not the wrong ones—
fl eeing substandard education or health care, for example. The central 
government will need to invest in urban infrastructure, because emerging 
cities cannot raise money, either from taxes or borrowing, suffi cient to the 
task. Investments in roads, rail, and telecommunications make it easier for 
labor to move, albeit in some respects less necessary. Indeed, many services 
can now be delivered at a distance, thanks to advances in communications 
technologies.
One important aspect of regional policy is fi scal. Developing countries 
raise the bulk of their taxes at the national level. Thus, the central govern-
ment’s fi scal powers dwarf those of state or local governments. And yet 
responsive government often requires a decentralized administration, in 
which decisions are taken close to home. 
How, then, should the central government share its tax receipts with 
states, provinces, and municipalities? Countries vary enormously in how 
they divide revenues and responsibilities. In China, for example, the central 
government appoints governors and mayors, who are rotated from one 
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province to another. Their performance is judged against objectives set by 
the central government. Compared with more formally democratic systems, 
there is less local input to objectives and policies. This can create problems 
if local information is required to guide a policy.
Democracies usually give more voice to localities. But even in democ-
racies, some local governments perform far better than others. This rich 
variation should give social scientists plenty to say about what works and 
what does not. Unfortunately, that is not the case: thus far, the variety of 
cases is bewildering rather than revealing.
Regional diversity has its advantages, however. If different parts of the 
country try different things, they can learn from each others’ successes and 
mistakes. Demonstration effects can be a powerful stimulus for reform, as 
can competition between regions. For this reason, the spread of the mobile 
phone and the extension of information technology to large numbers of 
people may have an enormous infl uence on governance. This technology 
makes it easier for people to know what is happening next door, or on the 
other side of the country, inviting them to draw comparisons.
The Environment and Energy Use
It is only a slight exaggeration to say that most developing countries decide 
to grow fi rst and worry about the environment later. This is a costly mis-
take. Developing economies are diversifying quickly and investing heavily. 
In doing so, they respond to price signals. But those prices rarely refl ect 
environmental costs. As a consequence, their investments will be misguided. 
Industry will install the wrong equipment and locate in the wrong places. 
Buildings will be designed without due regard to the energy they consume. 
It is costly to reverse or ameliorate these mistakes; cheaper not to make 
them in the fi rst place. 
It is important to emphasize that developing countries do not have to 
adopt the most advanced environmental standards immediately. These 
standards may be unaffordable. But they should plan the evolution of the 
economy with the environmental costs in mind.
In many parts of the developing world, energy is subsidized. This is also 
a mistake. According to research by IMF economists, Indonesia and Yemen 
spent more on fuel subsidies in 2005 than on health and education com-
bined.29 Although removing the subsidies is politically diffi cult, the costs of 
not doing so are high—and rising as the price of energy climbs. The cost is 
not only fi scal. These subsidies also distort the evolution of the economy, 
making energy-intensive industries artifi cially attractive. Moreover, as the 
29 Coady, David, et al. 2006. “The Magnitude and Distribution of Fuel Subsidies.” IMF Working Paper 
06/247. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
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world mobilizes to combat climate change, these subsidies contribute to the 
problem. They may also hamper countries in their trade negotiations with 
the developed world, where some people now argue for higher tariffs to 
offset these carbon subsidies.
Environmental safeguards should not be seen simply as a concession 
the developing world makes to the developed. The poor suffer the most 
from many kinds of pollution. Effl uents contaminate rivers in which the 
poor bathe and obtain drinking water; particulates thicken the air in neigh-
borhoods where the poor live. Early attention to environmental standards 
serves the interests of equity as well as growth. 
Once governments have decided to tackle this problem, they face a choice 
of how to do it. They can impose quantitative limits on effl uents, raise 
prices on pollution, or issue a fi xed number of tradable licenses, which give 
their holder the right to emit a given amount of pollution, sulfur dioxide, 
for example. Prices or tradable permits are effi cient: they encourage pollut-
ers to fi nd the cheapest way to cut effl uents. The disadvantage is that it may 
take several iterations before acceptable targets are hit. Direct, quantitative 
caps have the opposite advantages and disadvantages: they limit effl uents 
with greater certainty, but also at a greater cost. 
Effective Government
In the fi rst part of this report we dwelled at some length on the art of 
policy making. But government is not only a policy maker. It is also a ser-
vice provider, an investor, an arbitrator, and an employer, often a big one. 
And while a government’s choice of policies matters a great deal, it is also 
important that it implement those policies well. That is the issue to which 
we now turn.
The effectiveness of government depends on the talent it can attract, the 
incentives it fosters, the vigor of its debates, and the organizational struc-
tures it imposes. Some of the fast-growing economies prided themselves on 
their cadres of highly trained, well-paid civil servants, often recruited by 
competitive selection. An elite civil service may not come cheap. But poorly 
motivated, ill-prepared civil servants are tremendously costly.
Recruiting the right people is a start. Those recruits must then be given the 
right incentives. Otherwise, their carefully selected talents will be devoted 
to turf wars, offi ce politics, or self-dealing.
That last vice—corruption—must be fought vigorously and visibly. Gov-
ernment leaders send powerful signals about values and the limits of accept-
able behavior when they decide on how to respond to cases of misbehavior. 
Mild responses send the clear signal that while the misbehavior is not right, 
it is not all that serious. In other cases, leaders go out of their way to name 
and shame offenders, thus sending a clear message to others.
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One way to sharpen incentives for good performance is to award pro-
motions and salary increases on merit. But how is a civil servant’s merit to 
be judged? If too much discretion is left to his or her superiors, they will be 
free to dispense promotions as patronage to their favorites. This is a legiti-
mate concern, which explains why many bureaucracies spurn meritocracy 
in favor of rigid seniority systems that hand out promotions based on years 
of service. Such a system leaves no room for favoritism, at the cost of leav-
ing little room for initiative either.
A better solution is to develop more objective measures of a civil ser-
vant’s performance, which can be used to confi rm or question a superior’s 
judgment. Such metrics are being devised. India, for example, has invented 
a quality standard for bureaucracies similar to the business quality stan-
dards formulated by the International Organization for Standardization. 
This is one of several areas in which civil services around the world could 
probably learn from experiments in other countries. Although they may be 
reluctant to believe it, taxpayers might benefi t from allowing their public 
servants the occasional trip abroad to exchange ideas at international train-
ing institutes and the like.
The civil service as a whole should also be held to regular account. Unlike 
other professions, the bureaucracy does not face a competitive test in the 
marketplace each day. As a result, none of its functions or lines of activity 
are weeded out by competitive failure. They can instead survive long into 
obsolescence.
Where the government provides a service, it should be forced to compete 
with alternative providers from the private or nonprofi t sectors. In addi-
tion, it should collect feedback from the citizens it serves. Where this is not 
possible or not suffi cient, bureaucracies should also be subject to periodic 
scrutiny by an independent evaluator. 
These evaluators should aim to identify and remove some of the redun-
dant layers that bureaucracies collect over the years.
The Quality of Debate
A country’s fortunes depend on stopping bad policies as well as imple-
menting good ones. Fallacies and follies must be identifi ed, criticized, and 
rejected. Judging by the experiences of the members of the Commission 
and other leaders, the importance of this function should not be underesti-
mated. Successful countries owe a lot to an environment in which all ideas, 
good and bad, are exposed to review and vigorous debate.
The policy-making process need not be confi ned to government circles. 
In many countries, the cast of actors is much larger, encompassing think 
tanks, the academy, the press, and independent review commissions. More 
autocratic countries may lack some of these elements, such as a fi ercely 
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independent press. This can leave such regimes vulnerable to policy mis-
takes that a freer debate might have uncovered and resisted. 
However, there are many examples of highly successful autocracies that 
nonetheless encouraged vigorous debate. The high-growth cases include a 
number of countries that were dominated by a single party for at least part 
of their growth process. In all of these countries, the quality of the debate 
was high, although it was sometimes hidden from the public and outside 
world. It seems fair to conclude that successful countries differ more in the 
visibility of their policy debates than in their vigor.
Bad Ideas
Debates help clarify good ideas, subjecting them to scrutiny and construc-
tive criticism. But debates can also be infected by bad ideas. This poses two 
diffi culties for policy makers. First they must identify bad ideas, because 
specious proposals can often sound promising. Then, they must prevent 
them from being implemented. An illustrative list of “bad ideas”, which are 
nonetheless often brought into the debate and should be resisted, is offered 
below. We hasten to add that just as our recommendations for good policies 
are qualifi ed by the need to avoid one-size-fi ts-all approaches and to tailor 
the policies to country-specifi c circumstances, our list of bad policies must 
also similarly be qualifi ed. There are situations and circumstances that may 
justify limited or temporary resort to some of the policies listed below, but 
the overwhelming weight of evidence suggests that such policies involve 
large costs and their stated objectives—which are often admirable—are 
usually much better served through other means. 
• Subsidizing energy except for very limited subsidies targeted at highly 
vulnerable sections of the population.
• Dealing with joblessness by relying on the civil service as an “employer 
of last resort.” This is distinct from public-works programs, such as rural 
employment schemes, which can provide a valuable social safety net.
• Reducing fi scal defi cits, because of short term macroeconomic compul-
sions, by cutting expenditure on infrastructure investment (or other public 
spending that yields large social returns in the long run). 
• Providing open-ended protection of specifi c sectors, industries, fi rms, 
and jobs from competition. Where support is necessary, it should be for 
a limited period, with a clear strategy for moving to a self-supporting 
structure.
• Imposing price controls to stem infl ation, which is much better handled 
through other macroeconomic policies.
• Banning exports for long periods of time to keep domestic prices low for 
consumers at the expense of producers.
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• Resisting urbanization and as a consequence underinvesting in urban 
infrastructure.
• Ignoring environmental issues in the early stages of growth on the grounds 
that they are an “unaffordable luxury.”
• Measuring educational progress solely by the construction of school infra-
structure or even by higher enrollments, instead of focusing on the extent 
of learning and quality of education.
• Underpaying civil servants (including teachers) relative to what the market 
would provide for comparable skills and combining this with promotion 
by seniority instead of evolving credible methods of measuring perfor-
mance of civil servants and rewarding it.
• Poor regulation of the banking system combined with excessive direct 
control and interference. In general, this prevents the development of an 
effi cient system of fi nancial intermediation that has higher costs in terms 
of productivity. 
• Allowing the exchange rate to appreciate excessively before the economy 
is ready for the transition towards higher-productivity industry.
The list above is illustrative and not exhaustive. Individual countries will 
have their own list of practices that appear to be desirable but are ineffec-
tive. Relentless scrutiny of policies should be an essential element in ratio-
nal policy making. This due diligence needs to be doubled for policies of 
the type listed above.
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Growth Challenges in Specifi c 
Country Contexts
PART 3
Sub-Saharan Africa30
Sub-Saharan Africa is enjoying its fastest growth in decades. The pace of 
the region’s economies picked up in the mid-1990s and has grown by 6 
percent a year in the past few years (see fi gure 8). African countries owe this 
growth to better microeconomic policies, more prudent macroeconomic 
management, a more generous volume of aid—and higher prices for their 
exports. In many countries, if not most, a new generation of leaders is in 
power, committed to growth and to more open and accountable govern-
ment. Institutions have also improved in a number of cases. Botswana has 
a tradition of long-term planning guided by a vision for the future direction 
30 Commission for Africa, 2005. “Our Common Interest.” Report of the Commission for Africa. Lon-
don. http://www.commissionforafrica.org; Collier, P. 2007. “The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest 
Countries Are Failing, and What Can Be Done About It?” New York: Oxford University Press; and 
proceedings of the Commission on Growth Workshop on country case studies, which included Col-
lier, P. 2008. “Growth Strategies for Africa.” Working Paper No. 9. Commission on Growth and 
Development, Washington, DC; Maipose, G. 2008. “Policy and Institutional Dynamics of Sustained 
Development in Botswana.” Working Paper No. 35. Commission on Growth and Development, 
Washington, DC; Kigabo, T. R. 2008. Leadership, Policy Making, Quality of Economic Policies and 
Their Inclusiveness: The Case of Rwanda.” Working Paper No. 20. Commission on Growth and 
Development, Washington, DC; Iyoha, M. 2008. Leadership, Policy-Making and Economic Growth 
in African Countries: The Case of Nigeria.” Working Paper No. 17. Commission on Growth and 
Development, Washington, DC; Ndiaye, M. 2008. “Growth in Senegal: The 1995–2005 Experience.” 
Working Paper No. 23. Commission on Growth and Development, Washington, DC.
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of the economy. More recently, Rwanda has shown similar farsightedness. 
Nigeria, Tanzania, and Botswana have strengthened checks and balances, 
and have taken major initiatives toward reducing corruption. Botswana has 
long had a strong focus on monitoring and evaluation, and so now does 
Rwanda.
The challenge is to convert these favorable circumstances into lasting 
progress, based on rapid job growth and a more diverse economy. The task 
is to use the fruits of the commodities boom to reduce the region’s depen-
dency on those commodities. 
Investment rates in countries such as Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique, 
and Ghana are close to 20 percent of GDP or more. Over the last 10 years, 
these countries have lifted their saving rate and diversifi ed their exports. But 
elsewhere, like many other developing countries, African economies still 
save and invest too small a share of their GDP. And in some cases, incen-
tives for diversifi cation have lessened as high commodity prices, more aid, 
and stronger capital infl ows have strengthened their exchange rates.
Moving forward, the leadership in African countries is focused on taking 
advantage of the opportunity created by the commodity price increases to 
enter paths of higher sustainable growth. As the earlier part of this report 
discussed, this requires strategies facilitating integration with the global 
economy; densifi cation, of people and activities; and policies that encour-
age self-discovery of the products in which Africa can create comparative 
advantage, including labor-intensive and diversifi ed exports. This implies 
in turn stepped-up state involvement in infrastructure, activist and sensible 
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industrial policies, and macroeconomic policies consistent with the need to 
maintain competitive exchange rates. With a view toward long-run objec-
tives, it would also be important to formulate growth-oriented strategies 
with time horizons of 10 years or more.
There are several components to this effort that merit attention.
• With the help of external resources and technology, increase the produc-
tivity and output of agriculture.
• Invest in infrastructure to support agricultural productivity growth and 
potential export diversifi cation as described earlier in the report. This will 
also help create a larger, more connected continental market. 
• With the help of international development agencies, increase the produc-
tivity of private sector fi rms. Reduce the cost of doing business through 
improvements in government administration and by streamlining and sim-
plifying administrative procedures.
• Continue the signifi cant progress in elementary school enrollments, 
improve quality and the output of skills, and commit more resources to 
secondary and tertiary education. 
• Encourage regional cooperation to build infrastructure that serves the 
needs of all the countries, particularly the landlocked ones. 
• As many countries have low populations, they face the problems common 
to small states described later in this report. Regional integration to share 
key government services and selected outsourcing can help reduce the high 
per capita costs of effective government for the smaller countries.
• Promote selected fi nancial sector development so that all citizens and sec-
tors have access to secure channels for saving and access to credit. As in 
other parts of the world, progress formalizing property rights with sup-
porting legal institutions will facilitate local investment and entrepreneur-
ial activity, including especially the scaling-up of successful businesses.
• Adoption of best practices in the exploitation of natural resource wealth is 
essential in capturing and channeling natural resource rents into growth- 
promoting investments in education, technology, and infrastructure. The 
recently announced EITI++ program of the World Bank, building on the 
existing EITI transparency framework, has the potential to help countries 
manage their resource wealth. (See box 6 in the section on resource-rich 
countries.)
• Africa’s recent macroeconomic stability owes a lot to determined policy 
makers and institutional reforms. Many African countries now have inde-
pendent central banks. But inside and outside Africa, the origin of mis-
management has often been fi scal, not monetary. An example of what can 
be done is Nigeria’s passage in 2007 of the Fiscal Responsibility Bill, which 
limits what the fi nance minister can do during economic cycles.
• As the investment in higher education rises, there is a growing incremen-
tal opportunity for “trade” in services, domestically and regionally, and 
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Africa’s colonial history has left it with an unusual politi-
cal geography. Although the region’s 48 states vary a 
great deal, they can be grouped into three loose cat-
egories: coastal, landlocked, and resource-rich. Coun-
tries along the coasts of Africa can ship goods directly 
to world markets. Landlocked countries, on the other 
hand, cannot integrate easily with the world economy 
without the help of their neighbors. Countries in the 
third category may or may not lie along the coasts, but 
the commodities they produce are valuable enough to 
justify the costs of transporting them across even large 
distances and multiple borders. 
Africa’s population is distributed fairly equally 
across these three groups: a third, a third, and a 
third. This is one of Africa’s most distinctive fea-
tures. Outside the region, 88 percent of the devel-
Box 4: Sub-Saharan Africa’s geography
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oping world lives in countries with access to the 
coast (but no other natural resources). In Africa only 
a third does. Outside Africa, only 1 percent of the 
developing world’s population lives in landlocked 
countries that lack natural resources. In Africa, a 
full third does. This confi guration is the result of 
colonial border-making. In other parts of the world, 
places that are landlocked and resource-scarce did 
not become countries. In Africa, they did. The region 
cannot reverse this legacy of history. It can only try 
to make the best of it.
Source: Paul Collier and Stephen A. O’Connell, “Opportunities 
and Choices.” Prepared for the synthesis volume of the African 
Economic Research Consortium’s Explaining African Economic 
Growth project.
Note: Collier and O’Connell’s paper classifi es Sudan and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo as landlocked based on the judg-
ment that the vast majority of the populations in these two coun-
tries have limited access to the coast.
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perhaps internationally. This is of particular importance to landlocked 
countries.31 
• Higher education and higher-level skills training raises the brain drain 
issue. It is important. There is no simple response to meet this challenge. 
Domestic job opportunities are clearly crucial. Making public fi nancial-
support conditional on domestic employment and service is a possible 
approach. It has been done before. In the 1960s and 1970s in the United 
States, college and university loans were reduced or forgiven over time if 
students worked as teachers or lecturers. 
It is clear that there is an expansive agenda of policy actions and invest-
ments to be undertaken, some domestically and others on a multinational 
basis within the continent. They will take time. Persistent, focused, and 
determined leadership will make the difference. It need not happen over-
night. Progress on these fronts will enable a pattern of accelerated growth 
of an inclusive kind in the coming decades.
Africa’s policy makers have spent many years preoccupied with debt, 
defi cits, and infl ation. Having won the fi ght for macroeconomic stability, 
they can now afford to think about long-term growth. Over the past two 
years, for example, South Africa has invited economists to visit the coun-
try and help the authorities rethink their growth strategy. Similar efforts 
are underway in other countries, including Rwanda, Ghana, Uganda, and 
Madagascar. This is important. 
The foundations of sustained growth will take time to build. But the 
region is now blessed with a group of leaders who recognize the importance 
of a stable climate for private investment and clean, inclusive government. 
They each evince a greater sense of control over their country’s destiny, and 
a greater sense of responsibility for it. 
African countries have much to do for themselves. What can advanced 
countries, other developing countries, donors, and the international devel-
opment institutions do by way of support?
• Grant time-bound trade preferences to manufactured exports from Afri-
can countries to help them overcome the disadvantages of being late 
starters. If they are successful, preferences will not cost the advanced 
countries much and, if not successful, the costs would be minimal (see 
box 5). 
• Provide more support to postconfl ict countries. Under current strategies, 
peacekeepers remain until elections can be held, and then leave promptly 
thereafter, presumably because elections legitimize the new government. 
In the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo, elections were held on 
October 29, 2006, and the withdrawal of international peacekeepers was 
31 Bangalore, Hyderabad, and Gurgaon in India are nowhere near a coast. They depend primarily on 
ICT infrastructure and services, and on the normal urban services that attract a highly educated 
workforce.
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scheduled for October 30. Yet the evidence suggests the risk of confl ict 
goes up after elections, not down. Peacekeeping in fragile countries must 
be guided by more realistic expectations.
• Industrialized countries benefi ting from Africa’s brain drain need to pay 
for at least a part of the investments made by African governments. This 
could take the form of fi nancing expansion of tertiary education.
• Rethink how aid is channeled into Africa. Over the last few decades, Africa 
has received a large volume of aid, in various forms. Much of this assis-
tance has been very benefi cial and has helped improve Africa’s health and 
education status. But it does not always refl ect the right priorities, or the 
priorities of the countries that are supposed to benefi t from it. Neglected 
areas include infrastructure and higher education. Some also fear that large 
volumes of aid undermine the competitiveness of Africa’s exports, either by 
driving up the exchange rate or bidding up local wages and prices. These 
fears are diffi cult to prove, but equally diffi cult to dismiss. Some argue 
that if aid makes the economy more productive, it will offset any harmful 
effects on the exchange rate. But these offsetting increases in productivity 
would have to be large and rapid. There is no agreement on how best to 
deal with this problem. But it is no excuse for donors to reduce volumes of 
aid. The government of a poor country may well consider the competitive-
ness of its export sector when choosing how much aid to accept. But that 
should not determine how much aid is offered. 
Small States
There are over 50 small states in the world: each has a population of less 
than 2 million and their combined population totals less than 20 million. 
Can trade preferences make a tangible difference to 
Africa? They already have. In October 2000, America 
opened its markets to 37 countries in Sub-Saharan 
African under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA). The duty-free access provided by the act has 
increased apparel exports to America 7- to 10-fold by 
some estimates. In Lesotho, for example, the garment 
industry accounts for almost 90 percent of the coun-
try’s export earnings.
The act has been less of a boon to other manufac-
tured products, however, because they do not benefi t 
from the same liberal rules of origin that apply to apparel. 
These rules determine whether a product made in one 
country from parts made in another, qualifi es for duty-
free access or not. 
What Africa needs is a policy giving all African coun-
tries (not only the poorest) preferential access to OECD 
countries, with no rules-of-origin requirements, for a 
period of 10 to 15 years. 
Box 5: Trade preferences for Africa
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Their cases are interesting in their own right. But they also help to illumi-
nate the role of size in a growth strategy, and the potential of regional inte-
gration to make a larger economic bloc out of discrete political units. 
Small states face at least three distinctive disadvantages. One is the 
absence of scale economies, both in the production of goods and the provi-
sion of public services. A second is risk: many small states are in regions 
vulnerable to hurricanes, cyclones, droughts, and volcanic eruptions. Their 
economies are also less diversifi ed than those of bigger states. Some, but not 
all, small states are also geographically remote, a third disadvantage that 
makes it harder for them to integrate with the world economy.
But small states do not have lower average incomes or slower growth than 
other countries. Indeed, they benefi t from some countervailing advantages. 
They are easier to monitor and comprehend, which allows policy makers to 
rely more on common sense and discretion. They also have little choice but 
to turn outward. The ratio of trade to GDP in small states is higher than for 
other country groups. Singapore, for example, embraced export-led growth 
only after the 1965 breakup of its brief union with Malaysia.
Singapore (which now has more than 2 million people) shows that small-
ness is not a decisive handicap in economics, especially if the country enjoys 
close proximity to world markets and a privileged geographical location. 
The expansion of world trade makes a big domestic market less vital for 
development. It may explain why the number of independent countries has 
increased rapidly in the past six decades. 
In recent years, the external environment has become both more hospita-
ble to small states and less so. A new range of services has become tradable, 
thanks to advances in information, communications, and technology (ICT), 
as the rise of outsourcing and offshoring illustrate. This creates new oppor-
tunities, which should be seized, for small countries that rely heavily on 
trade. On the other hand, many small states are suffering from “preference 
erosion.” They enjoy preferential access to developed country markets, but 
these privileges lose their value as tariffs fall across the board. Tighter regu-
lation of offshore fi nancial centers has also curtailed the freedom of action 
of some small states.
It is noteworthy that most small states are very “young” states—over 
half of them were founded after 1970. Independence meant that public 
services, such as security, justice, and regulation of economic activity, were 
no longer imported from colonial powers. They instead had to be produced 
locally by national institutions. But the provision of such goods in small 
states is expensive whenever there are indivisibilities in production. 
The fi nancial system provides one example. As empires fragmented, 
fi nancial transactions once contained within a single banking system had to 
be carried out in different currencies, under different supervisory regimes, 
and so on. Unfortunately, the cost of bank supervision is probably similar 
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for a country with a population of 400,000 people as for a country with a 
population of 4 million. (It is certainly more than a tenth of the amount.)
In response, small states have shown great ingenuity in pooling their 
efforts and outsourcing public services. The Central and West Africa region, 
for example, relies on multicountry central banking, as does the Eastern 
Caribbean. The Eastern Caribbean also has a single telecommunications 
authority. Its Supreme Court is a particularly interesting example. It is a 
superior court of record with nine members. These include six independent 
states—namely, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and 
Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines—and three British 
Overseas Territories: Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands, and Montserrat. 
As well as pooling its services, it also outsources the role of the fi nal appel-
late court to the Privy Council in London.
In all of these cases, small states sacrifi ced some political sovereignty in 
exchange for better quality of service. The rules governing these arrange-
ments were not easy to write—they had to maintain political stability 
and uphold high technical standards. But the consensus is that they have 
worked.
By contrast, Australia Aid is dealing with a dozen microstates in the 
Pacifi c, which possess many of the institutions typical of a large country: 
representatives in the UN, embassies abroad, central banks, and so on. In 
these circumstances, undiluted sovereignty is an expensive proposition. A 
more viable model would be a self-governing structure in association with 
Australia or New Zealand. One possible model is Puerto Rico, a self-gov-
erning commonwealth in association with the United States.32
In sum, small states should seek to pool their markets, through regional 
economic integration, and to spread the burden of public services, through 
partial political union. Good governance is an important foundation on 
which regional cooperation and multinational integration can build. 
Dealing with risk is more diffi cult. In principle, it is a problem the interna-
tional fi nancial system exists to solve. A state could hold a diversifi ed port-
folio of fi nancial assets, even if it does not have a diversifi ed economy. But 
in practice, small states are more often saddled with foreign liabilities than 
cushioned by foreign assets. The global fi nancial industry and the interna-
tional fi nancial institutions should be able to create instruments of interest 
to them. For example, Caribbean states, with the help of donors, have cre-
ated an insurance fund for members struck by hurricanes or earthquakes. 
Their reserve pool is reinsured in the international fi nancial markets.
Finally, small size translates into a relatively weak voice in international 
trade negotiations. The WTO, other international organizations, and the 
advanced countries need to make a special effort to take into account the 
32 For a description of the division of functions, see http://welcome.topuertorico.org/government.
shtml.
“The country I’m from, 
St. Lucia, has 160,000 
people. The cost of 
government per capita 
is very high; the markets 
are very small; and the 
cost of production is very 
high. Also, every year we 
have a hurricane season, 
which can destroy the 
country’s GDP. In some 
countries, it can also 
lead to high debt levels. 
Their infrastructure is 
destroyed, before they 
have paid for it, so they 
borrow again. Then it is 
destroyed a second, and 
sometimes even a third 
time.”
—Sir K. Dwight Venner
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peculiar needs and interests of small states. Even if their economies are not 
overwhelmingly signifi cant, these states are morally and often strategically 
important.
Resource-Rich Countries
Thanks to burgeoning global demand for commodities, from iron ore to 
soybeans, countries blessed with natural resources are growing quickly. But 
the sudden increase in commodity prices can make it harder to diversify an 
economy—harder to create room for export industries that do not rely on 
nature’s patrimony. 
The foreign exchange such exporters earn counts for less in an economy 
fl ush with petrodollars or mineral revenues. And as the proceeds of com-
modity sales percolate through the domestic economy, wages and rents will 
rise, making it harder for the country’s other export industries to compete 
abroad.
This problem of “Dutch disease,” as economists call it, is not insurmount-
able. An endowment of natural resources did not stop several countries—
Botswana, Brazil, Oman, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand—from making 
our list of 13 success stories. Botswana’s growth began before the discovery 
of diamonds and continued after it. Many middle-income and advanced 
economies have also taken resource booms in their stride. The problem is not 
the resources themselves, but how the proceeds (or “rents”) are handled. 
Governments, especially in poorer countries, do not always handle them 
well. In the fi rst place, they sometimes fail to claim their rightful share of 
them, by selling extraction rights too cheaply and taxing the revenues too 
lightly. As Paul Collier of Oxford University has pointed out, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo received only $86,000 in mineral royalties in 2006. It is 
such instances that the EITI initiative (see box 6) seeks to combat.
Second, the money that does materialize is sometimes stolen or wasted. 
Often, it is collected and spent in secret, making it diffi cult to know how 
it is used. Resource rents have the potential to relax constraints on growth 
and development, providing a ready source of foreign exchange a country 
might otherwise lack. But they can also distort a country’s politics. Political 
leaders may fi ght for power not to serve the country, but to get their hands 
on the resource revenues, which they can then use to buy votes and stay in 
power. In extreme cases, the availability of rents can lead to violent confl ict 
over how they are spent. 
Even if a government does have the right intentions, it is not easy to know 
how to use the money to lift growth. For example, there is no straightfor-
ward way to decide how the proceeds should be distributed over time, how 
much should be consumed and how much invested for the future. If govern-
ments spend the money on public investment, they need to pick the right 
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projects generating the best social returns. They do not always have the 
capacity to do this, particularly in the early stages of development. 
How, then, should governments proceed? Below we briefl y describe the 
key elements of a sound strategy. All require governments and companies 
to remain open and transparent, disclosing the sums they pay and spend so 
the nation knows where its wealth is going.
First, governments must decide how to allocate the rights for exploration 
and development of their oil fi elds, mineral deposits, and so on. They must 
also decide how to tax the earnings the concessionaire makes. These two 
decisions together determine the fl ow of rents to the country and how those 
rents adjust to changing global prices. There is a growing body of exper-
tise on both the design of auctions and approaches to taxation that can be 
tapped. That expertise should help governments strike better deals in the 
future. But what about the past? In cases where the allocation of exploita-
tion rights was fl awed, governments should renegotiate the concession to 
restore a proper balance between private return and public revenue.
The next issue is where should the rents fl ow? There is a plethora of 
options. The money can be consumed at home, or invested at home, either 
It takes the most sophisticated prospecting technolo-
gies to discover fresh oil deposits hidden beneath 
the earth’s surface. Too often, tracking oil revenues is 
equally diffi cult. The Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI), launched in 2002, aims to bring the 
money that governments earn from oil, gas, and mining 
to the surface (www.eitransparency.org).
To meet the initiative’s standards, companies must 
declare how much they pay to governments in royalties 
and for oil, gas, and mining rights. By the same token, 
member governments must disclose the revenues they 
receive from their natural resources. A big gap between 
those two fi gures would be one sign of malfeasance. 
Moreover, by bringing the money to light, the initiative 
makes it easier for outside observers to monitor its sub-
sequent use.
The initiative is unusual in that it is managed by a 
broad coalition of governments, companies, industry 
associations, investors, the World Bank, and nongov-
ernmental organizations like Transparency International 
and Global Witness. The initiative is voluntary, but it is 
nonetheless hard to ignore. Its reporting template pro-
vides a useful benchmark and rallying point for public 
campaigns and international pressure. Companies and 
governments that comply with its standards win public 
approval; those that refuse risk opprobrium. As a result, 
22 countries are now implementing the initiative. 
The World Bank recently announced an extension of 
the framework called EITI++. It aims to promote similar 
standards of transparency up and down the full sup-
ply chain, from the initial allocation of extraction rights 
to the fi nal expenditure of the proceeds. It could, for 
example, help governments design auctions, monitor 
royalty collections, and hedge against price volatility. It 
could also give countries broad guidelines about how 
much of their revenues to spend and how much to 
save.
The initiative is far more ambitious than the origi-
nal EITI and its success will also depend on building a 
broad coalition of partners and supporters. But given 
the extraordinary boom in commodity revenues, the 
stakes could not be higher.
Box 6: The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
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by the private sector or the public sector. Alternatively, it can be invested 
in overseas deposits, bonds, or other fi nancial instruments. These choices 
will determine how the rents are distributed across generations. The calcu-
lations can become quite complicated and there is a need for a simplifi ed 
framework to guide sensible choices. Because public investment matters so 
much to growth, and because it is often squeezed by other fi scal pressures, 
we would propose that it enjoy a fi rst claim on resources. Although coun-
tries will differ in their circumstances and in the investments they choose, 
they should aim to invest in the range of 5–7 percent of GDP—or more if 
they have great needs in education or infrastructure.
Those are big sums. To get the most out of the money, governments must 
pick the right investment projects for the right reasons. They may need 
international assistance, especially with the procurement process, which 
is often a source of waste and corruption. Some also argue that projects 
should be planned, implemented, and monitored by separate parts of the 
government. When these functions are all combined in the same ministry, 
its pet projects are not questioned and mistakes are glossed over.
If these public investments do not exhaust the resource rents, the remain-
der should fl ow into a savings fund. The fund should be managed by expe-
rienced investment professionals operating within well-defi ned parameters 
of risk, return, and diversifi cation. They should divide the money between 
domestic and foreign assets as best serves their investment goals. However, 
the capacity of the domestic economy to absorb this investment will be 
limited. In such cases, a nontrivial fraction of the incremental rents should 
be invested outside the country.
The fund must be insulated from political forces. There are two reasons 
for this. First, this is the only way to ensure decisions are made in pursuit 
of risk-adjusted returns. Otherwise, powerful interest groups will divert the 
investment for their own purposes. Second, there is a growing unease about 
the fi nancial power of sovereign wealth funds. If a fund has political objec-
tives that trump its commercial aims, its access to the global capital markets 
may in future be curtailed. 
The fund should not hoard its wealth entirely. It should pay out a per-
centage of the total each year for the benefi t of the citizens, much as non-
profi t endowments do. It can pass this money to citizens directly, or do it 
indirectly through tax cuts. The distribution of these payouts will vary from 
one country to the next, but in all countries they can further the goals of 
equity and inclusion. 
Middle-Income Countries
Of the 13 high-growth cases, six eventually reached income levels associ-
ated with the advanced countries. But this is uncommon. In a large group of 
“Institutions—that is, 
organizations, norms 
and rules—provide 
sustainability and 
longevity to policies. 
Let’s say you have a 
windfall, and there 
are no institutions. 
People tend to take the 
windfall as normal, and 
then when the windfall 
disappears, they have 
diffi culty adapting. If 
you have institutional 
arrangements, I think 
those problems could be 
mitigated. They won’t go 
away, but you won’t have 
large swings.” 
—Sir K. Dwight Venner
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countries, including many in Latin America, growth has slowed markedly 
at the middle-income level. The reasons are complex. If anything, this sec-
ond stage of growth, from middle to high income, is less understood, and 
certainly less studied, than the fi rst stage.
The focus on poorer countries is entirely understandable. But middle-
income transitions deserve more attention than they have received. Many 
people live in such countries, including many who are poor. In a number 
of them, inequality remains high. The politics of a country that has lost its 
growth momentum are fraught. Without growth, unequal societies become 
trapped in zero-sum games.
No one can identify all the reasons why some economies lose momen-
tum, and others don’t. But there are common patterns across countries 
that are suggestive. As the economy evolves from middle to high income, 
it branches out into more capital-intensive and skill-intensive industries. 
The service sector grows. The domestic economy with its increased size and 
wealth becomes a more important engine of growth. 
The supply of labor in middle-income countries, which once seemed 
infi nitely elastic, ceases to be so. As surplus labor disappears, the oppor-
tunity cost of employing a worker in one sector rather than another, rises. 
Firms compete for workers and wages increase. These higher wages slow 
the growth of the labor-intensive sectors. Indeed, these export industries, 
which once drove growth, decline and eventually disappear. 
Shortages of high-skilled labor emerge. As a result, policies shift toward 
promoting human capital and technology. The policy maker’s role must 
also change. When a country is far behind the leading economies, says 
Philippe Aghion, a leading growth theorist at Harvard University, “it is 
very clear what you have to do, so you can run things like an army.” But 
as an economy catches up with the leaders, it becomes less obvious what it 
should make and where its prosperity lies. More must be left to the bets of 
private investors and the collective judgment of the market.
The different stages are not cleanly delineated in time. In a country like 
China, the skill-intensive sectors, which are emerging strongly, live side 
by side, in a sense, with the labor-intensive industries that are still busily 
absorbing China’s rural millions. China’s policy makers show an intense 
determination to expand higher education and research, in response to the 
growing demand for human capital. 
The fi rst priority for policy makers is to anticipate this transition and 
the new demands it will make of them. Many governments have a plan-
ning unit, which focuses attention on the future evolution of the economy 
and anticipates the public policies and outlays needed to support it. Korea, 
for example, changed its policies and public investments in the 1980s and 
1990s to help the economy’s evolution from labor-intensive manufactur-
ing to a more knowledge- and capital-intensive economy. It opened the 
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door to foreign direct investment, privatized the national steel company, 
joined the OECD, and watched labor-intensive manufacturing move to 
new destinations.33 
The second—not easy—is to let go of some of their earlier policies, even 
the successful ones. To be specifi c, special export zones, heavily managed 
exchange rates, and other forms of industrial policy can be pursued for too 
long. The problems these policies address decline over time, so they are not 
needed forever. Resisting such forces will delay the structural change of the 
economy. It will divert investment away from new export industries and 
from industries that serve the domestic market.
Singapore, for example, responded to evolving economic conditions at 
home and abroad by allowing labor-intensive manufacturing to migrate 
elsewhere in the region, where labor was cheaper. It even ran special eco-
nomic zones in China and India, which hosted some of the departing indus-
tries. This allowed Singapore to concentrate its resources on industries 
befi tting a labor-scarce economy.34
Just as it is possible to hold on to a labor-intensive strategy for too long, 
it is possible to abandon it as a growth engine too quickly. Countries should 
wait until surplus labor is absorbed and the human capital stock has risen 
to a level that supports the transition to higher value-added sectors. The 
effect of a premature shift can be to strand unskilled labor in traditional or 
informal sectors. 
33 Nike plants for example, departed for cheaper locations elsewhere, where they were still often run by 
the original Korean owners and managers.
34 For an instructive discussion of the transition, see Ying, Tan Yin et al. 2007. “Perspectives on Growth: 
A Political Economy Framework (The Case of Singapore).” Case Study, Commission on Growth and 
Development.
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New Global Trends
PART 4
This fourth and fi nal part of the report turns to new global trends—fea-
tures of the landscape that a developing-country policy maker cannot hope 
to control alone, because they are the aggregate result of many countries’ 
behavior. These trends are also relatively new developments, which the 
13 success stories did not themselves have to face. The fi rst is the threat 
economic growth poses to the world’s climate—and the threat the climate 
poses to growth.
Global Warming
Suppose the developing world does emulate the growth of China, Indo-
nesia, and the rest of our 13 successes, industrializing briskly for the next 
20 years at a growth rate of about 7 percent annually. This would be a 
triumph, but a qualifi ed one. It would carry one unsettling implication: 
such rapid industrial expansion would add dangerous amounts of carbon 
dioxide to an atmosphere already polluted by unsafe concentrations of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs).
The Quantitative Challenge
The Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has calculated 
that a relatively safe level of CO2 emissions globally is 14.5 gigatons per 
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year, which comes out to 2.25 tons per person per year globally. Table 2 
from the United Nations Human Development Report (2007) gives the per 
capita emissions for major industrial countries.
Clearly the advanced countries are at per capita output levels that, if 
replicated by the developing world, would be dramatically in excess of safe 
levels. World carbon emissions are now at about twice the safe level, mean-
ing that if the current output is sustained, the CO2 stock in the atmosphere 
will rise above safe levels in the next 40 years. The fi gures for a range of 
countries, including developing countries, are shown in Figure 9.
If the developing countries did not grow, then safe levels of emissions 
would be achieved by reducing advanced country emissions by a factor of 
two or a little more. But with the growth of the developing countries, the 
incremental emissions are very large because of the size of the populations. 
To take the extreme case, if the whole world grew to advanced country 
incomes and converged on the German levels of emissions per capita, then 
to be safe from a warming standpoint, emissions per capita would need 
to decline by a factor of four. Reductions of this magnitude with existing 
technology are either not possible, or so costly as to be certain of slowing 
global and developing country growth.
What these calculations make clear is that technology is the key to 
accommodating developing country and global growth. We need to lower 
the costs of mitigation. Put differently, we need to build more economic 
value on top of a limited energy base. For that we need new knowledge.
Population growth is sometimes viewed as the problem. It may be in 
the future, but most of the projected emissions growth is not in high-
Table 2 Global carbon footprints at OECD levels would require more than one planeta
CO2 emissions per 
capita (t CO2) 2004
Equivalent global CO2 
emissions (Gt CO2) 2004
b
Equivalent number of sustainable 
carbon budgetsc
Worldd 4.5 29 2
Australia 16.2 104 7
Canada 20.0 129 9
France 6.0 39 3
Germany 9.8 63 4
Italy 7.8 50 3
Japan 9.9 63 4
Netherlands 8.7 56 4
United Kingdom 9.8 63 4
United States 20.6 132 9
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2007, calculations based on Indicator Table 24.
a. As measured in sustainable carbon budgets.
b. Refers to global emissions if every country in the world emitted at the same per capita level as the specifi ed country.
c. Based on a sustainable emissions pathway of 14.5 Gt CO2 per year.
d. Current global carbon footprint.
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 population-growth countries. The real challenge is accommodating high-
speed economic growth in what are currently large populations. 
Carbon Intensity
The carbon intensities for the advanced countries and China and India 
measured as gigatons per trillion dollars of GDP are shown below. Carbon 
intensity is clearly much lower in advanced countries, even in the United 
States, which is very high in terms of energy consumption per person and 
per dollar of GDP (table 3).35 
This decline of carbon intensity with per capita income 
is partly the result of a shift to value built on knowledge 
and human capital in the course of growth. It is also 
partly a result of the movement of energy- and carbon-
intensive industries to lower-income countries. Often 
these industries export their products back to developed 
countries. To that extent, developing countries owe their 
carbon intensity not to their own consumption patterns, 
but to those of the developed countries. Declining car-
bon intensity will help but not solve the problem.
35 This is a natural result of economic growth. The latter is accompanied by a structural evolution of the 
economy toward services, knowledge-intensive, value-added activities that are by nature less energy- 
and carbon-intensive.
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Figure 9 Per Capita CO2 Emissions
Table 3 Carbon Intensity (Gigatons of CO2 
emissions per trillion dollars of GDP)
Countries Output
United States 0.46
European Union 0.29
Japan 0.19
China 1.67
India 1.30
Source: See appendix, p. 163.
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2007.
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The debate on global warming has generated its own terminology. “Mit-
igation” refers to efforts to reduce the greenhouse effect; “adaptation,” to 
efforts to cope with the consequences of climate change. To put it simply, 
we mitigate so that we won’t have to adapt, and we adapt insofar as we fail 
to mitigate.
Mitigation efforts include cutting carbon emissions by increasing energy 
effi ciency. They might also include measures to remove carbon from the 
atmosphere by planting trees, for example. Deforestation and land use 
changes account of 20–30 percent of emissions growth, which could be 
considerably reduced by avoiding deforestation and expanding aforesta-
tion. Mitigation could also include attempts to offset greenhouse gases: if 
the outer atmosphere could be made more refl ective, for instance, it would 
repel heat-generating radiation before it reaches the earth’s surface and is 
trapped by greenhouse gases.
Adaptation includes irrigating fi elds deprived of rain, building levies 
against rising sea levels, or moving further inland. The term could also 
include medical responses to the diseases that might thrive in a warmer, 
wetter climate.
What is at stake for developing countries?
Some of the countries likely to suffer the worst, earliest damage from global 
warming are poor countries in the tropics. Models suggest, for example, 
that coastal erosion may threaten more than 1 million people by 2050 in 
the Nile delta in Egypt, the Mekong Delta in Vietnam, and the Ganges-
Brahmaputra delta in Bangladesh.36 Developing countries also lack the 
resources to adapt easily to global warming. They cannot afford, for exam-
ple, to relocate large numbers of people from low-lying areas.
But developing economies are not only potential victims of climate 
change. Some also contribute to the problem. China, India, and other 
big, fast-growing economies now generate too much carbon dioxide to be 
ignored. China’s annual emissions, for example, now approximately match 
those of America. The world will not succeed in its efforts to mitigate global 
warming if the bigger, faster-growing economies do not take part.
As a result, China, India, and their peers are under pressure to commit 
to cut emissions by a given percentage by 2050. They are resisting, because 
such commitments might threaten their growth, and also because they con-
sider them unfair. The commitments they are being urged to make ignore 
the fact that their per capita emissions are much lower than those in devel-
oped economies. An equal emissions entitlement per person is, in their view, 
the minimum requirement for fairness.37
36 IPCC. 2007. “Coastal Systems and Low-Lying Areas” in Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation 
and Vulnerability. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
37 The Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh has stated that India would be willing to undertake 
to keep its per capita emissions below those of industrialized countries thus giving the latter a strong 
incentive to reduce their emissions as quickly as possible.
“Climate-change 
agreements need to fi nd 
a way to accommodate 
the growth in developing 
countries. We don’t want 
to say, ‘I’m sorry, you 
arrived late. The world’s 
changed; you don’t get to 
grow.’ It just isn’t right.” 
—Michael Spence
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It is not wise to seek long-term commitments from developing countries 
to reduce emissions, nor is it likely to result in an agreement. There remains 
a great deal we do not know about the impact of climate change and the cost 
of cutting carbon. This uncertainty will be resolved over time. Therefore, the 
world should not lock itself into precise, quantitative commitments for the 
far-fl ung future. It should instead anticipate that information will improve—
and leave some options open. Interim mitigation targets, set at periodic inter-
vals, would allow policies to respond to new information as it arrives. 
We know that the world will get warmer as a result of a given stock of 
GHGs. But we cannot say how much warmer with any precision. Nor do we 
know the costs of cutting emissions. These costs will vary by source—it may 
be cheaper to cut transport emissions or power station emissions—and by 
location—it may be costlier to cut CO2 in Asia or in Africa. The cost of car-
bon cuts will also change in the future, as new clean technologies emerge. 
Faced with these uncertainties, it is not wise for a country to tie its hands. 
But the risks for poor countries are greater. If GHGs turn out to warm the 
climate less than we thought, or the cost of cutting carbon turns out to be 
far greater than we thought, developing countries may regret any long-term 
promises they made.
The effort to cut carbon by a given percentage should be judged by two 
criteria: is it effi cient? That is, are we cutting carbon as cheaply as possible? 
Second, is it fair? Is the mitigation effort giving room to the aspirations of 
developing economies to raise their living standards?
If one assumes that each country must bear the cost of its own fi ght 
against carbon, no deal will pass these two tests. An effi cient agreement 
will be unfair, because effi ciency will require carbon cuts in the developing 
world. A fair agreement will be ineffi cient, because it is relatively costly to 
cut carbon in the rich world. We are in a bind.
Fortunately, there is a way out of this bind: the cost of mitigation can 
be decoupled from the site of mitigation. Who cuts carbon is one question; 
who bears the cost another. In principle, high-income countries could bear 
the cost of cutting carbon in developing countries. The cuts can be made 
effi ciently; the costs distributed fairly.
There are two ways to do this: a global carbon tax, or a global allocation 
of greenhouse gas permits, distributed fairly, which can be bought and sold. 
Both put a price on carbon (which creates an incentive to invent ways to 
economize on it). Both result in an effi cient pattern of carbon cuts.
How does a cap-and-trade system divorce cost from location? Permits 
are given to countries, giving them the right to emit a given amount of car-
bon dioxide. Enough permits are awarded to poor countries to give them 
room to grow. But because they can sell these permits for the prevailing 
carbon price, they have an incentive not to use them. If economizing on 
carbon is cheaper than the world price of emitting carbon, they will sell the 
permit rather than using it.
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A carbon tax does not by itself separate the cost of mitigation from the 
location. Countries pay their own carbon taxes. Even though they also 
retain the revenues, these taxes may still harm the economy. Therefore a 
uniform, global carbon tax would have to be supplemented by a burden-
sharing mechanism that pools the revenues and transfers money from rich 
countries to poorer ones, according to a fair principle.
The world is not as yet ready to adopt either of these solutions. Long 
years of design, negotiation, and implementation await. What should coun-
tries do in the meantime?
The Commission recommends the following nine steps. Taken together, 
they will cut emissions, thereby staving off some of the worst dangers of 
global warming. They will reveal more about the cost of cutting emissions, 
and they will encourage new technologies that reduce these costs. These 
steps are also fair. 
1. The advanced economies should cut emissions fi rst and they should do 
so aggressively. This will slow the accumulation of carbon in the atmo-
sphere. It will also reveal a great deal about how much it truly costs to 
cut carbon emissions.
2. More generous subsidies should be paid to energy-effi cient technolo-
gies and carbon reduction technologies, which will reduce the cost of 
mitigation.
3. Advanced economies should strive to put a price on carbon.
4. The task of monitoring emissions cuts and other mitigation measures 
should be assigned to an international institution, which should begin 
work as soon as possible.
5. Developing countries, while resisting long-term target-setting, should 
offer to cut carbon at home if other countries are willing to pay for it. 
Such collaborations take place through the Clean Development Mecha-
nism provisions in the Kyoto protocol. Rich countries can meet their 
Kyoto commitments by paying for carbon cuts in poorer countries.
6. Developing countries should promise to remove fuel subsidies, over a 
decent interval. These subsidies encourage pollution and weigh heavily 
on government budgets.
7. All countries should accept the dual criteria of effi ciency and fairness in 
carbon mitigation. In particular, richer countries, at or near high-income 
levels, should accept that they will each have the same emissions entitle-
ments per head as other countries.
8. Developing countries should educate their citizens about global warm-
ing. Awareness is already growing, bringing about changes in values and 
behavior.
9. International negotiations should concentrate on agreeing to carbon 
cuts for more advanced economies, to be achieved 10 or 15 years hence. 
These mitigation efforts should be designed so as to reveal the true costs 
of mitigation.
“Fighting climate change 
will, of course, change 
the pattern of growth. It 
may reduce it in some 
places, but expand it in 
others. For example, if 
we pay people to keep 
forests in place, those 
payments can be used for 
productive purposes.”
—Lord John Browne
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We do not know how much growth countries will have to sacrifi ce to 
cut carbon 25 years from now. If those costs are high, there will be very 
diffi cult choices to make. In the meantime, we should try to cut those costs, 
distribute the cuts effi ciently, and spread the costs fairly.
Rising Income Inequality and Protectionism
Income inequality is rising in a surprising number of countries across the 
globe (see fi gure 10). This trend is a complex phenomenon with multiple 
causes: technological change, shifting relative prices, and globalization. 
Much of it, however, is attributed to globalization.
The result is a growing skepticism about the benefi ts of globalization, in 
developing and developed countries alike. The October 2007 Pew Survey 
of Global Attitudes is both telling and worrying. It clearly indicates that 
enthusiasm for further opening of the global economy is fl agging in many 
advanced economies, and some developing countries as well. Only coun-
tries in East Asia buck this trend.
In political terms, these attitudes can translate easily into protection-
ist sentiment. For example, America’s administration is fi nding it diffi cult 
to persuade Congress to pass bilateral trade agreements with allies like 
Colombia and Korea. The World Trade Organization, described as the 
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Figure 10 Gini Annual Change
Source: World Bank, Global Monitoring Report 2008.
Note: The time period varies depending on the availability of data. Typically it is from late 1980s and early 
1990s to later 1990s and early 2000s.
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world’s “insurance policy against protectionism” by its Director-General, 
Pascal Lamy, is likewise struggling to make progress with the Doha round 
of global trade talks, which were launched in Qatar in 2001 and were origi-
nally scheduled for completion by the end of 2004. Economists may dis-
agree on the economic signifi cance of the global deal under negotiation. But 
progress in the Doha round has assumed great symbolic importance as a 
test of the world’s commitment to a fl exible multilateral trading system in 
the face of a potential protectionist backlash. 
This worrying turn in sentiment, it seems to us, is largely the result of 
two trends, trends that policy makers in most countries have done too little 
to ameliorate. One is the rapid movement of economic activity from one 
location to another. A second is the impact of labor-saving technologies, 
particularly in the sphere of information processing. Both trends add to 
economic growth. But both also pose a potential threat to some people’s 
jobs and job security. 
In an important sense the global economy is a public good, provision of 
which requires coordinated action from all countries. With enough effort 
from governments and international organizations, the benefi ts of the global 
economy could be distributed widely across nations and within them. The 
net welfare gains from openness provide ample resources to compensate 
globalization’s casualties and discontents, if governments had the political 
will to manage the problem. At the moment the rhetoric is consistent with 
this priority, but the actions are not. 
In developing countries, as noted earlier, policies designed to impede entry 
and exit are quite likely to succeed in slowing productivity and growth. 
Much the same is true in the global economy. Protecting companies and 
jobs from competition will slow economic progress. A better approach is 
to protect people and incomes, providing support to workers between jobs 
and preserving their access to essential services during these transitions. 
To shore up support for an open global economy, governments may have 
to change their domestic policies. The U.S. economy, for example, offers 
relatively low levels of social insurance by European standards. The tax 
system has become less progressive over time. Certain social functions have 
devolved to local government and to nonprofi t organizations. Some argue 
this provides a better balance between social insurance and protection on 
the one hand, and fl exibility and effi ciency on the other. 
Other people, as one would expect, take the opposite view. We only 
want to make the point that the balance a country strikes between fl ex-
ibility and security, effi ciency and welfare, is not timeless or independent 
of circumstances. If economic shocks become more frequent or severe, a 
new dispensation might be required. It would seem quite natural to think 
that a country’s safety nets and social insurance systems need to adapt, and 
probably also the tax system. The alternative approach is distinctly worse. 
“The leadership of the 
global economy is cause 
for concern. A system 
unable to generate 
consensus on the Doha 
trade round will likely 
fail to reach consensus 
on other critical global 
issues such as global 
warming, or the rise of 
protectionist forces in 
industrialized countries.”
—Montek Singh Ahluwalia
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It is to preserve domestic systems in aspic and to shy away from the global 
economy instead.
Such defensiveness is damaging and counterproductive. It hurts a coun-
try’s trading partners in the short run, and damages the country itself in 
the long run. But the task of defending an open, global economy would be 
easier if we stopped talking about it as an obvious choice and started to 
admit that it is hard and challenging work. It is not easy to adapt domes-
tic policies and coordinate international responses to a constantly shifting 
global terrain. It would also serve the cause if it is acknowledged at the 
outset that the benefi ts and costs fall asymmetrically across countries, and 
across groups of people within countries. 
The Rise of China and India and the Decline 
of Manufacturing Prices
One does not have to spend much time listening to the concerns of poorer 
developing countries to discover that a major worry is how to fi nd room 
in the global economy beside the giants of China and India. Developing 
countries (without resource wealth) typically prise their way into world 
markets by trading on their relative abundance of labor. But of what value 
is abundant labor in a world where China, and prospectively India, have an 
apparently overwhelming advantage in labor-intensive manufacturing?
Will the growth strategy that worked well in the past 50 years continue 
to be an attractive option in the future? There is evidence of a potential 
problem. When the Multifi ber Agreement lapsed at the end of 2005, the 
textile industry, freed from national quotas, expanded in some countries 
and shrank in others. This had damaging short-run consequences in Africa 
and parts of Latin America, while Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Vietnam, 
and of course China, did well.
No country will remain hypercompetitive in labor-intensive industries 
indefi nitely. At some point, the country’s surplus labor will be absorbed 
and wages will rise. But with 55 percent of China’s population still living in 
rural areas, and 72 percent of India’s, the wait could be quite long. 
The effi ciency and scale of Chinese manufacturing has pushed down the 
price of many manufactured products, relative to many other goods and 
services in the global economy (see fi gure 11). (There are exceptions. The 
relative price of information-technology services has probably fallen even 
faster.)
This decline in manufacturing prices does not mean that labor-intensive 
growth strategies are impossible. It does, however, imply that they are more 
diffi cult to start and less effective in elevating incomes than they were in the 
past. This is discouraging news for countries, many of them in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, hoping to follow in the footsteps of the Asian tigers and others.
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Paul Collier of Oxford University has argued that Europe should grant 
African countries trade preferences, which would help them compete 
despite low world prices. Steps have already been taken to implement this 
recommendation. The advantage of this approach is that it is temporary 
and timely. If successful, it is not very costly to the countries granting the 
preferences. If it is not successful, the costs are essentially zero. These privi-
leges, if they work, can then be extended to a wider range of poorer coun-
tries at the early stages of export diversifi cation and growth.
Implementing trade preferences will require more fl exible “rules of ori-
gin,” the rules that determine such niceties as whether an African shirt made 
from Chinese yarn counts as African or Chinese. These rules often put such 
unrealistic demands on developing countries that they cannot avail them-
selves of the preferences they are given.
It should also be said that the global supply chains that run through 
countries like China and India represent a signifi cant opportunity and not 
just a threat. China imports growing volumes of goods from elsewhere in 
Asia. These goods either serve its growing domestic market or feed the sup-
ply chains of which it is part. There is growing evidence that this new and 
growing demand can and will extend to other parts of the world.
The “Adding-Up” Problem
The rise of China and India has revived an old concern about export-led 
growth: the strategy may work for one country, but can it work for many? 
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If a number of economies all try to expand their exports of labor-intensive 
manufacturing, who will do the importing? 
The question has arisen before, prompted by the rise of the four Asian 
tigers—Korea; Taiwan, China; Hong Kong, China; and Singapore—and 
the efforts of a wider range of countries to emulate their success. It was 
investigated by William Cline of the Center for Global Development in 
an infl uential series of studies in the 1980s. He has recently revisited the 
conclusions of his initial paper and subsequent book in the light of 25 more 
years of evidence.38 
The problem is referred to as either the “adding-up” problem or the “fal-
lacy of composition”: what is true at the level of the individual country may 
not hold in the aggregate. Export-led growth may not add up for at least 
two reasons. One is that the glut of manufactured goods depresses prices, 
reducing the private and social returns to manufacturing investment. The 
second is that a fl ood of exports might provoke a protectionist response in 
the importing markets (largely the advanced economies), again reducing 
the returns to investment in these industries.
Since Cline’s initial study, the original four tigers have largely exited the 
most labor-intensive industries. This was quite natural, a result of the tigers 
becoming richer and their workers becoming more expensive. It was an 
example of the structural evolution that underpins growth. 
As they have exited these industries, China has entered, in force. Its size 
and growth does appear to have pushed down the relative price of manu-
factured goods. But there is also evidence that rising incomes are starting to 
push China’s economy away from labor-intensive industries. Some of those 
industries are moving to other countries at earlier stages in the growth pro-
cess. China has also emerged as an important market for capital goods and 
intermediate goods sold by the advanced economies, especially Japan, and 
the four tigers it displaced.
While the evolving pattern of trade is fascinatingly complex, there is little 
evidence that the point of entry available to the tigers and then to China has 
been blocked for later arrivals. The relative price of manufactured goods 
may have fallen, reducing the returns to investment in the sector. But in poor 
countries, where labor is cheap, those returns still exceed the cost of capital. 
So far, markets in the advanced economies have also remained open. How-
ever, as noted earlier, there are signs of mounting protectionist sentiment in 
a number of countries. We may not have heard the last word on this.
Just as some countries enter labor-intensive manufacturing, others grad-
uate from it. There is no guarantee that the rate of exit will offset the 
rate of entry, so that the adding-up problem never bites. But this dynamic 
process of ascension and succession certainly helps. Cline notes that the 
38 “Exports of Manufactures and Economic Growth: The Fallacy of Composition Revisited.” Paper 
prepared for the World Bank. 2006.
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potential new entrants waiting in the wings are not that large relative to 
global demand. In addition, China is evolving so rapidly that it may exit 
some industries sooner rather than later. These two facts combined reas-
sure Cline that the labor-intensive route is unlikely to be cut off in the near 
future.
Cline is however concerned about a different issue, the problem of “global 
imbalances.” Since the late 1990s, many rapidly growing economies have 
run trade surpluses. These surpluses were not huge, but there were a lot of 
them. Several developing economies, including China, also attracted large 
infl ows of private capital. This combination of trade surpluses and private-
capital infl ows put upward pressure on the exchange rate, which in turn 
threatened the competitiveness of exports. To ward off this threat, central 
banks bought large amounts of dollars, which they added to their foreign-
exchange reserves.
The net effect was a fl ow of capital to the United States, which fi nanced 
America’s trade defi cit, allowing the country to live beyond its means. This 
American spending has kept the world economy ticking, but it is unlikely to 
be sustainable. Indeed, at the time of this report, some sort of rebalancing 
is already underway.
Economic growth requires a source of demand as well as supply. Over 
the past 10 years, America has provided more than its share of that demand. 
If that confi guration is unsustainable, and it probably is, then growth may 
indeed slow as it unwinds. But other sources of demand may emerge to 
take up the slack. The challenge is to match the decline in the U.S. defi cit 
with a reduction in excess saving in developing countries. Coordination is 
required so that the target is agreed and the time horizons match.
A number of countries already have the economic mass to make a notable 
contribution to global demand. And they will be joined by others, if more 
countries succeed in accelerating growth. Thus, it is quite possible that trade 
and capital fl ows will settle into a more sustainable pattern, which nonethe-
less maintains the growth rates experienced in the past decade.
The Rising Price of Food and Fuel
Food
Reversing decades of low prices, the last two years have seen sharp, largely 
unanticipated increases in the cost of food. Because poor people devote 
between half and three quarters of their income to feeding themselves and 
their families, the steep increase in the price of rice, grains, and edible oils 
is tantamount to a large reduction in their income. While in the long run 
higher food prices are an opportunity for those who live and work in rural 
areas, in the short run they create a crisis of serious proportions for the 
urban and rural poor, especially children. The World Bank estimates that 
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some 100 million people may have been pushed into poverty because of the 
high prices of the past two years. Africa and other low-income countries are 
particularly vulnerable. But even middle-income countries are at risk if they 
lack well-developed social safety-nets.
What lies behind these steep price increases? There are many potential 
causes, the relative importance of which is not yet clear. The contributing 
factors include rising demand, shifting diets, droughts, possibly fi nancial 
speculation, increased costs of key agricultural inputs such as fertilizers, 
and policies that encourage the use of agricultural land and output for bio-
fuels. Although there is no consensus yet on the relative importance of these 
factors, many believe that policies that favor biofuels over food need to be 
reviewed and if necessary reversed.
Other longer-term factors may have been at play. Some have suggested 
that the low agricultural prices that prevailed until recently bred a false sense 
of security among governments, which led them to neglect investments in 
rural infrastructure, research and development, storage, and food security 
programs that were once a government priority. In parallel, agricultural 
policies in many countries encouraged nonfood over food commodities.
Whatever their cause, the high prices demand a response. The United 
Nations, the World Bank, and other multilateral agencies have mobilized 
efforts to deal with the immediate crisis by providing aid in the form of both 
money and food. The challenge is huge because the problem is a global one. 
It is unlike past episodes of starvation or malnutrition, which had local 
causes such as drought or confl ict. 
While this initial multilateral response is encouraging, the crisis has 
highlighted a worrying lack of economic coordination between countries, a 
theme to which a later part of this report returns. For example, many major 
food-producing countries have reacted to the crisis by restricting exports to 
help contain prices at home. While entirely understandable as an emergency 
measure, these steps exacerbate the supply shortage in the rest of the global 
economy, driving prices still higher. Global markets in food are becoming 
temporarily balkanized as a result. In the long run, this encourages coun-
tries to become self-suffi cient in food, even if this is not their comparative 
advantage. As yet, there is little awareness of these long run risks, nor is 
there an adequate global mechanism for managing them.
High prices will also tempt governments to introduce price controls. 
These measures also are understandable and perhaps even justifi ed in an 
emergency. But while governments will want to protect consumers, they 
also have to recognize that such interference in the price mechanism is 
counterproductive over the long run. 
Higher prices are an important signal to domestic food producers, 
encouraging them to expand their supply. But not all farmers will be able 
to respond vigorously. Large numbers of small farmers lack the technology 
and the inputs needed to raise their productivity to its full potential. An 
“There is no effective 
development strategy 
that doesn’t fi rst deal 
with the issue of 
hunger. But there is a 
distinction between food 
security and food self-
suffi ciency. Successful 
economies have striven 
for growth that gives 
the broadest segment 
of the population 
suffi cient purchasing 
power to buy adequate 
nutrition. Without this, 
we cannot hope to see 
healthy mothers, effective 
students or productive 
workers.” 
—Danny Leipziger
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effective supply response therefore requires sustained public investment in 
critical aspects of rural infrastructure, a stronger publicly funded research 
effort, and an expansion of credit to underserved farmers. A sustained 
effort at increasing food production must therefore play a larger part in the 
development strategy of most developing countries than it has done so far. 
If farmers do eventually produce a much bigger crop, high food prices 
will subside. But to assume this is a one-time event is probably not a good 
idea. The global system is likely to be vulnerable to such shocks on an 
ongoing basis. It would therefore be wise to put better systems in place to 
respond to them. Countries urgently need effective social-safety nets that 
distribute cash to the poor or offer them employment on public-works pro-
grams. Reserves and inventories need to be accumulated to relieve tempo-
rary shortages, especially since persistent export bans cannot be ruled out. 
It is more effi cient to build these buffer stocks on a multinational basis with 
suitable assurances of access and availability.
Fuel 
Food staples are not the only commodities that have risen sharply in price 
in recent years. Crude oil prices have increased from under $25 a barrel six 
years ago to over $110 in May 2008. Many governments are understand-
ably reluctant to allow these higher prices to pass directly to consumers. But 
unless buyers face higher prices they will have no incentive to economize on 
fuel or to shift to less energy-intensive production. Costly energy subsidies 
will only make societies more dependent on oil and leave governments with 
less money to help the poor. 
One big question remains. Do these rising prices mark the beginning of 
a period in which natural resources, broadly defi ned, impose new limits 
on global growth? It is possible. Growth, both globally and in developing 
countries, may be somewhat slower than the pace set in the recent past. But 
it is not possible to know in advance how tight the new limits might be. 
It is worth noting that knowledge and ingenuity, not oil or minerals, 
account for much of the value that has been added to the global economy 
in recent years, especially in the leading economies. If this pattern holds in 
the future, the amount of natural resources required to produce a dollar of 
GDP will continue to decline. 
There are optimists and pessimists about this. But it is clear that our col-
lective future will depend on our ability to create as much value as possible 
on the natural resource base that we have.
Demographics, Aging, and Migration
The global population is aging. That conclusion emerges clearly from the 
evidence and forecasts we reviewed with the help of some distinguished 
“Rapid growth remains 
both possible and 
necessary for the billions 
of people throughout the 
developing world . . . if 
it can be made to be 
inclusive, and if it 
can adapt to new 
natural-resource and 
climate constraints 
that have to be taken 
seriously.”
—Kemal Dervis¸
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demographers. This aging has two principal causes: a fall in fertility and a 
large increase in longevity. Infants are entering the global population at a 
lower rate, and elderly people are exiting it later. There are of course coun-
tries and regions that do not refl ect this pattern, especially poorer countries 
where fertility rates remain high and diseases like HIV/AIDS have reduced 
longevity substantially.
Nonetheless the overall pattern is clear. The question is whether this 
aging will have a major impact on global growth and related variables like 
saving and investment. These are complex issues and this is not the place to 
go into detail. We confi ne ourselves to the major conclusions and refer the 
interested reader to the more detailed studies.
Aging societies account for about 70 percent of global GDP, large enough 
to be signifi cant. As their populations gray, must their economic growth 
slow? According to simple arithmetic, if the number of working-age adults 
stagnates or falls, and the number of retirees increases, this must surely 
squeeze income per head. There are fewer people to earn the income, but 
no fewer people to divide it among.
But this gloomy projection assumes that the defi nition of “working-age” 
remains the same as it does today. That is unlikely to be true. In many coun-
tries and regions (including most of Europe, North America, Japan, and 
China), the graying of the population threatens the solvency of the coun-
try’s pension arrangements. As a result, reforms are needed to extend the 
working life in these countries, or to give people a different set of choices 
with respect to retirement, income, and consumption before and after retire-
ment. The current fi xed retirement ages cannot survive.
Thus the reforms needed to restore the fi scal viability of many national 
pension systems will also change the length and pattern of working lives. If 
these reforms are undertaken gradually, as we expect, then the research sug-
gests there is no compelling reason to expect a major slowdown in global 
growth. 
Several countries are moving away from a “pay-as-you-go” pension sys-
tem, in which taxes are levied on today’s working generation to pay for 
today’s retirees. They are opting instead for more fully funded systems, 
in which today’s working generation accumulates fi nancial assets that will 
give it a claim on future output. 
As countries shift from one system to another, their saving rate may 
increase temporarily, adding to the “savings glut” in the world economy. 
That shift away from consumption could adversely affect growth for a 
period of time.
Aging is mostly a problem for the richer countries but does include 
China. Many of the world’s least developed countries have the opposite 
problem. Populations are young, and in countries ravaged by diseases like 
HIV/AIDs, the “anti-aging effect” is dramatic.
100 The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development
As a result, some countries have millions of young people leaving school 
and entering job markets that cannot absorb them. Moreover, as new 
entrants to the labor force, youth are often at a disadvantage to more expe-
rienced workers. The result is a worrying youth unemployment problem. 
It is a predicament that goes well beyond economics, posing a moral chal-
lenge and a security risk. And it is very widespread.
In some areas, even very high growth rates will not be quick enough to 
absorb the forecast labor supply. The numbers are striking (see fi gure 12). 
From now until 2050, the world is projected to add 3 billion people. Only 
100 million will be in rich countries. One billion will be in fast-developing 
countries, like India and China. The remainder, which is to say two-thirds 
of the world’s population increase, will be added in countries that do not 
yet have a solid track record of growth. Thus, the supply of labor is not 
where the jobs are being created. 
This demographic problem cannot be solved by individual countries 
alone. The solution will have to span national boundaries. For many coun-
tries, it is clear to us, migration for purposes of work is the only potential 
solution. Workers will have to move from countries where labor is abun-
dant to countries where it is scarce. Migration for work needs international 
supervision to prevent abuses in the treatment of mobile labor. 
Cross-border migration is a double-edged sword for developing coun-
tries. For those with excess labor supplies, it is an opportunity. The money 
that migrants remit back to their families and homes now far exceeds all 
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“In speaking about 
human progress, there 
is much to celebrate, 
but there is also much 
to deplore, because 
almost half of the world’s 
people are still living in 
poverty. We have focused 
on economic growth 
because without it the 
polarization between 
the haves and the have-
nots in our world would 
continue to widen 
and remain a cause of 
confl ict and instability.”
—Ernesto Zedillo
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offi cial aid. On the other hand, many countries suffer an outmigration of 
highly educated people whose service in government, business, and profes-
sional sectors would benefi t the home country.
The problem is compounded if the migrants were educated with public 
funds. The migrant enjoys the private return to this education, even as his 
or her home country misses out on the social returns. There are techniques 
for dealing with this potential divergence. One example would be to offer 
students loans for their education, then cut the repayment amount for every 
year they work in their home country.
Countries can also do a lot to win back their highly educated and expe-
rienced citizens. Fast-growing economies, where opportunities abound, 
can attract substantial return migration. And these skilled returnees can, in 
turn, make a substantial contribution to a country’s growth. Homecoming 
and fortune-hunting can form a virtuous circle. 
What about permanent migration from poor to rich countries? Large-
scale migration from the developing world to the developed world would 
increase global incomes substantially. If the migrants were younger on aver-
age than the citizens of their host countries, it would also slow the aging of 
the host’s population. While both statements are true, the political and social 
complexity associated with permanent migration on a large scale make it 
unlikely to occur. It should not be counted on as an important driver of 
inclusive growth at the global level, at least not in the near future. 
Global Imbalances and Global Governance
Developing economies have become a more intrusive presence in the rich 
world. In the past, their economic triumphs and mishaps were noted with 
applause or regret. But however important developing economies were 
locally or regionally, they did not have large macroeconomic consequences 
for the world economy. It was the advanced economies that accounted for 
the bulk of global output, income, and assets. And insofar as the world 
economy was governed by anyone, it was governed by policy makers in the 
capitals of the rich world. 
This constellation of powers is changing rapidly. The defi ning economic 
characteristic of the next few decades is likely to be the increasing size and 
expanding role of the developing world. China’s 2007 GDP is about $3.2 
trillion (at market exchange rates, with no adjustment for purchasing power 
parity) and growing at over 10 percent a year. It is almost 20 percent of the 
size of the U.S. economy, which means that 10 percent growth in China is 
the equivalent of 2 percent growth in the United States or Europe. India’s 
economy is approaching $1 trillion. It is likely to follow China’s path with 
a lag of about 12–15 years. 
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By mid-2007, reserves held by central banks were about $4.5 trillion. 
China’s reserves alone are about $1.6 trillion and rising, thanks to its grow-
ing trade surplus (10–12 percent of GDP in 2007) and the heavy private 
capital fl ows it attracts (see fi gure 13). The holdings of sovereign wealth 
funds, which are on the order of $3 trillion, are also rising because of high 
oil prices and governments’ willingness to hold a more diversifi ed portfolio 
of foreign assets. Some worry that these funds, which are owned by govern-
ments, will make their investment decisions for political reasons, not just 
commercial ones. There is no evidence that this has yet happened on any 
scale. But it is in everyone’s interest to make sure it does not happen, by 
making the right formal agreements and institutional arrangements.
Thanks to fi nancial innovation, the stock of fi nancial assets has grown 
three times faster than global GDP since 1980. But this ingenuity has also 
made several markets more opaque and more diffi cult to regulate, as the 
current credit crisis (2007–08) in America and Europe illustrates. These 
troubles have also left the fi nancial and monetary authorities confused 
about their roles. The responsibilities of central banks now extend beyond 
infl ation to credit crunches, growth slowdowns, asset bubbles, and, in 
some cases, exchange rates. In the face of relatively free international capi-
tal fl ows, it is unclear whether central banks have enough instruments to 
accomplish these objectives.
Since the summer of 2007, the capital markets have begun to price risky 
assets less generously. But the world economy is still unbalanced. United 
States savings rates are still low, China’s reserve accumulation has not 
slowed, and its trade surplus, once modest, is now rising rapidly. Currencies 
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that track the dollar (or the yuan) have largely accompanied the American 
currency on its descent, in defi ance of their underlying fundamentals.
It is clear to most observers that the global economy has outrun our 
capacity to manage it. This creates risks for developing countries in par-
ticular, because they are most vulnerable to sudden stoppages of credit, 
and sudden switches of international custom or supply. Wherever they are 
able to do so, countries are taking precautionary steps. They are amassing 
substantial foreign currency reserves and limiting capital fl ows in various 
categories that pose potential risks to stability, growth, and competitive-
ness. In the wake of America’s subprime crisis, developing countries are 
newly skeptical of the proposition that lightly regulated capital markets 
work best.
Indeed, a number of developing countries have their own potential asset 
bubbles to worry about. The price of real estate in Mumbai, for example, is 
reported to be as high or higher than that of New York or London. Hous-
ing prices in many parts of the world have become detached from rents. 
When asset bubbles burst, they have the potential to produce rapid slow-
downs in the nonfi nancial economy as well.
As the number of infl uential countries grows, it becomes all the more 
important to establish a mechanism for coordinating their policies. These 
economies, which now include the larger developing countries, share a joint 
responsibility for the stability of the global fi nancial system. But there is no 
international institution that allows them to discharge this responsibility 
properly. The G8 excludes them by design. The International Monetary 
Fund has tried to accommodate them, but its “quota” reforms have redis-
tributed voting power only marginally. To many in Asia, the IMF remains 
a creature of a postwar age, dominated by the European and American 
economies, that has passed.
An international institution that gave emerging economies their due 
would have two tasks. First is the duty of monitoring and keeping watch, 
what the IMF calls “surveillance.” The international system must anticipate 
fi nancial strains, imbalances, and fragilities. This would allow it to act early 
to reduce the chances of abrupt adjustments. The second task is to muster a 
timely and coordinated response to those crises it failed to anticipate, such 
as rising food prices.
The global economy, this report has argued, made it possible for 3 billion 
people to enjoy the fruits of growth in the postwar period. It also provides 
an economic springboard for another 2 billion people to fulfi ll their aspira-
tions. No doubt the global marketplace poses risks. No doubt people need 
to be protected from its harsher consequences and unrulier moments. But it 
is also true that openness itself needs protecting. An international economy 
in a world of nation-states has no natural guardians. That is perhaps the 
biggest risk of all. 
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This appendix is a graphical review of the evolution of the global 
economy in the postwar period and the growing role of developing 
countries. We present the main characteristics of developing countries’ 
economic and social evolution, and some features of the global economic 
environment that infl uence these countries’ economic prospects and 
challenges. 
In doing this review we have been surprised by the extent to which 
important data on developing countries are incomplete or contradictory. 
On the one hand, there are basic problems such as compilation issues. For 
example, no single source provides time series for all countries’ national 
accounts that are consistent with national accounts statistics: more often 
than not the time series are truncated. On the other hand, there are more 
serious problems such as lack of data. For example, data are incomplete 
on infrastructure and quality of education and, more generally, on the 
Statistical Appendix
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Countries since WWII
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effi ciency of public sector spending. It seems important that international 
development institutions and statistical offi ces invest the time and 
resources needed to address this problem. 
The appendix consists of six parts. Part 1 reviews the evolution of GDP 
in industrialized and developing countries. Part 2 documents population 
trends, including forecasts. Part 3 deals with poverty in developing 
countries and some of its main characteristics. Part 4 provides some 
information on the evolution of socioeconomic indicators, education and 
health indicators in particular. Part 5 reviews selected information on 
infrastructure, an area where data are surprisingly incomplete. Part 6 
reviews important global trends. 
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1. EVOLUTION OF GLOBAL GDP 
AND PER CAPITA GDP
1.1 Evolution of Global and Per Capita GDP in the Last 2,000 Years 
A school of thought has long maintained that modern economic growth started with 
the “Industrial Revolution.” In fact, economic growth started well before, as a result of 
the spread of universities in the 14th and 15th centuries, and a series of scientifi c and 
technological innovations (e.g., the printing press, progress in ship engineering, 
navigational instruments, and advances in meteorological and astronomical knowledge). 
These developments, together with the return of some peace and security in Western 
Europe which facilitated trade, contributed to the acceleration of economic growth 
before the Industrial Revolution. After several tens of thousands of years of low or 
negligible economic progress, growth accelerated circa 1,000 AD, accelerated again in 
the 19th century and, some believe, has accelerated once more in the last two 
decades—although it is too early to conclude on the latter. This evolution in per capita 
incomes is illustrated in the fi gure below, which shows estimates of both the world 
GDP and of per capita incomes in the past two thousand years.
Source: Maddison, Angus. 2007. Contours of the World Economy, 1–2030 AD. Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press.
Note: PPP = purchasing power parity.
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1.2 The Growth of the World Population and Some Major Events in the History 
of Technology—9,000 B.C. to Present
Growth in incomes was accompanied by unprecedented increases in population and 
exponential increases in the rate of scientifi c discoveries.
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1.3 Long-Term Evolution of Per Capita GDP for Selected Developing Countries 
and Regions
Until WWII, economic growth was limited to Europe and North America. Per capita 
income stagnated elsewhere as shown in fi gure 1.3, where the horizontal axis measures 
per capita incomes for different groups of countries or regions over the past 2,000 years. 
Source: Angus Maddison’s Web site, www.ggdc.net/Maddison.
Note: PPP = purchasing power parity.
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1.4 Global GDP since 1960
After WWII, some developing countries started to grow at high rates and to catch up with 
industrialized countries, thus contributing to the exponential growth of world GDP. Figure 
1.4 shows how different groups of countries and regions have contributed to the world’s 
GDP since 1960. It shows that the United States, Canada, the European Union, and 
Japan account for well over half the global GDP, but that this proportion has been 
declining as a result of China and India’s growth. Since WWII Japan has experienced high 
growth that is a hybrid of catching up and postwar recovery. Whereas Japan was part of 
the developing world in the 1950s, 1960s, and part of the 1970s, it is now an 
industrialized economy and its GDP ranks among the world’s largest. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007.
Note: As of 2006, the European Union (European Union) consisted of 25 countries. Years of data availability 
vary by country; for example, German GDP begins in 1971. “Dev11” refers to the 11 developing countries 
that are among the 25 largest developing countries featured in table 1.1 and are not captured by the 
categories above. Dev11 comprises Algeria, Bangladesh, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Indonesia, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Romania, Thailand, and Turkey. The top 10 economies in 
the “others” category by size are the Republic of Korea; Australia; Taiwan, China; Switzerland; Hong Kong, 
China; Norway; Singapore; New Zealand; Ukraine; and Vietnam. 
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1.5 Growth in Today’s 25 Largest Developing Countries
Some of the largest developing countries have put their economies on track to catch up 
with industrialized countries; many others have not. There are about 150 developing 
countries in the world. The 10 largest account for about 70 percent of developing 
countries’ GDP, and the 25 largest countries for about 90 percent. The growth 
performance of these 25 countries has been uneven. Because industrialized countries’ 
secular growth rate is about 2 percent per capita, developing countries need to grow at 
much higher rates to catch up. Less than half have been able to reach this performance 
as indicated in the table below. Since 1960, only 6 countries have grown faster than 3 
percent in per capita terms and 10 had growth rates below 2 percent, implying that they 
have fallen farther behind industrialized countries’ incomes. Japan and the Republic of 
Korea are two large economies in the category of developing economies after WWII that, 
because of their growth performance, have reached the income levels of industrialized 
countries and hence are not in this table. As mentioned above, Japan’s growth is a hybrid 
of war recovery and catching up.
Real 
GDP* 
2006
Share in 
total**
GDP growth rate***
Rank 
1960
Real 
GDP 
1960
1980–2006 1960–2006
Real Per capita Real Per capita
China 2092 25.4 9.8 8.6 7.7 6.1 5 70
Brazil 765 9.3 2.2 0.5 4.4 2.3 2 105
India 703 8.5 6.0 4.1 4.9 2.8 4 77
Mexico 666 8.1 2.6 0.9 4.3 2.0 3 94
Russian Federation 373 4.5 –0.4 –0.2 – – – –
Argentina 340 4.1 1.8 0.5 2.5 1.1 1 108
Turkey 261 3.2 4.4 2.5 4.3 2.2 – –
Indonesia 219 2.7 5.2 3.6 5.5 3.6 8 18
Poland 210 2.6 3.7 3.7 – – – –
South Africa 169 2.0 2.2 0.1 3.3 1.0 7 38
Thailand 165 2.0 5.9 4.5 6.6 4.5 19 9
Venezuela, R. B. de 147 1.8 2.0 –0.3 2.8 0.0 6 41
Iran, Islamic Rep. of 140 1.7 3.5 1.3 4.4 1.8 – –
Egypt, Arab Rep. of 128 1.5 4.7 2.6 5.3 3.0 17 12
Malaysia 119 1.4 6.1 3.6 6.6 3.9 22 6
Colombia 106 1.3 3.2 1.4 4.2 1.9 11 16
Philippines 99 1.2 2.9 0.7 4.0 1.4 9 17
Pakistan 99 1.2 5.1 2.5 5.5 2.7 20 9
Chile 96 1.2 4.9 3.3 4.3 2.5 12 14
Algeria 72 0.9 2.8 0.5 3.6 1.1 13 14
Peru 71 0.9 2.3 0.4 3.2 0.9 10 16
Bangladesh 65 0.8 4.6 2.3 3.6 1.3 16 13
Nigeria 64 0.8 2.7 0.0 3.5 0.8 15 13
Hungary 62 0.7 1.7 2.0 3.4 3.4 14 13
Romania 53 0.6 1.0 1.1 – – – –
Others 965 11.7 – – – – – –
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007.
Note: The table excludes countries that were developing in 1960 and have already reached industrialized countries’ income levels. Numbers in italics and 
red indicate different time periods due to data availability: Russia (1989–2006), Turkey (1968–2006), Poland (1990–2006), Iran (1965–2006).
*Real and per capita GDP in constant 2000 US dollars, billions.
**Shares in total developing countries’ real GDP in 2006.
***Period growth rate in CAGR (compound annual growth rate).
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1.6 Divergence in Economic Performance, 1960–2006
Differences in economic performance are signifi cant. This applies particularly to Africa and 
Latin America, where growth has been slow or has slowed relative to the incomes of 
industrialized countries, implying that they have fallen behind.
1.7 Catching Up
Another way of describing differences in developing countries’ economic performance is 
to ask what growth rate a country would need to achieve to catch up with industrialized 
countries (whose per capita income is growing at the 2 percent secular rate) by a certain 
date. The table below shows the increase needed to catch up by 2050 and by 2100. 
Current trends persisting, China could reduce its per capita growth rate to 5.7 percent 
per year, down from its 8.3 percent average during the past 10 years. This indicates that 
at current rates China will catch up with industrialized countries before 2050. Brazil, on 
the other hand, needs to raise its per capita income growth rate by a factor of 5 
compared to its 1.1 percent growth over the past 10 years to catch up with industrialized 
countries by 2050. 
The last column in the table below shows the number of years needed for a country to 
catch up with OECD countries, assuming it grows in the future at the highest rate 
registered in the last 10 years. This rate is obviously arbitrary. Countries that experience 
large fl uctuations, such as Venezuela, will automatically have a very high growth rate, 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007.
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Per capita 
GDP* in 2006
Growth rate during past 
10 yrs
Growth rate needed to 
catch up*** Years needed to 
catch up****maximum** average** in 2050 in 2100
China 6,621 10.1 8.3 5.7 3.7 23
Brazil 7,826 4.3 1.1 5.3 3.5 119
India 3,308 7.7 4.9 7.4 4.5 50
Mexico 9,967 5.2 2.4 4.7 3.3 55
Russian Federation 10,350 10.0 5.4 4.6 3.2 17
Argentina 13,652 8.1 1.7 4.0 2.9 17
Turkey 7,842 8.3 2.7 5.3 3.5 28
Indonesia 3,570 4.3 1.3 7.2 4.4 181
Poland 13,349 7.0 4.3 4.0 3.0 22
South Africa 10,338 3.9 1.7 4.6 3.2 135
Thailand 8,065 6.2 1.8 5.2 3.5 45
Venezuela, R. B. de 6,485 16.2 1.1 5.7 3.7 13
Iran, Islamic Rep. of 7,405 5.9 3.2 5.4 3.6 54
Egypt, Arab Rep. of 4,031 4.9 2.7 6.9 4.3 118
Malaysia 10,091 6.4 2.2 4.7 3.3 35
Colombia 6,886 5.4 1.0 5.6 3.7 68
Philippines 4,731 4.3 2.2 6.5 4.1 159
Pakistan 2,206 4.8 1.8 8.3 4.9 159
Chile 10,939 5.1 2.6 4.5 3.2 54
Algeria 6,376 5.3 2.4 5.8 3.8 75
Peru 5,725 6.5 2.3 6.0 3.9 51
Bangladesh 1,916 4.8 3.5 8.7 5.1 163
Nigeria 1,008 8.0 1.8 10.3 5.8 74
Hungary 16,928 5.5 4.7 3.4 2.7 26
Romania 8,722 8.7 3.1 5.0 3.4 24
Per capita 
GDP in 2006
Growth rate during past 
10 yrs Per capita GDP***
maximum average in 2050 in 2100
OECD 30,897 3.08 2.04 75,130 206,222 –
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007.
*Per capita GDP based on purchasing power parity, in constant 2000 international dollars.
**Maximum and simple average of the annual growth rates during the past 10 years.
***Assuming growth at annual rate of 2.04%, which is the average growth rate of OECD during the past 10 years.
****Assuming both grow at the maximum growth rate achieved during the past 10 years.
explained by rebounds, and hence an artifi cially low number of years to catch up. Using 
the average for the last 10 years would have provided a more credible estimate. However, 
many countries have an average per capita growth rate for the decade well below the 
OECD secular per capita growth rate, implying that they would never catch up at such 
rates. On the other hand, the table shows that all countries grew at a rate above 2 
percent in at least one year. Using this rate renders the calculation mathematically 
feasible, but its economic meaning needs to be interpreted carefully. 
Growth has recently accelerated in countries in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle 
East, partly as a result of commodity price increases, and partly as a result of changes in 
economic policies. The issue now is whether this acceleration will persist. 
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1.8 Rapid Growth Is Urban Based—Decomposition of Growth Rates 
for the Fast-Growing Economies: Various Periods
In all cases of sustained high growth (7 percent or more sustained over 25 years or 
more), it is production in urban areas—that is, manufacturing and services—that led the 
growth. 
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007; for Brazil: World Bank calculation using data from World Tables 1976, World Bank, and Institute 
of Applied Economic Research (IAER), Brazil (http://www.ipeadata.gov.br); for Japan: World Bank calculation using data from World Tables 1976, World 
Bank, and Maddison, Angus, 2001: The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective. Paris: OECD.
Note: The calculations apply for different periods indicated in parentheses because of different degrees of consistent data availability: Botswana 
(1965–2006); Brazil (1955–73); China (1965–2006); Hong Kong, China (2000–06); Indonesia (1960–2005); Japan (1955–73); Korea, Rep. of (1970–2006); 
Malaysia (1970–2006); Oman (1988–2004); Singapore (1975–2006); Taiwan, China (1965–2006); and Thailand (1960–2006).
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1.9 Divergence in Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia, 1960–2006
Another way of looking at divergence is to compare selected regions or economies over 
time. The fi gure below shows differences in performance of Africa overall in relation to 
East Asia.
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1.10 Divergence within Africa, 1960–2006
Within Africa itself there has been signifi cant divergence. For example, Mauritius and 
Côte d’Ivoire faced the same international market for commodities and became 
independent at about the same period. Mauritius pursued a growth strategy aimed at 
supplying the external market, integrating itself with the global economy, and diversifying 
its production and exports. Conversely, Côte d’Ivoire relied almost exclusively on the 
rents of its commodity exports. Zambia and Botswana started with about the same per 
capita income, and both were rich in minerals: again, different policies and institutions 
brought about different results. 
Source: Arbache, Jorge, Go, Delfi n, and Page, John. 2008. “Is Africa at a Turning Point?” Policy Research 
Working Paper 4519, February. World Bank, Washington, DC.
Note: PPP = purchasing power parity.
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1.11 The Rise of China and India, 1960–2006
Because of the consistently improving economic performance of China and India, the 
share of developing countries in global GDP is increasing. The corollary is that the share 
of the United States, Canada, Japan, and the European Union has been declining since 
the 1980s—although these economic blocks together still account for 70 percent of the 
world’s GDP. 
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2.2 Global Population, 1960–2006 and 2030 Forecast, Percent Distribution
The corollary to population growth in developing countries is that industrialized countries 
account for a dwindling share of the world population. 
2. POPULATION: TRENDS AND FORECASTS
2.1 Population Growth, 1960–2006 and 2030 Forecast
Since WWII, most of the growth in the world’s population has taken place in developing 
countries.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007; forecast for 2030 from Maddison, 2001. 
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2.3 Demographic Change, 1950–2050, by Five-Year Age Group
The fi gures below illustrate for different groups of countries and regions the evolution of 
the age structure of the population from 1950 to present, and how it is expected to 
evolve from the present to 2050. The fi gures ignore future migration fl ows. Reading the 
age axis from left to right provides the age composition of the population at different 
points in time, starting in 1950, by fi ve-year age groups. Reading the time axis from past 
to present, and then to the future, following the contour on the surface, shows the 
evolution in size of a particular age group. In the case of China, for example, as one 
moves right along the time axis, the fi gure shows fi rst an increase in the number of 
children in the 0–4 year group, followed by a sharp decline, which is expected to continue 
throughout 2050. All the countries and regions have experienced or will experience a 
decline in the low age categories as a result of declining birth rates. In the case of the 
United States and the European Union, for example, declining birth rates explain the rise 
in the high age categories. One important exception is Sub-Saharan Africa, where low 
age groups are expected to continue to increase in number. Another exceptional feature 
of Sub-Saharan Africa’s population trends is the expected rapid decline in population in 
the higher age categories.
The main conclusions of the fi gures below are that important demographic changes are 
underway that will lead to rapidly aging populations in industrialized countries.
Populations in industrialized countries will age rapidly.
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Aging will be particularly pronounced in Japan, Russia, and, to a lesser extent, China.
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Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. 2005 and 2006. “World Population 
Prospects: The 2006 Revision” and “World Urbanization Prospects: The 2005 Revision.” Available at: http://esa.un.org/unpp.
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2.3 Demographic Change, 1950–2050, by Five-Year Age Group—continued
India’s population will also age, albeit less than China’s.
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Latin America’s population will age, and Africa’s shows the devastating effects of HIV/
AIDS on longevity.
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2.4 Urban Population and Urbanization Rate, 1960–2006
Both as a result of population growth within urban areas and in-migration from rural 
areas, the world is becoming increasingly urbanized. A threshold was crossed in 2008: 50 
percent of the world population is now urban. There is a lot more urbanization to come, 
as countries industrialize and grow.
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2.5 Population Growth to 2030: Low- and Middle-Income 
versus High-Income Countries
Most of the increase in population in the next two decades will take place in the cities of 
today’s developing countries. 
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2.6 Female Labor Force and Female Participation Rate, 1980 to Present
The participation of women in the labor force has increased in industrialized countries and 
in Latin America and the Dev11, but participation rates have declined in India, China, and 
Russia. The reasons behind these declining trends have not been studied and are poorly 
understood. Declining trends may be explained by the upward trends in school 
enrollment, to the extent that participation in labor comes from girls who should 
otherwise be enrolled. Another possible explanation is inelastic labor demand for women 
for a variety of sociological and cultural reasons. The conclusion is that more work is 
needed to understand the meaning of these data and whether data collection captures 
informal work by women. Additionally, some of these trends should be disaggregated by 
age and education, and labor market issues in general should be looked at more deeply. 
Another issue with data on female participation in the labor force is comparability across 
countries. In general, estimates of women in the labor force are lower than those of men 
and are not comparable internationally, refl ecting the fact that for women, demographic, 
social, legal, and cultural trends and norms determine whether their activities are 
regarded as economic. In many countries large numbers of women work on farms or in 
other family enterprises without pay, while others work in or near their homes, mixing 
work and family activities during the day. Countries differ in the criteria used to determine 
whether such workers are to be counted as part of the labor force. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007.
*Simple average is used for calculating aggregates.
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3. POVERTY
3.1 Number of People Living below US$2 a Day and Percentage in Population 
Reduction of poverty has been an explicit or implicit goal of governments in many 
developing countries since at least the end of WWII. India has pioneered the formulation 
of poverty concepts and measurements since the 1950s, including the use of household 
surveys, and is the developing country with the longest consistent series of poverty 
indicators. Starting in the 1990s, the World Bank built on this and other developing 
countries’ measurement efforts. It supported the design and implementation of 
household surveys in a large number of countries and popularized a number of 
methodologies, concepts, and measurements. 
These efforts helped develop poverty lines that allow comparisons across countries and 
over time. Poverty defi nitions vary from country to country. In some countries, the poor 
are defi ned as those in the lowest quintile or the lowest third of the income distribution. 
As a result, the number of poor never declines. A reduction in poverty in this context 
means an improvement in the incomes of those at the bottom of the distribution. In other 
countries, the poor are those who consume below a certain level considered minimal. 
The defi nition of “minimal” varies of course from country to country, depending on their 
level of development, incomes, values, and norms: what is considered essential in one 
country may be part of what is superfl uous in another. A common defi nition applicable 
across countries addresses this problem and allows countries to be compared with each 
other. 
This is what the poverty line valued at US$1 or US$2 achieves. It uses as a poverty line a 
common basket of commodities valued at common prices or purchasing power parities 
(PPPs). By this defi nition, while the number of poor has remained relatively stable since 
the early 1990s, the number of poor as a proportion of the total population has declined 
because the total population in developing countries has increased.
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Source: Development Economics Research Group, World Bank. 
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3.2 Gini Coeffi cients: Selected Examples
Poverty incidence measures provide information on the number of people consuming 
less than what is considered nutritionally and socially desirable. Although they are the 
most telling measure of a country’s economic and social performance, there exist more 
subtle measures. Often the Gini coeffi cient is used: it calculates the distance from an 
absolutely equal income distribution among citizens, which is when the Gini coeffi cient 
would be equal to zero. Conversely, the more unequal the distribution, the closer to 1 is 
the Gini coeffi cient. In the most extreme case in which one citizen has all of the GDP and 
the rest of the population zero, the coeffi cient would be equal to 1.
The table below highlights some regional differences. Latin American countries—in 
particular Brazil and Chile—have much more unequal distribution of income than in Asia. 
Tanzania is an interesting exception in a region where income distribution tends to be as 
unequal as in Latin America. This is possibly the result of the land reform programs under 
President Nyerere. 
The actual calculation of Gini coeffi cients is complex and requires income data at the 
household level that often do not exist. The distribution of expenditure at the household 
level is used instead in these cases, which often tends to bias results toward more 
equality than really exists. The periodicity of the data is another issue. In most countries, 
income or expenditure distribution data are available at infrequently intervals only. 
Comparisons between countries and over time should hence be made carefully. For 
example, the map that follows shows the United States with a more equal distribution 
than China’s. But the coeffi cient for China is calculated on the basis of 2004 data, and 
that of the United States on the basis of 2000 data, and most observers would agree that 
coeffi cients in the two countries now are believed to be quite close to each other—in the 
mid 40s. 
The table below also provides some information on the evolution of the distribution of 
income in selected countries. It shows that income distribution has worsened in 
Bangladesh, China, and India, countries that have experienced rapid growth in the last 
two decades. In Brazil, where per capita income has stagnated over the last 25 years, 
income distribution improved as a result of the end of hyperinfl ation (which penalized the 
poor disproportionately) and the implementation of redistributive programs. In Chile, 
Indonesia, and Morocco, the income distribution has remained relatively stable.
Gini Coeffi cients of Selected Countries (times 100)
Country Year 1 Year 2 Gini in year 1 Gini in year 2
Bangladesh 1991–92 2005 28.27 33.20
Brazil 1990 2004 60.68 56.99
Chile 1990 2003 55.52 54.92
China 1990 2004 33.50 46.90
India 1993–94 2004–05 31.52 36.76
Indonesia 1993 2004 34.63 34.76
Morocco 1990–91 1998–99 39.20 39.46
Tanzania 1991 2000–01 33.83 34.62
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007. 
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3.4 Growth Incidence Curves
Growth incidence curves help illustrate the evolution of income distribution by calculating 
the rate of income growth for each household. When high-income groups see their 
incomes rise faster than the bottom group, income distribution worsens, even though the 
whole population sees an increase in incomes.
3.4.1 China
The growth incidence curve for China between 1993 and 2004 illustrates this point. 
During this period, the annual per capita growth rate was close to 7 percent per year. For 
the top half of the population in terms of income the increase was above 7 percent, and 
for the bottom half it was below. The highest income groups benefi ted more, probably 
because their skills and assets were in shorter supply. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007.
Note: Per capita income has been adjusted by the cost of living difference between the rural and urban 
areas.
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3.4.2 India
The case of India is more diffi cult to interpret. Whereas national accounts data indicate 
that per capita income between 1993 and 2004 increased in excess of 4 percent per year, 
household surveys show dramatically smaller increases in consumption expenditure—
implausibly smaller. The reasons for the discrepancy have been the subject of 
considerable debate in India. But India is not unique in this aspect. Already in 1999, 
Angus Deaton* had observed that in many countries discrepancies between household 
surveys and national accounts were a serious issue deserving serious investigation. This 
suggestion unfortunately has not been followed up, and one of the many statistical 
shortcomings in developing countries persists. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007.
Note: Per capita consumption expenditure has been adjusted by the cost of living difference between the 
rural and urban areas.
*Deaton, Angus. 1999. “Saving and Growth.” In Luis Serven and Klaus Schmitt-Hebbel, Economics of 
Savings and Growth. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
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3.5 Ratios of Quintile Shares, Selected Countries
Tracking each population quintile’s consumption as a share of GDP is another way of 
capturing the extent of inequality. In the case of Brazil, the richest 20 percent of the 
population had more than half of the country’s income, whereas in India the top quintile 
had between one third and 40 percent of income, and in China between 40 and 45 
percent. The ratio between top and bottom quintile consumption is another measure of 
inequality: it varies between a high of more than 20:1 in Brazil, to less than 10:1 in China, 
to much less in India or Bangladesh. 
Quintile share
Country Year 1 Year 2
Bottom 
in year1
Top in 
year1
Bottom 
in year 2
Top in 
year 2
Top/bottom 
in yr 1
Top/bottom 
in yr 2
Bangladesh 1991–92 2005 9.4 33.9 8.8 37.6 3.6 4.3
Brazil 1990 2004 2.3 55.7 2.6 53.0 23.9 20.2
Chile 1990 2003 3.4 52.8 3.7 52.7 15.4 14.3
China 1990 2004 5.6 41.5 4.3 44.5 7.4 10.5
India 1993–94 2004–05 8.9 36.3 8.1 40.4 4.1 5.0
Indonesia 1993 2004 8.3 38.0 8.0 38.0 4.6 4.8
Morocco 1990–91 1998–99 6.6 40.9 6.4 40.7 6.2 6.3
Tanzania 1991 2000–01 7.4 36.8 7.3 37.2 5.0 5.1
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007. 
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3.6 Inequality over Time: Annual Change in Gini Coeffi cient 
in 59 Developing Countries
Over the last decade, it has become increasingly clear that inequality is rising in many 
countries, including industrialized ones. The IMF World Economic Outlook documented 
this trend in its most recent 2008 report. The fi gure below shows that inequality has 
increased in most countries. The reasons are not entirely well understood. In 
industrialized countries, inequality may result from the integration of China and India into 
the global economy, which puts pressure on low and unskilled labor, technological 
progress, and migration. Which of these factors matters most is the subject of 
considerable debate and controversy. In developing countries on a high growth path, the 
rise in income inequality seems to be the consequence of the movement of people from 
low- to high-productivity activities and sectors. 
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Source: World Bank, Global Monitoring Report 2008.
Note: The time period varies depending on the availability of data. Typically it is from late 1980s and early 
1990s to later 1990s and early 2000s. 
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4. SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS
4.1 Improved Sanitation Facilities and  Water Source, 1990–2004
Developing countries lag behind industrialized countries in terms of access to 
infrastructure and other services that are crucial determinants of health outcomes. It is 
well-known, for example, that frequently malnutrition develops not from insuffi cient 
intake of food, but from diseases associated with lack of access to sanitation and potable 
water.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007.
Improved sanitation facilities: Access to improved sanitation facilities refers to the percentage of the population with at least adequate access to excreta 
disposal facilities that can effectively prevent human, animal, and insect contact with excreta. Improved facilities range from simple but protected pit 
latrines to fl ush toilets with a sewerage connection. To be effective, facilities must be correctly constructed and properly maintained. See World Health 
Organization and United Nations Children’s Fund, Meeting the MDG Drinking Water and Sanitation Target, for details. 
Improved water source: Access to an improved water source refers to the percentage of the population with reasonable access to an adequate amount of 
water from an improved source, such as a household connection, public standpipe, borehole, protected well or spring, and rainwater collection. 
Unimproved sources include vendors, tanker trucks, and unprotected wells and springs. Reasonable access is defi ned as the availability of at least 20 
liters a person a day from a source within one kilometer of the dwelling. See World Health Organization and United Nations Children’s Fund, Meeting the 
MDG Drinking Water and Sanitation Target, for details. 
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4.2 DPT* and Measles Immunization, 1995–2005
Although there has been considerable improvement, access to the most basic public 
good, vaccines, remains remarkably uneven.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007.
*Diphtheria, pertussis (or whooping cough), and tetanus.
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4.3 Prevalence of Undernourishment* and HIV/AIDS
Although there have been improvements everywhere except in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
undernourishment and HIV remain serious health problems in developing countries, even 
in the rapidly growing ones. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007.
*Population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption.
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4.4 Public Spending on Education (2004)* and Expected Years 
of Schooling (2005)**
It is extremely hard to compile statistics on education that make sense. For example, 
years of schooling is a function of both public and private spending on education, but data 
on private spending are not collected systematically.
Another problem is that in most countries, public spending in education is done mostly 
by the lower levels of government—provincial and city governments—but these data are 
not systematically collected and processed, with the result that public spending on 
education is typically underestimated. 
Last but not least, years of schooling is a poor proxy to learning achievements, which is 
the real output of any school system. But developing better data on this will take years of 
effort. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007.
*Most recent year (1999) is used for China.
**The number of years a child of school entrance age is expected to spend at school or university, including years spent on repetition.
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4.5 Primary School Enrollment* and Completion Rate
The statistics that are collected suggest that in most countries primary enrollment and 
completion rates have increased and are getting closer to industrialized levels, except for 
Africa and India, where they remain at lower levels. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007.
*Ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that offi cially corresponds to the level of education shown.
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4.6 Adult and Youth Literacy Rates
Low enrollment rates generally translate into low literacy rates among adults and young 
people.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007.
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4.7 PISA Tests: 2006
Learning achievements—that is the acquisition of specifi c cognitive skills—when they are 
measured, are quite varied both within and across countries. The so-called PISA tests 
consist of elaborate evaluations meant to determine the learning achievements of 
students in science. The results show signifi cant variance between and within countries.
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5. INFRASTRUCTURE
Investment in infrastructure is key for growth and development because it expands the 
range of opportunities for and returns on private investment. Furthermore, investment in 
infrastructure ensures access to key public services such as water, public transportation, 
and urban amenities—services that not only support growth but also and in turn help 
distribute the benefi ts of growth across the population at large. Given the importance of 
infrastructure for long-term growth and inclusiveness, available data are surprisingly hard 
to obtain. There appear to be two main reasons for this. First, public investment is 
generally carried out by various levels of government and agencies whose expenditures 
are not part of the budget. Very few countries consolidate these various sources of 
infrastructure spending in their national accounts. Second, private investment in 
infrastructure is rarely fully recorded. India is an exception in both these dimensions; but 
for other countries, the information base needs to be built.
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India: Gross Domestic Capital Formation in Infrastructure Sectors (% of GDP)
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South Africa: Infrastructure Investment (% of GDP)
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Thailand: Infrastructure Investment (% of GDP)
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6. GLOBAL TRENDS
The post WWII period was characterized by a number of important global trends, some of 
which represent a clear break with the past and a change in direction. 
6.1 Infl ation*
The last 20 years saw a decline in the rate of infl ation. The decline started in industrialized 
countries and was followed after a lag by developing countries.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007.
*Infl ation is measured by the median infl ation rate in both groups of countries.
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6.2 Real Interest Rate,* 1960–2005
Domestic real interest rates increased signifi cantly, because in most developing 
countries, nominal rates declined less than the decline in infl ation.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007.
*Real interest rates are measured by the median infl ation rate in both groups of countries.
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6.3 Emerging Markets Risk Spreads,* 2000–08
Risks spreads for emerging markets have substantially declined in the last eight years 
because of fi scal consolidation, improved debt management, and buildup of reserves.
Source: JP Morgan Government Bond Indices. 
*In the calculation of JP Morgan EMBI Stripped Spreads, the value of collateralized fl ows (if any) is stripped from the bond and hence it provides a better 
measure of the credit risk premium over United States Treasury bonds.
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6.4 Commodity Prices
The third important development, more recent than the previous two, is a return to 
higher commodity prices. This has been felt in all classes of commodities, as shown in 
the next four graphs. Agriculture and food indices rose markedly less than other 
commodities but they have been catching up in recent months. 
6.4.1 World Bank Major Commodity Price Indices*
Source: Development Economics Prospects Group, World Bank, Commodity Price Data: various issues.
*World Bank commodity price indices are trade-weighted indices for developing countries.
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6.4.2 Selected Metals Prices*
Source: Development Economics Prospects Group, World Bank, Commodity Price Data: various issues. 
*Real metal price in constant 1990 US$.
forecast
0
1,000
3,000
2,000
4,000
5,000
7,000
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
copper aluminum nickel gold (right axis) zinc (right axis)
U
S
$/
m
et
ri
c 
to
n
 (
co
p
p
er
, a
lu
m
in
u
m
); 
ce
n
ts
/k
g
 (
n
ic
ke
l)
6,000
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
900
U
S
$/
to
z 
(g
o
ld
); 
ce
n
ts
/k
g
 (
zi
n
c)
800
148 The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development
6.4.3 Agriculture: Indices for Various Categories of Products 
Source: Development Economics Prospects Group, World Bank, Commodity Price Data: various issues.
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6.4.4 Food: Indices for Various Categories of Products 
Source: Development Economics Prospects Group, World Bank, Commodity Price Data: various issues.
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6.5 Global Savings Rates* for Developed and Developing Countries as Percent 
of GDP
Saving rates have been declining in industrialized countries and increasing in developing 
countries. During the last decade, developing countries have become net exporters of 
capital. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007.
*Gross domestic savings rates are gross domestic savings (GDP less fi nal consumption expenditure (total consumption)) as percentage of GDP, both in 
current US$.
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6.6 Global Investment Rates* for Developed and Developing Countries as 
Percent of GDP
Investment rates have followed movements in saving rates—that is, declining in 
industrialized countries and rising in most developing countries. The exceptions are 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, where rates of investment and growth have been 
stagnant. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007.
*Gross domestic investment rates are gross capital formation (formerly gross domestic investment, which consists of outlays on additions to the fi xed 
assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories) as percentage of GDP, both in current US$.
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6.7 Size of Government (government expenditure as share of GDP) 
of Developed and Developing Countries, 1960–2005
The size of government is another important macroeconomic variable that is diffi cult to 
estimate precisely because some government expenditure and investment takes place in 
public enterprises. These are not always consolidated into the government accounts. This 
leads to variability, and a tendency to understate the fi gures.
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook.
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6.8 International Trade
Since WWII, international trade has grown faster than global GDP. This is illustrated in the 
three graphs below.
6.8.1 Evolution of World Exports and the Share 
of Developing Countries, 1975–2005
World exports grew from less than 20 percent of global GDP in 1975 to 30 percent in 
2005. The share of developing countries in global exports increased from about 22 
percent to about 28 percent. The increase came after a sharp decline in the mid-1980s 
when the oil price dropped to about US$10/bbl by about 1986. In constant United States 
dollar terms, the share of developing countries’ exports appear more stable. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007.
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6.8.2 Developing Countries’ Exports of Manufactures and Commodities*
The growth in exports of developing countries comes from both manufactures and 
commodities. The fi gures below show exports measured in nominal United States dollars 
and hence include price effects. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007.
*Estimates for Sub-Saharan Africa not available in 2004 and 2005; for all trade data, regional aggregates do not exclude intraregional trade. 
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6.8.3 More Export Opportunities for High-Income Countries 
and South-South Trade, 1980–2005
Two new trends emerged in the 1990s: developing countries’ imports grew faster than 
industrialized countries’ exports, and developing countries’ exports grew faster than 
industrialized countries’ imports. The fi rst trend indicates that developing countries’ 
markets are increasingly open to industrialized countries. Both trends suggest increasing 
South-South trade (see the fi gures below). 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007.
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6.9 Global Migration and Remittances 
Since World War II, migration has become an increasingly important component of 
development. The number of immigrants has more than tripled, and remittances have 
been growing as a share of developing countries’ GDP.
6.9.1 Global Migration and Remittances, 1960 to 2005
The number of immigrants has more than tripled. As a proportion of the world population, 
migration has increased from about 2.5 percent to 3 percent, and probably much more as 
a proportion of industrialized countries’ population. Not surprisingly, remittances have 
become an increasingly large share of developing countries’ GDP.
Source: Population Division, United Nations, “Trends in Total Migrant Stock: 2005 Revision”; World Bank staff estimates based on the International 
Monetary Fund’s Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook 2007.
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6.9.2 Remittances in Relation to FDI and Aid, 1970 to 2005
Remittances now exceed offi cial development assistance.
Source: World Bank staff estimates based on the International Monetary Fund’s Balance of Payments 
Statistics Yearbook 2007; World Bank, World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance, 
2007; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and Balance of Payments databases.
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1970 1975 1980
U
S
$ 
(b
ill
io
n
s)
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
remittances inflows to
developing countries
official development
assistance and official aid
FDI, net inflows to 
developing countries
Statistical Appendix 155
6.10 Role of Technological Advances in Developing Countries’ Economies
Developing countries have become technologically more sophisticated, as indicated in 
the graphs below.
6.10.1 Share of Developing Countries’ High-Technology* Exports 
and Detailed Decomposition 
Developing countries’ share of high-technology exports has been increasing rapidly in 
recent years, driven mostly by China, but also other Asian countries.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007.
Note: For all trade data, regional aggregates do not exclude intraregional trade.
*High-technology exports are products with high R&D intensity, such as in aerospace, computers, 
pharmaceuticals, scientifi c instruments, and electrical machinery.
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6.10.2 Exports of Knowledge-Based* Commercial Services Dominated 
by the United States and the European Union
In the case of services, world trade is still dominated by the United States and the 
European Union. Notwithstanding India’s growing exports of services, the share of 
developing countries has in fact declined.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007.
*Knowledge-based commercial services include information technology (IT), communications, insurance, 
fi nancial, and other services; but do not include transportation and travel. Typical activities are international 
telecommunications and postal and courier services; computer data processing; news-related service 
transactions between residents and nonresidents; construction services; royalties and license fees; 
miscellaneous business, professional, and technical services; personal, cultural, and recreational services; 
freight insurance on goods exported and other direct insurance such as life insurance; fi nancial 
intermediation services such as commissions, foreign exchange transactions, and brokerage services; and 
auxiliary services such as fi nancial market operational and regulatory services.
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6.10.3 Developing Countries’ Share of Patent Applications 
(residents and nonresidents), 1995–2004
Developing countries have become more important innovators.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007.
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6.10.4 Receipts of Royalty and License Fees, 1997–2004
However, income from innovation is still dominated by industrialized countries.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007.
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6.11 Private Capital Flows to Developing Countries
Since the mid-1990s, private capital fl ows to developing countries have declined and 
developing countries now are net savers. The exception is FDI, whose role in recent years 
has increased, in both absolute and relative terms. This is illustrated in the fi gures below.
6.11.1 FDI Infl ows to Developing Countries, 1980–2005
The infl ows of FDI to developing countries are highly concentrated, with Latin America 
and China being the major recipients in the last 10 years. In aggregate terms, FDI to 
developing countries has been volatile. Between the mid-1990s and the early 2000s, 
infl ows declined from 35 percent of total world FDI to 10 percent. FDI infl ows have now 
recovered and are hovering around 30 percent of the world total. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007.
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6.11.2 Private Capital Flows* into Developing Countries 
and Their Share in Total Private Capital Flows, 1991–2005
After reaching over 25 percent of the world total in the early 1990s, private capital fl ows 
into developing countries are a small and declining portion of all private capital fl ows.
Source: World Bank, Development Economics Group.
*Private capital fl ows consist of private debt and nondebt fl ows. Private debt fl ows include commercial bank 
lending, bonds, and other private credits; nondebt private fl ows are FDI and portfolio equity investment.
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6.11.3 Buildup of Reserves in Developing Countries, 1993–2006
Over the last decade, developing countries have started accumulating substantial 
reserves.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007.
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6.11.4 Global Imbalances, 1999–2006
The increase in developing economies’ reserves occurred in parallel with a decline in the 
United States savings rate to unprecedentedly low levels.
Global imbalance
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Major reserve-positive economies
Total reserves, top 10 (minus gold, current US$, millions)
China 158 168 216 291 408 614 822 1068
Japan 287 355 395 461 663 834 834 880
Russian Federation 8 24 33 44 73 121 176 296
Taiwan, China 106 107 122 162 207 242 253 266
Korea, Rep. of 74 96 103 121 155 199 210 239
India 33 38 46 68 99 127 132 171
Singapore 77 80 76 82 96 113 116 136
Hong Kong, China 96 108 111 112 118 124 124 133
Brazil 35 32 36 38 49 53 54 86
Malaysia 31 28 30 33 44 66 70 82
U.S. household saving (current US$, billions)
114 117 108 169 166 160 13 6
As a percentage of household disposable income
1.7 1.6 1.4 2.2 2.0 1.8 0.1 0.1
U.S. current account defi cit (current US$, billions)
300 415 389 472 528 665 729 857
Composition of U.S. capital infl ows by major reserve holding economies (current US$, billions)
Foreign-owned assets in the United States, excluding fi nancial derivatives (increase/fi nancial infl ow (+))
European Union 409 593 362 215 244 467 479 799
China 15 19 39 72 75 125 188 210
Middle East 2 16 2 1 8 28 19 63
Japan 25 58 50 77 139 238 61 48
Germany 49 72 62 18 40 35 32 42
Hong Kong, China 11 10 29 15 38 11 32 38
Brazil –1 1 8 –2 10 3 10 32
Korea, Rep. of 11 1 1 14 18 19 22 16
Singapore –2 9 0 8 11 12 5
India 3 –1 0 3 7 –3 4 5
Taiwan, China 0 –2 9 11 23 8 11 4
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007; Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Economic Accounts Data and United States International 
Transactions Accounts Data.
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6.12 Climate Change
Global warming and its potential costly consequences are a major, if not the most 
important, global trend facing developing economies. The fi gures below illustrate some of 
the magnitudes of the problem.
6.12.1 Per Capita Carbon Emission, 1970–2003 
Per capita emissions of CO2 are lower than those in industrialized countries, but rising 
rapidly. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007.
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6.12.2 CO2 Emissions in the United States, China, and India, 
Present and Future
Currently, China’s total carbon emissions are approximately equal to those of the United 
States, and India’s are about one fi fth. On a per capita basis, however, India’s emissions 
were 5 percent and China’s 25 percent of United States levels. If India and China reduced 
emissions by 20 percent over the next 50 years (a period in which their per capita 
incomes are likely to grow to advanced-country levels) and the United States reduced 
emissions by 80 percent, then China and India’s per capita emissions would be roughly 
equal and 20 percent of the United States levels, respectively.
Emissions in China and India as percentage of United States levels
Total CO2 
emissions
Per capita 
emissions
Per 
capita 
GDP
Per capita emissions 
80% reduction in 
United States and 
20% in China and India
India (% of 
United States)
20 5 2 20
China (% of 
United States)
100 25 6 100
6.12.3 Carbon Intensity in Selected Countries* 
Industrialized countries produce much less CO2 than developing countries per unit of 
output. This refl ects more effi cient technology, the production mix, and, possibly, energy 
costs, which tend to be more highly subsidized in developing countries. 
Countries Output
United States 0.46
European Union 0.29
Japan 0.19
China 1.67
India 1.30
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2007.
*Gigatons of CO2 emissions per trillion United States dollars of GDP.
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2007.
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6.12.4 The Magnitude of the Challenge
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has assessed that a relatively 
safe level of CO2 emissions globally is 14.5 gigatons per year, which comes out to 2.25 
metric tons per person per year. The table below from the United Nations Human 
Development Report (2007) shows the per capita emissions for major industrial 
countries. World carbon emissions are now at about two times the safe level, meaning 
that if the current output is sustained, the CO2 stock in the atmosphere will rise above 
safe levels in the next 40 years.
Global carbon footprints at OECD levels would require more than one planeta
CO2 emissions per 
capita (t CO2) 2004
Equivalent global CO2 
emissions (Gt CO2) 2004
b
Equivalent number of sustainable 
carbon budgetsc
Worldd 4.5 29 2
Australia 16.2 104 7
Canada 20.0 129 9
France 6.0 39 3
Germany 9.8 63 4
Italy 7.8 50 3
Japan 9.9 63 4
Netherlands 8.7 56 4
United Kingdom 9.8 63 4
United States 20.6 132 9
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2007, calculations based on Indicator Table 24.
a. As measured in sustainable carbon budgets.
b. Refers to global emissions if every country in the world emitted at the same per capita level as the specifi ed country.
c. Based on a sustainable emissions pathway of 14.5 Gt CO2 per year.
d. Current global carbon footprint.
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6.12.5 Concentrations of Particulate Matter and Sulfur Dioxide
In addition to the global environment, developing countries also have to deal with local 
environmental challenges. Particularly in urban areas, air pollution can be the cause of 
severe respiratory diseases, and children are most at risk. Water pollution and the 
availability of water is another daunting challenge.
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Glossary
Agglomeration: The geographical clustering of economic activity.
Agglomeration Externalities: The benefi ts of clustering—such as the ready 
availability of a pool of skilled workers—for which fi rms do not pay. 
Budget defi cit: What results when a government spends more than it can 
raise in revenues.
Capital Account: Countries record their economic transactions with other 
nations in a national ledger called the balance of payments. The capital 
account is the part of this ledger where they record cross-border trade 
in assets—such as bonds or shares. It thus tracks the fl ow of capital into 
and out of the country.
Catch-Up: The process by which less developed economies tend to grow 
at faster rates than industrialized economies because they can replicate 
modern economies’ production methods, institutions, and technologies 
rather than developing them from scratch.
Clean Development Mechanism: An arrangement under the Kyoto Proto-
col (which came into force in 2005) that allows industrialized countries 
to invest in reducing emissions in developing countries as an alternative 
to reducing them in their own countries. 
Creative Destruction: A phrase popularized by the economist Joseph 
Schumpeter. In his vision of capitalism, entrepreneurs enter markets with 
new products and production techniques that create value even as they 
destroy the worth of existing companies.
Current Account: Like the capital account (see above), the current account 
is part of a country’s balance of payments, recording its transactions 
with the rest of the world. The current account records earnings from 
exports; expenditures on imports; unilateral transfers, such as migrant 
remittances; and the net income the country earns from its net holdings 
of foreign assets. Thus, while the purchase of a foreign bond would be 
recorded in the capital account, the interest received on that bond would 
be recorded in the current account.
Current-Account Defi cit: A country runs a current-account defi cit when its 
current receipts from the rest of the world fall short of its current pay-
ments to it. In other words it receives less income from its exports of 
foreign assets than it must pay to other countries to import their goods, 
or to service its foreign debt. To run a current-account defi cit, a country 
must borrow from the rest of the world, or must sell assets. 
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Economic Diversifi cation: Creating a variety of new economic activities 
and industries—implying that the share of traditional sectors, typically 
agriculture, goes down.  
Foreign Direct Investment: Capital infl ows from outside the country that 
create or add to company assets, such as plant and equipment. An impor-
tant feature of these fl ows is that they are not readily reversible, unlike 
some fi nancial fl ows.
Gini Coeffi cient:  A measure of income inequality, which ranges from 
zero (everyone has the same income) to one (one person receives all the 
income). Most countries for which there are estimates have Gini coef-
fi cients between 0.25 (Sweden in 2000) and 0.59 (Brazil in 2001).
Global Imbalances: The current worldwide pattern of saving and spending, 
which is marked by excess saving in Asia and the Middle East and excess 
spending in America. These patterns result in large current-account sur-
pluses in Asia and the Middle East and a big current-account defi cit in 
America. 
Import Substitution: A government policy that attempts to replace imports 
with domestically produced goods.
Industrial Policies: Any government regulation or spending that aims to 
promote a particular industry or fi rm. In developing countries, industrial 
policies are often intended to encourage export diversifi cation whereas 
in industrialized countries they are intended to push forward the techno-
logical frontier.
Infl ation Targeting: An approach to central banking in which a target rate 
of infl ation is announced, and the central bank then attempts to steer 
actual infl ation toward the target using interest rates and other tools.
Labor surplus: Where the labor provided is in excess of the labor necessary 
to carry out an activity.
Market Incentives: The incentive to increase profi table activities and 
decrease unprofi table ones, based on the demand for goods and services 
and the cost of providing them.
Mitigation: Reduction in the severity of adverse conditions. In the context 
of global warming, mitigation refers to cuts in the emission of green-
house gases, or to other, offsetting measures that reduce the amount of 
warming for a given concentration of greenhouse gases.
Resource Mobility: The ease with which labor and capital move from 
industry to industry, or region to region.
Resource Rents: The surplus value of natural resources, such as oil, after all 
costs have been accounted for.
Static Analysis:  Investigating the properties of an economy or market “at 
rest,” when market forces are in a settled equilibrium. The analysis usu-
ally proceeds by changing one or more variables, while assuming that 
underlying parameters remain the same and ignoring the path taken from 
the initial situation to the amended one. For example, a static analysis 
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might compare the production costs of a small fi rm to those of a larger 
fi rm, assuming that tastes and technology remained the same.
Structural Diversifi cation: A major change in a country’s economy that 
involves extending economic activities into different fi elds. This may 
involve the reform or creation of new economic institutions.
Structural Transformation: A fundamental shift in a country’s methods of 
economic organization, such as the reallocation of labor, physical, and 
human capital among agriculture, manufacturing, and services indus-
tries. This involves the addition of activities and the removal of other 
activities that are no longer economically viable or profi table.
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